Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–1154: Telegram

No. 451
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

secret priority

Berlin, February 11, 1954—1 a.m.

Secto 117. Department pass OSD. Fourteenth plenary session, Molotov in chair.²

1. Before presenting two proposals, one on German question and one on a European collective security treaty (verbatim texts forwarded Secto 115 and Secto 116³), Molotov made following preambular statement:⁴

a. Despite divergences on German question, this discussion should be continued.

b. Key object should be avoid division Europe into military groups (cited Eden’s statement of 25 September 1936 before League of Nations to this effect). Both world wars were preceded by division of Europe into opposing military groups. (Molotov then gave recital European history pre-World War I period and inter-war. With reference latter period, mentioned anti-Comintern pact group had been found culpable by post-World War II Military Tribunal and by Cordell Hull.)

c. Therefore, necessary take sober view of events now going on because prevention third world war is on our hands if we learn from history that way to prevent war is to prevent development of opposing military groups.

d. Key role of Germany in military groups promoting both world wars must be borne in mind.

e. Anti-Russian bloc now beginning be implemented through NATO under UK and US leadership. NATO in many ways resembles anti-Comintern pact, no reason to think its results will be any better.

f. Soviet delegation keeps emphasizing dangers of EDC relative to collective security Europe; Eden and Bidault assertions (that EDC not pointed against East Europe and that guarantees of security for East might be provided) are illusory since any effective guarantee Eastern security must be guarantee against resurgence German militarism whereas EDC plans necessarily lead to such resurgence. Federal Republic has greatest military, industrial, and manpower resources in Western Europe and would play leading role in EDC. To link guarantees with existence EDC is tantamount providing guarantee of Eastern security by resurgence German militarism which is principal threat to Eastern security.

g. EDC (formation of which would be facilitated by early unification Germany on Western terms) means six nations against rest of Europe; will deepen division of Europe, aggravate tensions and threaten all rest of Europe. EDC is a narrow and exclusive group to which only six nations may belong.

h. West plans with formation EDC enter Bonn and Paris treaties⁵ into force, permitting foreign armed forces in Europe for 50 years which quite contrary to Eastern security interests and to normal peaceful life of Europe. Furthermore, would postpone unification Germany and German peace treaty.

i. Verbal guarantees from US, UK on Eastern security of dubious value since these countries dominant members NATO of which EDC integral part.

j. Therefore, what alternative EDC? Answer: Practical implementation of project for collective security pact for all Europe, somewhat after pattern Inter-American Treaty of Rio de Janeiro. Why would such undertaking not be completely consistent UN Charter? Therefore, Soviet delegation welcomes such pact embracing all European countries and having appropriate concrete (including military) obligations. USSR had favored such pact before World War II but Hitler opposed.

k. Re unification Germany and settlement German problem, we have difficult task but practicable. What cannot be done here can be postponed to an early future conference but we must finish that job. Occupation troops must be withdrawn now from both East and West Germany; this would reduce tensions in Europe and outside Europe.

l. Big Four, however, should hasten to facilitate collective security treaty with appropriate guarantee against aggression of Europe. Pending settlement German question, both East and West Germany should participate in such pact.

m. Effective conclusion such pact (terms of which would require dismantlement NATO and abandonment EDC project) could precede definitive settlement German question.

2. Molotov then read verbatim text of two Soviet proposals and subsequently distributed copies before asking comment. Dulles suggested recess to enable other delegations study Soviet proposals.

3. Upon resumption after recess Dulles made statement verbatim text of which reported Secto 114.⁶

4. Bidault:

a. Had listened carefully to Soviet presentation; noted no change re German settlement; noted, however, abandonment NATO and EDC now made prominent issue. Thought that Molotov’s historical exercise unrealistic; not all alliances can be treated as being identical. There were, indeed, military groups in Europe before both world wars, but clearly the aggressors were Wilhelm II and Hitler. France, on other hand, had in both cases belonged to defensive alliances without which defense would have been impossible. NATO is similarly defensive alliance.

b. Soviet proposals show clearly Soviet delegation now wants (for 50 years) not only neutralized Germany but also neutralized Western Europe by compulsory abandonment EDC and NATO; and would prolong division Germany for 50 years by postponing peace treaty.

c. Molotov’s point on exclusivity EDC is clearly refuted by Article 129 which makes EDC open to accession; reason why only six countries now involved are well-known.

