Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762.022/3–1754: Telegram

No. 671
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

secret

Washington, March 17, 1954—11:11 a.m.

4771. Re series recent cables March 9 Saar meeting. In view key importance which Saar settlement now assumes in connection French ratification EDC and fact that agreed statement of principles must be reached in next Bidault–Adenauer meeting, believe time has come for US–UK to consider urgently what we can do to facilitate and ensure agreement.

London Embassy should therefore approach Foreign Office to outline our views as given below with view to working out promptly US–UK joint views on what appear to be remaining major differences between French and Germans and obtain agreement that our joint views be informally given to French and Germans in appropriate manner at time to be agreed. We believe such procedure essential to minimize risk next meeting may fail to reach settlement.

1. We consider both sides should accept Van Naters’ plan except where there are good reasons for specific variations.

2. Obviously some compromise essential between present French position that Saar be placed permanently under Council of Europe and German view that settlement can only be implemented when EPC created. We favor Van Naters’ recommendation that Council of Europe act pending creating EPC. French do not appear to have justified their solution, which would place Saar permanently under Council of Europe which we consider incapable of wielding effective executive authority. We also inclined agree with views expressed by Van Naters and Bruce that since developing six nation community is real kernel of European integration, its organs preferable from political and psychological viewpoint to supervise Saar. At same time we agree CSC not fully qualified and settlement cannot await creation EPC. We therefore believe both French and Germans should be persuaded accept Van Naters’ solution.

3. We are disturbed by latest French suggestion that Saar be given attributes sovereign state through voting membership various European bodies. This clearly inconsistent with basis on which Franco-German negotiations have been conducted since summer 1952. Such solution seems most unlikely secure Bundestag approval. Here again we believe Van Naters’ plan which gives Saar consultative but not voting status provides sound basis for agreement, particularly since French have failed justify departure therefrom. Therefore hope present French proposal only bargaining position which can be relinquished.

4. Re Saar currency, we agree Van Naters’ recommendation (French currency until European currency created) which we believe acceptable to French, and hope Germans will accept as well.

5. As in 1952, question of economic concessions to Germany still apparently one creating greatest difficulties. Here again we believe Van Naters’ plan represents desirable compromise. Department has always recognized necessity for Adenauer’s obtaining immediate practical benefits and Bidault’s concept lump sum amount for German-Saar free trade—when spelled out—should take care of this. In addition, we believe principle should be enunciated of progressive German economic equality in Saar. Believe that in practical application of agreement, difficulty comes in statement of principles as each side desires present opposite impression to parliaments. Hence Van Naters’ wording (paragraph 12) desirable as compromise.

6. We should like to go as far as possible in satisfying French desire for US–UK assurances of support for Saar settlement both at German peace conference and pending a peace treaty. As it is impossible for us to give guarantee without a formal treaty, we trust and have reason to believe from talks with French here² that statement along lines indicated below would serve purpose. Statement would be either unilateral or bilateral with UK after conclusion Franco-German agreement.

“The Governments of US and UK have noted with great satisfaction that the Foreign Minister of French Republic and Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany have reached an agreement as to a European status for the Saar. The Governments of the US and UK welcome this agreement pending the conclusion of a peace treaty or of a settlement in lieu thereof. On the assumption that the EDC as a step in the development of the European community is concluded, the Governments of the US and UK will undertake furthermore to propose and support the acceptance of this solution as final, both at the negotiations which precede such Treaty or settlement and in the implementation thereof. The Governments of the US and UK have an abiding interest in the effectiveness of this settlement of the status of the Saar. Accordingly, if this status should be threatened, the two Governments will consider it of such concern as to require consultation as to the proper measures to be taken.”

Such statement as foregoing would require congressional consultation and is set forth subject to results thereof.

As word “guarantee” contained in Van Naters’ proposal and French draft of Franco-German statement of principles, it should be made clear that US concept of its possible commitment on this point is limited to statement such as foregoing and we should leave it to French and Germans to draft and follow through on their bilateral statement accordingly, preferably by omission text their bilateral statement any reference to US–UK commitment which would be announced separately and consecutively.

7. Re German support for Saar settlement at peace treaty, believe best solution might be that suggested paragraph 3 B Coled 168 (repeated by Department to Bonn 2487, London 4538)³ to effect that while all-German government cannot be committed in advance, German people are committed to West and will therefore continue to support European integration in event of unification. We all agree Federal Republic cannot legally bind an all-German government at peace treaty and difficult to see how French can expect more.

8. While we share French desire to make Saar settlement as permanent as possible, we do not believe that there should be any restrictions on formation and activities of political parties so long as these activities are conducted peacefully and democratically. Therefore cannot support language used latest French proposal that parties “could not question the validity of the adopted statute.” Therefore believe Van Naters’ proposal which abolishes licensing of parties should be accepted by both sides. If French maintain this unacceptable, statement could omit any reference this point or provisions along lines language used last sentence paragraph 7 Coled 179 (repeated London 748, Bonn 669)⁴ could be included to effect once statute adopted cannot be modified unilaterally by Saar regardless of outcome any particular election.

9(a) We support Van Naters’ proposal that mine ownership be given to Saar and question of desequestration industrial property be postponed. (b) If former presents difficulty, it might also be postponed.

10. We note latest German proposal conditions settlement on EDC ratification, whereas neither Van Naters’ nor French proposal contains mention this subject nor reference cables. If Adenauer insists on this condition, we would support him as we believe our statement of support should contain same condition.

Foregoing views should presumably not be given in toto to both French and Germans. Paragraphs 3, 8, 9(b), 10 basically require French concessions from position advanced March 9 and hence should not be disclosed to Germans. Paragraph 4 for same reasons should not be disclosed to French. Believe other points should be made to both except text of US statement of support should not be disclosed to French or Germans until agreed US–UK statement has been subject of congressional consultation.

UK and your views on above and any other suggestions re how we might ensure success of next obviously critical Adenauer–Bidault meeting desired urgently.⁵

Dulles

1. Drafted by Morris and Blumberg of GER and Fisher of WE and cleared with Bonbright, MacArthur, Murphy, Merchant, Lyon, Tyler, RA, and L. Repeated to Bonn and Paris for Bruce and Dillon.
2. On Mar. 13 Daridan had discussed this question with Bonbright, stating that he was under instructions to seek U.S. agreement to the granting of a guarantee on the Saar. A memorandum of this conversation is in file 762.022/3–1354.
3. See footnote 4, Document 669.
4. Document 669.
5. On Mar. 18 the Embassy in London reported the complete approval of Hancock, the head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, with the general position outlined in this telegram and stated that once agreement was reached on the text of the joint statement, the British would be prepared to intervene. (Telegram 4010 from London, 762.022/3–1854)