Office of the Historian

780.5/5–1454

No. 209
Paper Prepared in the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State1

secret
Washington, May 3, 1954.

OIR Contribution to NIE 30–54: Middle East Defense

conclusions

1.
Prospects for the development of effective defense of the Middle East against a major aggressor are only slightly more favorable now than in 1951 and 1952, the dates of the unsuccessful MEC and MEDO proposals.
2.
The Turk-Pakistani agreement providing for defense consultation as an initial step toward regional defense, attempts to overcome one obstacle to previous attempts to set up regional defense—namely, an over-emphasis on Western initiative and direction. In addition, the possibility of substantial MDAP assistance without ostensible “strings” offers a new feature in the situation since all of the states in the area desire to improve or expand their military establishments. Despite these potentially favorable factors, however, there 0are serious obstacles to be surmounted before a wider regional defense system can be brought into being.
3.
Iran and Afghanistan are unlikely to risk joining any Middle East defense arrangement until it has shown sufficient strength to provide them immediately with a fair degree of protection.
4.
The adherence of Iraq to the Turk-Pakistani pact is problematic since it depends on the strength and nature of internal as well as external opposition, with time apparently working to reduce the prospect of adherence. An important variable, however, will be the timing, scope and nature of MDAP assistance.
5.
Egyptian support for the purposes of the Turk-Pakistani agreement will depend on the outcome of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations respecting the Suez base. If these negotiations are successful, Egypt’s policy will probably be favorable to the general purposes of the Turk-Pakistani arrangement, particularly if Western military assistance were provided to Egypt.
6.
The willingness of other Arab states to adhere to the Turk-Pakistani agreement will depend on the attitudes of both Iraq and Egypt. If either Iraq or Egypt should be favorable and the other unfavorable, the situation with respect to the other Arab countries would be difficult to assess; fears of Israel would increase, Arab balance of power rivalries would be intensified, and united Arab response could hardly be expected.
7.
Whatever success may attend efforts to bring about a regional defense grouping on the Turk-Pakistani pattern, prospects for a tighter defense organization, with planning and coordinating functions and perhaps a combined command, are not likely to become more favorable unless there is a reduction of the basic incompatibilities of Western and Middle Eastern political objectives, and in particular a lessening of the tensions between the Western powers and the Middle East states which arise from the Anglo-Egyptian and Anglo-Iranian disputes and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Other rivalries and tensions in the area also present serious, though not necessarily insuperable, obstacles to the successful operation of a regional defense arrangement of this more effective nature. Such an arrangement could probably gain force and effectiveness only as a consequence of an enlarged direct political and military assistance role of the US and continued US/UK cooperation. France would play only a marginal role in these defense arrangements, although it would expect to be consulted. The UK, with its special treaty rights and positions, would be extremely vigilant in protecting its regional interests and would seek to reconcile the purposes of any regional arrangement with these interests.

  1. The source text was the first section of a 40-page paper prepared in OIR. No drafter was listed on the text. The rest of the paper consisted of sections on the background of a Middle East defense organization, the attitudes of other states toward adherence to the Turkish-Pakistan agreement, the prospects for development of a formal regional defense organization, the probable attitudes of other countries toward a formal regional defense organization, and the probable consequences of developments in Middle East defense.

    The “conclusions” section was attached to a memorandum by Fritzlan to Hart, dated May 14, not printed (780.5/5–1454), which disagreed with a number of statements in the paper. For a more formal statement of disagreement, see the paper approved by the Chiefs of Mission Conference at Istanbul, May 14, entitled “Conference Statement on Middle East Defense Commenting on OIR Contribution to NIE 30–54, May 3, 1954,” Document 212. NIE 30–54, June 22, is printed as Document 215.

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