d. Soviet proposition is that Western defensive alliance needs to be disrupted; but no reference made to present existence Eastern bloc. If Soviet proposal is, indeed, intended to be so one-sided, it not acceptable. Security of Europe includes, but is not limited, to security of USSR.

e. Re guarantees against German militarism, it seems dangerous to leave an independent Germany in center of Europe free to choose sides; this danger aggravated by proposal to impose military limitations on Germany which likely be ignored since history teaches that “no one treads path of barracks unless prohibited to do so.”

f. Re Molotov’s critical reference British–American troops in Europe would only say that had such troops been in Europe 1919 to 1939 there would have been no World War II. France has no intention shaking off a worthwhile friendship.

g. Re proposed collective security pact, that agreeable in principle but it must be real not verbal, must recognize necessity settling German and Austrian questions first. Furthermore, mutual assistance arrangements meaningless unless preceded by clear frontiers which follow not precede peace settlements.

h. Would appreciate explanation repeated Molotov reference to “32 states”; this figure not meaningful.

i. Soviets renew proposals for troop withdrawal from Germany; but is now evident that withdrawals would be only partial and anyway only theoretical since under Soviet proposal troops could be returned to Germany without prior notice.

j. Amazed at Soviet suggestion US observer status proposed collective security pact could be compensated by similar [status?] Red China, since this suggestion seems overlook “revered Potsdam Agreement”.

k. Stated more positively, French view on problem of European security is that it necessary open new paths along which Europe can leave behind ancient rivalries and conflicting aims. This is meaning of Western efforts in last few years. It was necessary to note existence of a different system in the East; without exploring in detail the merits of the two systems it must be noted that Eastern system is a political, military, economic whole supported by Soviet Union; and on the other side there exist the outlines and the first foundations of a new community based on destiny and freedom of choice. Within this concept, France convinced that basic principles must be (1) never permit Germany again become center of aggression, and (2) achieve this end by free association Germany with other free countries of Europe. Also put unified Germany in world security system with benefits and obligations of UN Charter. This has been France’s policy; it not a militaristic policy nor even primarily military, but envisages other forms of association, economic, cultural, etc. This policy being pursued in full awareness of great intrinsic difficulty German problem and distinctly for France in German development and expansion. Objectively this policy cannot be achieved at one stroke or by miracle. Progress must be concrete and systematic.

l. In conclusion, the path on which West has moved was dictated by a situation which West did not create. The East and particularly East Germany did not wait upon a collective security pact before raising and strengthening military force. How can defensive efforts of West create such a threat to security of Europe as Molotov alleges? EDC excludes possibility any individual armed action. EDC system provides organic security guarantee of a new type by associating Germany with countries whose desire for peace cannot be questioned. Molotov does not deny this but fears Germany might cut loose from this association; if that were really the problem we could consider firmer clauses; but he does not seem to want anything except abandonment EDC and NATO and exclusion US from Europe. Soviet must face the facts of Europe today, facts which face us all.

5. Eden:⁷

a. Soviet proposals appear resemble sort of Monroe Doctrine for Europe designed break up NATO and exclude US forces from Europe. To many countries, however, America’s part in European affairs has been very generous in many ways not the least of which economic in which respect was salvation of Western Europe. Marshall Plan is part of history and a generous chapter; it is not fault of Americans if it does not figure in every history book.

b. NATO is foundation UK policy; under it physically impossible initiate aggression. It offers threat to no one; we cannot give it up. Within it, we have useful associations with other nations, not limited to military matters; and as necessary military build-up tapers off other aspects of association (economic, cultural) will become more important. NATO involvement does not exclude friendship with others; but is vital part of life of free nations of West.

c. New Soviet proposals as applied Germany appear based on assumption German unification will not take place. Practical result is ensuring recognition GDR.

d. Furthermore, imply abandonment Soviet confidence in Germany which now to be neutralized by our decision; and whereas supervision of German elections was last week an affront, now it is proposed that German police strength be predetermined and subjected to inspection. Free elections seem to have disappeared and German problem is shelved.

e. The general collective security plan, like the German arrangements, appears to put things in the wrong order. These broad horizons of collective security must come after settlement German problem.

f. Soviet collective security proposals would require us (Article 7) give up our right of association in non-aggressive alliances; to deprive us of our freedom of choice while not apparently (Article 10) depriving USSR its freedom of choice.

g. Insofar as new proposals are directed at abandonment EDC and NATO, it appears Soviets have ignored all that was said in past two weeks about defensive character of these arrangements and about West’s willingness guarantee Russian security. Indeed, Molotov implied US, UK are parties to revival German militarism, all I can do is repeat assurances I have already given and refer again to UN Charter and Anglo-Soviet Treaty.

h. In summary, all Soviets want is dismantlement of NATO and Western defensive alliances without any comparable dismantlement their apparatus. This is not a possible foundation for work we have to do.

