Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

120.4382/5–1454

No. 211
Paper Approved by the Chiefs of Mission Conference at Istanbul, May 11-14, 1954¹

top secret

Istanbul, May 11–14, 1954.

Conference Conclusions on Regional Security in the Middle East

In preparing the suggestions set forth below, the Conference considered it unnecessary to dwell on the basic considerations responsible for its belief that the erection by the countries of the Middle East of a strong regional security structure would be in the interest of the United States. It has assumed that the interested US Governmental agencies are already well informed in this respect. It might be pointed out, nevertheless, that the participants of the Conference are convinced that it is one of the objectives of the Soviet Union to bring the Middle East behind the Iron Curtain and that the Soviet Union is constantly maneuvering with the purpose of facilitating the attainment of this objective; that it is desirable that the people of the Middle East should have confidence that there is a possibility of preventing the Soviet Union from obtaining control of the area; and that the loss of the Middle East to the Soviet Union would represent a major catastrophe to the free world.

1. It is the consensus of the Conference that a regional defense arrangement among the nations forming the so-called “Northern Tier”—that is, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey—would strengthen materially the security and stability of the Middle East, and would therefore be in the interest of the free world and in the national interest of the US.

2. The Conference, therefore, welcomes the arrangements which are being entered into between Turkey and Pakistan as a first step in the formation of the “Northern Tier.”

3. The Conference is hopeful that the agreement entered into recently between the US and Iraq, under which the US under certain conditions is to furnish military assistance to Iraq, will tend to encourage Iraq to become a member of the “Northern Tier”. The Conference believes that it would be a mistake for the US to bring pressure on Iraq to apply for admission into such regional security arrangements at this time; it is thought that it would be preferable for Iraq to consult with Turkey and Pakistan and then to decide for itself the course it should take.

4. It is the understanding of the Conference that, although Iran is convinced that its own security and that of the area would be strengthened if its defense could be coordinated with that of Pakistan, Iraq and Turkey, Iran does not believe it would be useful for it to enter into a regional security arrangement with these countries until it possesses armed forces capable of contributing to the defense of itself and to that of the area. The Conference, therefore, recommends that the US give consideration to assisting Iran within the shortest possible period to reorganize and strengthen its armed forces to such an extent that they would have defense capabilities. This assistance should be in the form of carefully selected matériel, highly concentrated training, advice with regard to organization and placing of Iranian armed forces and with regard to shifting of certain Iranian arsenals and supply bases to areas where they might be best defended from Soviet invading forces. The Conference also recommends that until the Iranian budgetary position is substantially improved, the military supplies and advisers be furnished on a grant basis and the US pay the cost of the additional training necessary to convert the present flaccid Iranian armed forces into cohesive hard-hitting military units.

5. The Conference is of the opinion that with the formation of a “Northern Tier,” an already isolated Afghanistan might become more attractive to Soviet aggressors, and also might become more susceptible to Soviet influence. It therefore recommends that the US make special efforts to bring about a closer association between Afghanistan and the members of the “Northern Tier”, particularly Pakistan and Iran. It further recommends that efforts be made to exploit the indicated desire of Afghanistan for military assistance in such a manner as to encourage it to stand up to Soviet pressure and that Afghanistan be given to understand that the eventual receipt by it of grant US military aid must be linked with its willingness to collaborate in matters of regional defense with the countries of the “Northern Tier”. In this connection study might be given to the possibility of ameliorating the hostility between Pakistan and Afghanistan growing out of the Pushtoonistan dispute by using Pakistan as a channel for extending military and economic assistance to Afghanistan. It is also suggested that consideration be given to the possibility that, in view of the strong ties existing between Turkey and Afghanistan, the former be urged to play a positive role in improving Afghan-Pakistan relations.

6. It is the consensus of the Conference that if the Arab countries lying behind the “Northern Tier”—that is, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan—should later individually or collectively ask to participate in this regional security arrangement, it would be in the interest of the US for such request or requests to be considered sympathetically. It was the general belief of those attending the Conference, however, that the US at this stage should not endeavor to encourage or discourage these Arab countries to make such requests. It should not encourage them because in the opinion of the Conference it might be preferable, at least in the initial stages of the organization, for the “Northern Tier” to be limited to the four countries mentioned in paragraph 1. If, without prompting from the US one or more Arab countries should ask to join the “Northern Tier” and be rejected, this might create friction harmful to area security. Requests should be examined, therefore, in the light of all the factors involved at the time.

