Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean, Volume VIII

768.5/9–1652: Telegram

No. 652
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia¹

top secret
niact

Washington, September 17, 1952—7:06 p.m.

394. No distribution outside Dept. Eyes only Chief of Mission and senior mil attaché. Deptel 393.² You are instructed inform Eden of US position along fol lines:

1. Dept regrets that for reasons indicated previous tels dipl approach for initiation strategic talks cld not have taken place before Eden visit Belgrade despite Yugo note on Trieste and Tito’s Sept. 14 speech.

2. In view change Brit and Fr position however this impossible nor is it now feasible endeavor obtain agreement for Eden to make approach on behalf three powers (Belgrade tel 367³).

3. We continue feel Eden shld discuss Trieste problem with Tito along broad lines set forth Deptel 1617 to London, 332 to Belgrade.³ However we strongly disagree with Eden proposal to modify this approach in such fashion as directly to link proposed mil talks with Yugo concessions on Trieste. In considering this relationship US Govt has from start considered that progress re Trieste and proposals re mil coop shld fol separate and parallel courses and not become conditionally related in such fashion as possibly to jeopardize favorable results in either sphere. We have been guided by principle on one hand that it was imperative for reasons of over-all West defense to accomplish our joint mil purposes without permitting polit issues to interfere and principle on other hand that we continue to make clear to Tito that our desire for mil coop does not detract from importance we attach to ultimate solution Trieste question. We believe that efforts to create a conditional relationship between proposed mil talks and Trieste problem rest in part on erroneous assumption that mil talks wld result only in net profit to Tito whereas in fact it is greatly in interest of three powers that after two years of delay we get down to concrete discussions with Tito in mil sphere.

4. We therefore feel that in discussing Trieste question Eden shld avoid any ref to Tito’s statement to Nash⁴ since this wld seriously jeopardize ultimate realization our joint purpose re desirability in terms of over-all West defense of purely mil talks with Yugo. Eden will recall in this connection that it is Tito’s overture to Nash which is to be basis for tripartite dipl approach for mil talks. If Tito shld on his own initiative raise question mil talks, we hope that Eden will also avoid creating impression we are linking Trieste in conditional relationship such talks.

5. We believe that success thus far achieved by West in developing mutually helpful relations with Tito regime has been made possible by our careful avoidance of polit pressure. Tito’s recent speech and his present frame of mind as reported ur 372⁵ emphasize delicacy of present situation this particular respect and represent additional reasons why kind of approach Eden proposes make wld in all probability evoke negative response and might well put off indefinitely any hopes of achieving either solution of Trieste problem or progress in mil coop field.

6. In light of foregoing we believe that no approach re initiating strategic talks shld be made during Eden’s visit but we hope nothing will occur during his visit which would prejudice our initiating such talks within week or ten days after his departure.

Acheson

1. Drafted by Thurston and Barbour, cleared with Byington and Perkins, and signed personally by Acheson. Sent also to Paris and London and repeated for information to Moscow, Athens, Rome, and Ankara eyes only Chiefs of Mission and senior military attachés.
2. Supra.
3. Not printed. (750G.00/9–552)
3. Not printed. (750G.00/9–552)
4. Tito’s discussion with Nash at Brdo on July 14 is described in Document 645.
5. Not printed. (768.11/9–1652)