The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in
393. No distribution outside Dept. Eyes only Chief of Mission and senior mil attache.
Fol is substance msg from Eden dlvd Dept late last night and discussed in Depts immed fol tel:2
- “View atmosphere created by Yugo note on Trieste3 and Tito’s 14 Sept speech4 I now convinced tripartite approach to Tito today or tomorrow wld be mistake.
- Though before recent developments I believed early approach wld be helpful, under present circumstances Tito wld inevitably conclude that three Western powers had made great effort make approach prior to my visit. . . . I do not believe two questions can be kept separate. Tito wld not permit us do so.
- West powers must also take Ital-Yugo relations into consideration. . . .
- I much prefer delay approach until results my visit known. I suggest that I might instead remind Tito of voluntary statement to Nash . . . . FYI in Secy’s msg phrase actually used was “ultimate reality and substance.”
Brit Emb informed Dept Eden had discussed above with Schuman who had “independently and firmly” reached same conclusion and agreed that Eden shld broach subj to Tito in sense of above discussion. Eden instructed Brit Emb here to suggest that Dept inform him through US Amb Belgrade whether—as he hopes—it agrees with his position.
- Drafted by Marcy, cleared with Perkins, and signed personally by Acheson. Sent also to Paris and London and repeated for information to Moscow, Athens, Rome, and Ankara eyes only Chiefs of Mission and senior military attachés.↩
- Telegram 394 to Belgrade, infra.↩
- The text of the Yugoslav reply of Sept. 11 to the tripartite aide-mémoire regarding Trieste was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 329 from Belgrade, Sept. 12. (750G.00/9–1152)↩
- A summary of Tito’s speech on Sept. 14 before a group of Slovene partisans, in which he stated that Yugoslavia’s position on Trieste would remain unchanged, was transmitted in telegram 364 from Belgrade, Sept. 15. (768.11/9–1552)↩