Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/3–1754: Telegram

No. 672
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Bonn, March 17, 1954—7 p.m.

2883. Blankenhorn informed us today that his discussions on Saar with Francois-Poncet yesterday took an unfavorable and discouraging turn. His previous talk March 12 which had largely dealt with economic matters had been encouraging. Poncet had seemed to accept German thesis that Germany should receive step-by-step access to common Saar market. On strength of this talk, Blankenhorn and his colleagues had prepared for yesterday’s meeting a German draft setting out Federal Republic ideas of Saar agreement.

Upon meeting Poncet yesterday and presenting German draft,² he was told by Poncet that latter was unable to talk on basis of German draft and must return to Bidault draft handed Adenauer on March 9.³ Blankenhorn stated that it was perfectly clear that Poncet had received new instructions because he was obviously discouraged and embarrassed and left most of discussion to Berard. Blankenhorn said he was satisfied that Maurice Schumann had been sent to Bonn on Monday (following Paris receipt of Poncet’s report of March 12 discussions) for express purpose of giving Poncet new Saar instructions and, incidentally, something like a reprimand for departing from Bidault draft.

Poncet and Berard together took line that it was impossible for France to give up economic privileges it now enjoys in Saar because they were necessary if France was to maintain anything like a position of economic parity with Germany. Blankenhorn said he was not able to make any progress in discussion although eventually they did get around to giving over German draft. Big obstacle was matter of economic concessions. There were other points but Blankenhorn thought them minor in relation to the economic and also negotiable.

Yesterday’s discussions were so unproductive that Blankenhorn felt necessity of sending Thierfelder⁴ to Paris at once to inform Bruce. He expressed view that it might not be possible to make much progress until return of Chancellor, who incidentally is stopping over in Rome to meet Scelba⁵ and arriving in Bonn March 27.

Blankenhorn expressed some skepticism as to how useful it might be in circumstances for Germans to agree Van Naters’ report at London meeting March 19–20.⁶ We expressed view to him that Federal Republic would be on solid ground in so doing.

As for Brussels meeting, Blankenhorn said Federal Republic would follow French wishes. If France felt need for postponement because of situation in Paris, Germans would agree. He assumed, however, Chancellor would, in case of postponement Brussels meeting, seek opportunity for early meeting with Bidault regarding Saar.

Conant

1. Repeated to Paris and London.
2. A copy of this 23-paragraph draft together with an amended proposal dated Mar. 16 was transmitted in telegram 3584 from Paris, Mar. 29, in both the French and English texts. (762.022/3–2954)
3. Regarding the Mar. 9 meeting and Bidault’s draft, see telegram 3277, Document 667.
4. Rudolf Thierfelder, expert on the Saar in the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany.
5. Mario Scelba, Italian Prime Minister.
6. A meeting of the Special Subcommittee of the General Affairs Committee of the Council of Europe was scheduled to be held in London, Mar. 19–21.