7. The Conference acknowledges that support of the “Northern Tier” by Syria, Lebanon and Jordan would constitute a defense contribution to strengthen the area. Accordingly, the Conference would favor the extension at an appropriate later date of military aid to these states dependent upon their willingness and ability to participate in the defense of the region.

It is the understanding of the Conference that Lebanon, which has no alternative except that of siding with the West, is considering the advisability of following Iraq’s example and making a request in the near future for grant military assistance in anticipation that its action would probably lead to participation in some form of regional defense arrangement. It appears that any contribution of Lebanon would be limited to its extensive airfield and to its ports.

It is considered possible that Syria might at some moment desire to participate in this regional security arrangement if it could obtain grant military aid thereby. It is believed that it would have little to contribute other than lines of access, air bases and ports.

Whether or not Jordan should desire to enter into the security arrangement would depend to a large extent upon the attitude of its ally, Great Britain, which is financing Jordan and supplying its military needs.

The Conference believed that Libya because of its strategic air bases and increasingly close ties with Turkey could make an appropriate contribution to the security arrangements of the area. It was considered probable that Libya would wish to join any defense arrangement including the Arab countries that offered the prospect of economic or military grant aid in return for the use of its base facilities.

8. The Conference recommends that negotiations be continued between Saudi Arabia and the US for the purpose of strengthening present arrangements (Dhahran Air Base Agreement and Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement for the extension of cash reimbursable military aid, both signed June 18, 1951)² for the extension by the US to Saudi Arabia of assistance in the organizing and equipping of Saudi Arabian armed forces capable of maintaining internal security. The expenses involved should continue to be borne by Saudi Arabia with the exception of the cost of the training and with the added exception that “training aid” should be furnished without cost by the US. The Conference was of the opinion that Saudi Arabia would not be able to make any contributions to the security of the area beyond maintaining internal stability, including protection of ARAMCO installations and personnel, and furnishing airfields and rear lines of communication.

9. The Conference noted that Egypt is likely to be displeased at the concept of a “Northern Tier”. Egypt will resent any Middle East arrangement in which it does not play a leading role. Egypt regards itself as indispensable to the defense of the Arab world. It is the view of the Conference that on appropriate occasions it be made clear to Egypt that the “Northern Tier” concept does not reduce the importance of Egypt, especially from the point of view of bases, communications and manpower. It is in the US interest that nothing in the “Northern Tier” concept should derogate from the US program to strengthen Egypt by military and economic assistance, to establish Egypt firmly on the side of the West, and to associate Egypt in some manner in the defense of the area. Such a program contemplates an early Anglo-Egyptian settlement.

10. It is the consensus of the Conference that if the “Northern Tier” concept is to have success in promoting the security of the Middle East and South Asia it must have the support of the British Government. It is the understanding of the Conference that the British Government has certain reservations regarding this concept and in particular is not enthusiastic about the inclusion of Iran. The Conference expressed the hope that as the result of political and military conversations with the British in the near future British doubts will be resolved, and that continued US and UK cooperation will be assured.

11. The Conference understands that Israel presently has the most capable military force in the Middle East outside of Turkey with a potential five divisions based on some 57,000 regular personnel and 145,000 trained reserves. As a result, Israel is at present able to defend itself against any likely combination of Arab states. If at an appropriate later date a program of arms aid to the Arab states should be instituted, it is believed that such aid will not materially change this power relationship for a considerable period after its initiation. It is also believed that a program of arms aid to Israel at the present time would result in Arab refusal to cooperate in measures designed to strengthen area defense. A program of military grant aid to Israel is therefore not now recommended. An arms aid program of the nature envisaged in the preceding paragraphs, however, might result in the danger that the arms would at some later time be used by the Arab states against Israel and will certainly give rise to fears by Israel of such a danger. To meet both the danger and the fear the Conference recommends:

(a) that Arab states contiguous to Israel be informed in discussions with them concerning possible arms aid that the Government of the US must be in a position publicly to state that the assurances which it had received from the Arab states not to use such arms for aggressive purposes were applicable to all countries, including Israel;

(b) that the US, the UK and France make public declarations of their intention to take specified economic and military sanctions to prevent the occupation by either Israel or the Arab states of territory of the other;

(c) that indirect and unattributed publicity be given to the fact that the contemplated scope, character and phasing of aid would not be such as to constitute a danger of their use for aggressive purposes.

1. Loy Henderson, assisted by Burton Berry and G. Lewis Jones, drafted this paper after a discussion of the topic by the participants at the Chiefs of Mission Conference at Istanbul, and it became Annex A to the Summary Record of the Conference. (120.4382/5–1454) For details of the Conference, see the editorial note, supra.
2. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. V, pp. 1017 ff.