Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–1754: Telegram

No. 494
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Embassy in Austria¹

secret priority

Berlin, February 17, 1954—2 a.m.

105. Re Secto 155.² No reason believe Soviets prepared retreat from basic insistence maintain troops in post-treaty Austria, although they may well produce proposal Thursday, making situation less unattractive Austrians. On other hand, believe Molotov’s tactics re 4 bis were not purely to gain time. Likely he will attempt maneuver Austrians into acceptance military neutrality in some form in treaty. Even should west refuse he will have established partial concession for use in future negotiations should he succeed with Austrians.

Regardless what tactics we develop here (we have dropped notion submitting alleviation plan until after conference) basic plan will be that west continues reject imposition neutrality on any nation to whom sovereignty being returned. Above all, no point discussing neutrality seriously so long as Soviets refuse withdraw proposal maintain forces in Austria after treaty.

Appreciate effectiveness your dealings with Raab Monday and hope you, and if so instructed other two HICOMs, can repeat performance stressing foregoing.³ Austrians obviously have little to lose in their view by accepting neutrality in treaty, and weight of argument should continue be that Soviet version Article 33 no matter how dressed up is unacceptable and that there is no point discussing neutrality question unless it is withdrawn.

1. Repeated to Washington, Paris, and London; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.
2. Document 491.
3. The “dealings” under reference have not been identified further, but presumably a meeting took place on Feb. 15 between Embassy officials and Raab during which proposals for the alleviation of conditions in Austria were discussed.