Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/3–2354: Telegram

No. 674
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Bonn, March 23, 1954—6 p.m.

2950. Reference: Deptel 4771 to London, repeated Bonn 2576, Paris 3193.² Recent developments on Saar also lead us to believe that moment is ripe for considering prompt mediation by UK–US if Adenauer on his return³ should bog down in Saar negotiations with Bidault. Despite apparent willingness Chancellor and his immediate advisers to accept solution along general lines of Van Naters’ plan, French and German negotiators have recently drawn further apart. Blankenhorn–Poncet conversations unfruitful; and parliamentary opposition to reasonable Saar settlement hardening. This marked by Gerstenmaier’s refusal to vote for moderate proposal re Saar political liberties in London meeting and increasingly strong assertions by FDP and DP politicians against giving up Saar as German territory. As impression grows here that French have taken step backward and are in effect insisting on Saar as reparations, German willingness to compromise diminishes. We believe Chancellor can still achieve Saar settlement along Van Naters plan lines but will be unable to agree settlement which appears in German eyes as reparation payment to France. French attitude on economic questions strike Germans as implying just that.

Paris telegram to Department 3457 March 21⁴ indicated that French may very shortly call upon US and UK to back up French position on Saar. We believe US–UK position should be one of mediation—not support for either side—and heartily concur Department’s analysis of Saar problem contained in Deptel to Bonn 2576. Van Naters’ plan represents reasonable middle ground. Its compromise on interim status under CE supervision and on status of Saar representation in European organizations seem maximum political concessions Bundestag ready to make. We believe Germans will accept Naters’ recommendation on currency. Plan recognizes legitimacy of German insistence on step-by-step access to Saar market and yet provide reasonable safeguards to protect French financial stability; which should be sufficiently far reaching to satisfy legitimate French fears. Proviso in Blankenhorn’s draft⁵ that Germans should in two years be on equal terms with French in Saar market is negotiable according to Blankenhorn. (See ourtel 2883, repeated Paris 570, London 469 and letter from Steere to Morris March 17 forwarding Blankenhorn draft.⁶)

With regard to German support of Saar settlement at Peace Treaty Adenauer has often made and surely would be ready to repeat assurances along lines of Deptel 4771 to London, numbered paragraph 7.

Although Gerstenmaier is insisting that political liberties in Saar be introduced at once, we believe plan for abolishing licensing parties and restoring full political liberties for six months before referendum and after adoption of Saar plan by interested European powers could be sold to Chancellor and majority Bundestag.

We also agree with reference Deptel that advisable to postpone settlement problem of sequestration property, particularly steel mills until later. Time too short for such complicated problem.

We believe proviso making Saar settlement conditional upon ratification EDC is reverse of coin to French insistence Saar settlement sine qua non for French ratification of EDC and we should support Germans this point.

Conant

1. Repeated to Paris and London.
2. Document 671.
3. Chancellor Adenauer had not returned from his trip to Greece, Turkey, and Italy.
4. Telegram 3457 reported that Schumann had told Dillon that the Franco-German talks on the Saar were going very badly and that the time might soon come when the French would have to ask for U.S.–U.K. help in the negotiations. (762.022/3–2154)
5. Regarding this draft, see Coled 190 and telegram 2883, supra and Document 672.
6. Telegram 2883, Document 672. The letter from Steere to Morris has not been found in Department of State files.