762.0221/8–2952: Telegram
No. 560
The United States High Commissioner for
Germany (Donnelly) to the Department of
State1
914. I confess to considerable confusion as to our strategy with respect to Berlin. In attempting to clarify the sitn, I will first enumerate different courses of action which have been recommended.
It has been variously suggested that we:
- 1.
- Protest to Chuikov on closure of Rothensee shiplift.
- 2.
- Request Sov agmnt to system of prior consultation, and provision of alternate means of access, in event any line of communication to Berlin must be temporarily closed.
- 3.
- Seize and/or slow down Sov controlled barges in W Berlin and W Ger.
- 4.
- Propose to Sovs creation of Polish type corridor from Berlin to W Zones.
- 5.
- Submit problem to UN or World Court.
- 6.
- Impress our intentions upon Chuikov by personal démarche of three HICOMs.
My first reservation on these proposals is that I detect no planned order concerning our capabilities for, and operation of these moves. Secondly, we have no great confidence in efficacy of these measures, either individually or collectively (e.g., we share Berlin’s apprehension that seizure of East Zone barges might precipitate countermeasures disproportionately painful to us).
Our main difficulty now with respect to Berlin policy is lack of a full inventory of countermeasures. We have previously stated our opinion that measures we have in Ger are meager, and probably largely ineffective. (See ourtel 22, July 2 and Desp 3300, June 10 which we are now re-examining.2) We must also determine what resources we have outside Ger. Our info is that Dept’s exam of these is not yet completed.
Once we possess a full inventory of our retaliatory measures, we must turn to next problem, namely, degree of support for carrying them out which we can secure from non-Sov world. We are not sanguine on this score.… On broader issues being examined in Wash we are little more hopeful.
I do not believe we shld launch counteraction, beyond protest, until we have full assessment of our ammo and support. Particularly do I believe this because, while we cannot afford to be complacent, I see no signs of Berlin crisis being directly upon us.
I am reinforced in this view by a personal report from Gen Mathewson in which he stated that despite an active rumor campaign toward the end of July none of the threats materialized; that while there are indications the Sovs intend to split Berlin, it has not taken place, largely because of harm it wld bring E. Berlin and obstacles to making it effective; that city is still able cope with influx of refugees; that thousands had visited W Berlin from the Sov Zone for Katholikentag, in spite of many reports they wld be prevented from traveling; that econ activity in city, and flow of goods in and out of Berlin, are normal; and finally that there is no feeling of alarm in Berlin, though of course full awareness that sitn might deteriorate at any time.
[Page 1295]Since an immed crisis does not exist it follows that we still have time—altho this may be limited—in which to make coherent preparations for mtg threat to Berlin. I therefore intend to withdraw my proposal to allied HICOMs that we request prior consultation on transport stoppages, and await receipt of the Wash survey of countermeasure. With this in hand, I suggest that we try to prepare as orderly a plan of counteractions as changing sitn requires and permits.