Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210: Telegram
No. 452
The United States
Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State1
Secto 114. Department pass OSD. Following is text of Secretary’s statement, 14th session, Foreign Ministers meeting, February 10:2
Mr. Dulles: Since Mr. Molotov has been kind enough to say that the United States can be an “observer”, I thought it would be in order to make some observations on his plan.
The proposals submitted are in two parts, one of which deals primarily with Germany and the other of which represents the draft of a proposed European treaty on collective security.3
The paper with reference to Germany contains the statement: “That we shall continue our efforts to seek a settlement of the German problem”, and that, of course, the United States is disposed to do.
Then the paper in its paragraph 2 goes on to repeat the proposal which has heretofore been made a number of times by the Soviet Union with reference to the withdrawal of so-called occupation forces from East and West Germany.
There is one translating question which I would like to raise. In paragraph 2(b) there is a reference to putting the occupation forces back in case security in Germany is threatened. The English text reads: “…4 In case the security of either part of Germany is threatened …” and I understand the Russian text reads: “… In case the security in either part of Germany is threatened …”. In other words, I interpret that paragraph 2(b) to relate to internal security, but I would be happy to have confirmation of that point from the Soviet delegation.
Mr. Molotov: I would ask you to be guided by the Russian text.
Mr. Dulles: That confirms my view, then, that the proposal with reference to Germany is substantially the same as heretofore submitted by the Soviet delegation.
It makes it relevant, therefore, only for me to repeat what has been said before by me and others around this table: That the proposal [Page 1025] would leave West Germany and consequently much of Western Europe exposed to any threat of external aggression.
A third paragraph of this paper contemplates the calling of another conference, and it is perhaps in order for me in this connection to say what I have said before; namely, that it seems whenever we have a conference which is unable to settle anything, the Soviet Union proposes that we have another conference which can only breed other conferences is the best we can do. That is a rather disheartening conclusion.
The second paper is the text of a proposed general European treaty on collective security in Europe. Since the United States would presumably not be a part of that treaty, my observations are not directed primarily to the actual text of the treaty, although there are certain implications in it which do affect the United States. It is perhaps implicit in the draft, although not entirely clear, that it is designed to replace the North Atlantic Treaty. I assume that from the provisions of Articles 7 and perhaps 10, and the fact that the Soviet Foreign Minister in introducing his text, made a serious attack upon the North Atlantic Pact “as resembling in many ways the anti-Comintern Pact which led to the unleashing of the Second World War”. He went on to say that “there are no reasons than that of the anti-Comintern Pact”.
So, I presume, although the Soviet Foreign Minister can correct me if I am wrong, that his proposed treaty for European collective security would be in reality a replacement of the North Atlantic Treaty.
The United States certainly cannot take offense at the suggestion of the Soviet Foreign Minister that the European countries should get together for their own collective security without the participation of the United States. The United States, I think, has never intruded itself as an unwanted participant in European affairs, and we do not have any intentions of doing so in the future.
The American people have a very deep and legitimate interest in Europe. Most of us derive from Western Europe. We share the culture and traditions and religion of Western Europe, and there are many bonds which tie us very closely together. But we do not feel that on that account we have any right to demand participation in European affairs.
The United States sent its armed forces to Europe in the First World War when the West was threatened by German militarism under the Kaiser. We delayed somewhat in doing so. But at the urgent appeal and desire of the threatened peoples of Western Europe, and because our own interests became involved, we did participate and certainly contributed to the final defeat of the German militarists represented by the Kaiser.
[Page 1026]When that war was over, we took our troops home at once. Then the same story was repeated under Hitler in the Second World War, and again, after some delay and when the danger not only to Western Europe but also the Soviet Union, was immense, and when we ourselves seemed threatened, we made gigantic effort of putting troops and supplies in Europe to help to save Europe from the renewed militarism of Germany.
And, after the Second World War we withdrew all our forces from Europe, except a relatively small number who were required for occupation purposes in Germany.
Now, for the third time in this century, we have sent forces back to Europe and again the reason was that there were many in Europe who were afraid and who asked us to do so. That fear is, I imagine, a fear which cannot be allayed by new words and new promises, because the fear was inspired by a country which was already bound by the United Nations Charter not to use force against the territorial integrity or independence of any state. Whether that fear will be allayed by any repetition of that pledge is not for me to decide.
It has been suggested that our participation in the present Defense of West Europe to which I now refer caused the division of Europe. That is one of these strange reversals of history—the upside-down talks—to which unfortunately we have had to accommodate ourselves. Everyone knows that the division of Europe was created before the action to which I refer and that our action was taken only because of the division of Europe.
It cannot, I think, be forgotten that when the United States proposed the Marshall Plan, which involved the contributions of many billions of dollars to the rehabilitation of Europe, that plan was initially made available to all of the European states. It was at that juncture that the Soviet satellites, under the direction of the Soviet Union, were not permitted to share in that plan. Perhaps if that plan had been carried out in its original scope, it would have prevented the division of Europe—or at least mitigated the division of Europe—which unfortunately was intensified by the Soviet action.
The division of Europe, I am afraid, comes from causes which considerably ante-date the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty and the proposed European Defense Community. It goes back to the date when the Soviet control initially confined to the Soviet Union itself, was extended to a vast area which now includes one-third of the human race.
I recall the pacts of mutual assistance which the Soviet Union made in 1939 with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which the Soviet Foreign Minister at the time described in language which is almost [Page 1027] exactly the same as the second preamble of the proposed new European treaty.
The pacts with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Mr. Molotov said on October 31, 1939, “strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sovereignty of signatory states and the principle of non-interference in each others affairs”.
The second preamble to which I refer speaks of the “respect for the independence and sovereignty of states and non-interference in their internal affairs”.
What quickly happened to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has gone on and on and has, I suggest, created the division to which the Soviet Foreign Minister refers.
It is a division between those who have been absorbed and the others who do not want to be absorbed.
Whether or not the Soviet proposal of today will obliterate that division in Europe is, as I say, something which is primarily to be considered by other states than the United States.
So far as the United States is concerned, we are determined that we will not be absorbed.
- Repeated to London, Paris, New York, Vienna, Moscow, Bonn, and CINCEUR.↩
- For a report on the fourteenth plenary, see Secto 117, supra. Secretary Dulles’ statement was circulated as FPM(54)49 in the records of the conference.↩
- FPM(54)46 and 47, Documents 516 and 517.↩
- Ellipses in this paragraph are in the source text.↩