The Ambassador in Yugoslavia (Allen) to the Department of State1
380. Eyes only Chief of Mission and senior military attaché. I have just read to Eden Deptel 394, September 17.2 He is inclined to [Page 1311]think subject of military coop will inevitably come up in one form or another during his talks here but he will not force the issue, and if and when question arises, he will make no mention of fact that three powers are contemplating tripartite approach on this subj, will not refer to Tito’s conv with Nash, and will carefully avoid making Trieste settlement a condition for mil aid or cooperation. He feels he must refer to obvious fact that improved relations between Yugo and Italy would make any plans for military cooperation in this area more effective, that supply lines to Yugo must come through Italy, etc. I said this would not run counter to statement already made to Tito but I believed Dept was primarily concerned lest Tito gain impression that military cooperation with Yugo was conditioned on Trieste settlement. He assured me he had no intention of giving such impression and was quite satisfied with statement in Secy’s letter to him3 that whatever mil plans may be made under present circumstances would lack ultimate reality in substance.
Eden did not conceal some annoyance on first reading of Deptel 394, particularly since Schuman is pressing him to make conditions re Trieste. He exclaimed, jokingly but with some seriousness, “What am I here for? I may as well go home.” However, Dixon and Cheatham joined Brit Amb and me in pointing out that Brit and US positions are not far apart. We both agree that questions re Trieste and mil cooperation should follow separate and parallel courses and that pol pressure should be voided. Conv ended in thoroughly friendly atmosphere.