Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/3–2554: Telegram

No. 675
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Bonn, March 25, 1954—6 p.m.

2980. 1. I note from Paris messages that Maurice Schumann persists in his representations that French Government cannot recede from position stated in his memorandum of March 8² on Saar settlement without meeting serious parliamentary and public opposition and that representatives of Federal Republic are showing themselves intransigent and unreasonable during these negotiations.

It appears that press and parliamentary opinion in France widely welcomed Council of Europe proposals for Saar settlement as important diplomatic victory for France and urged French Government to take this opportunity for settlement of this question. At same time Chancellor past few months has made one concession after another until now German position as defined in latest Blankenhorn memorandum is very close to that of Council of Europe report.³ In my view the Foreign Office has now gone so far that the Chancellor will need all his prestige to sell Blankenhorn proposal to Bundestag. While popular interest in the Saar question apparently not great in either France or Germany, it must be realized that the Chancellor is facing politically more explosive situation than French Government since he will have to defend surrender of Saar. Furthermore, separation of Saar from Germany will be attacked here as weakening Germany’s claims to eastern territories regardless of legal merits this contention. Evolution of German position should give French Government good reason to believe that it can obtain a final settlement which will meet its basic objectives with regard to the Saar and will be supported by French Parliament and French public.

2. On basis of the latest paper submitted by Blankenhorn to Francois-Poncet the following points could be presented by the French Government to the French Chamber of Deputies as major German concessions:

a. Saar territory is to be severed from Germany and become European.

b. Saar is to be autonomous and self-governing in its internal affairs.

c. Saar is to be represented separately in European assemblies and Council of Ministers.

d. Number of French deputies in European assemblies is to be equal to number of German deputies and Saar is to be represented separately by its own deputies with full rights.

e. Referendum on European statute is to take place without prior Saar landtag elections in which pro-German parties would be permitted to campaign.

f. European statute on Saar as integral part of Saar constitution and as an international treaty would be unchangeable except by agreement of all parties concerned.

g. Saar experts are to be permitted to participate in drafting statute.

h. Territory to be Europeanized is to come only from Germany.

i. Franco-Saar conventions to be recognized by being incorporated in whole or in part in European settlement.

j. Franco-Saar monetary union to be recognized by having French franc only legal tender in Saar for indefinite future.

k. Free movement of goods, currency and population between France and Saar to be retained intact.

l. Federal Republic given only gradual access to Saar trade and finance (this assumes two years asked by Blankenhorn is to be either extended or eliminated and made indefinite in time as in Council of Europe report) and safeguards provided lest this settlement be misused for economic transactions between Federal Republic and France to French disadvantage. Also consideration given to protective needs for individual branches Saar economy.

m. Treaty to provide for such measures as may be necessary in case French balance of payment seriously jeopardized as result of reorganization of Saar economic relations.

n. Germany is to be excluded from ownership of Saar mines, which are former German state property.

o. German steel mills and financial institutions are to remain under sequestration in the Saar until after EDC ratification at least.

In addition, Adenauer is willing to agree that Saar coal and steel production is to continue to count with French coal and steel production in European Coal and Steel Community.

Furthermore, French Government can point out to French Chamber that US and UK for first time would take definite commitment giving satisfaction to French demands on Saar dating back to four-power negotiations in Moscow in 1947 by supporting this Saar settlement and by committing themselves to present settlement at peace treaty negotiations.

On his side the Chancellor would have to seek Bundestag and popular support by presenting the following French concessions (some of which have not yet been finally made).

a. European settlement is to be valid only if EDC treaty ratified.

b. Saar settlement is to be eventually in framework of European community of six, thus promising that Saar will become a real European territory under real European institutions and that Germany, progressively as European community develops, will have an equal voice in control of Saar and equal access to it.

c. Germany is to have concessions on trade in near future (this assumes Bidault’s suggestion of freeing trade with limits to transshipment is put forward by France). Thus Saar will be Europeanized economically as well as politically by step-by-step access to Saar economy for Federal Republic (this point absolutely essential to achieve political acceptance of Saar solution by placing Chancellor in position to claim Saar solution is a step toward Europeanization rather than sell out to France).

d. Pro-German parties are to be free to participate in referendum and afterwards in Saar elections.

e. French and Federal Republic are to propose Saar as seat of European institutions.

f. All-German Government will be free to decide on Saar settlement at peace treaty negotiations.

g. German character and culture of Saar fully safeguarded.⁵

Conant

1. Repeated to London and Paris.
2. Presumably the proposal referred to in telegram 3277, Document 667.
3. Regarding Blankenhorn’s memorandum, see telegram 2883, Document 672.
5. On Mar. 26 Dillon reported that he and Bruce concurred in this analysis (telegram 3556 from Paris, 762.022/3–2654), while the Embassy in London reported that the Foreign Office at the working level also agreed with the analysis. (Telegram 4183 from London, 762.022/3–2654)