6. Molotov wished make brief clarification on some of questions raised:

a. Re Germany, reiterated Soviet proposals, viz.: No German army in either zone; problem to be settled by Germans not by occupation troops; no interference in German internal affairs (as distinct from external security matters with respect which Four Powers have rights and obligations until conclusion peace treaty); determination of size, composition, etc. of German police forces by agreement among the Four Powers; withdrawal occupation troops.

b. Re collective security pact, Soviet delegation had simply proposed that security in Europe was problem for 32 countries not 6. These 6 constituted themselves a closed group and despite Bidault’s citation Article 129, the fact remains entry for other countries so hedged with reservations as to be impossible in practice. Molotov conceded intent of Soviet proposal was against NATO and EDC because both these arrangements directed against USSR and People’s Democracies. Re mention by Eden and Bidault of Anglo-Soviet and Franco-Soviet treaties, Molotov wondered what is left of these undertakings since UK and France both busily engaged in efforts remilitarize Germany and consolidate NATO, both of which “spearheaded” against USSR. Hence, references to present force or possible extension these bilateral treaties are “incomprehensible to people in USSR”.

c. Much had been said about Eastern European bloc. Admittedly Soviet relations with People’s Democracies are good and are developing; but there exists no treaty within this bloc directed against any nation represented at this conference or designed for any purpose except to safeguard peace and security and prevent aggression by remilitarized Germany.

d. Soviet collective security proposal has as prime objective prevention emergence military groups directed against other groups of countries and to unify European countries in pursuit of collective security of Europe.

e. Re US, there can be no complaint against citation of fact that US is an American country not a European country. All that Soviet leaders beginning with Stalin have said about the great services rendered by US during the war against Hitler was true and USSR stands by it and is grateful for that help. Lines of policy, however, deviated only after World War II and only because US deviated from common war time policies; USSR is in no way responsible for that.

f. Soviet delegation had tabled certain proposals for collective security in Europe. There has been much criticism, most of which apparently based on insufficient knowledge or on misunderstanding. It appeared only Eden had categorically rejected Soviet proposal. Some remarks, however, seem imply rejection idea of collective security in Europe. Soviet delegation would appreciate clear statement on this since if idea unacceptable obviously Soviet draft of no use; but if idea viable, perhaps amendments possible.

7. Dulles:

a. Two papers had been submitted by Soviet delegation. Paper dealing with Germany not acceptable. Other paper had reference to a proposed collective security treaty to which US would not be party; therefore, not called upon to state position. For information, however, he could assure Molotov that US would not respond to invitation in Article 9 to serve as observer. If this invitation intended as “a poor joke”, it will not be received as such by American people who still have fresh in memory their outlay of blood and treasure in Europe.

b. Called attention to ambiguity in translation since language in Article 7 read “enter” in English text but read “participate” or “take part in” in French and Russian text. If Russian text determinative, it would be entirely clear that this article intended to supersede North Atlantic Treaty. He assumed this was Molotov’s intention.

8. Bidault: Idea of European collective security system acceptable on two conditions:

a. Unification of Germany and German peace treaty must come first; and

b. There must be no exclusion of right of association in defensive arrangements. The text presented by Soviet delegation is not acceptable.

9. Eden: His answer had already been given.

10. Molotov: Had not spoken on question raised by Dulles, but would not refuse to speak on it. Molotov immediately shifted to his capacity as session chairman and proposed continue with items discussed today. After interchange, Foreign Ministers agreed to leave today’s subject matter as unfinished business and to decide (after Friday’s meeting on Austria) when to return to it.

1. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Moscow, and Vienna.
2. The U.S. verbatim record of the fourteenth plenary, USDEL PLEN/14, which began at 3 p.m., is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 194.
3. Neither printed. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210) For text of these proposals, see FPM(54)46 and 47, Documents 516 and 517.
4. For Molotov’s statement, circulated as FPM(54)45, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 107–113; it includes the text of the Soviet proposal on European security.
5. Regarding the agreements signed at Bonn, May 26, 1952, see Documents 51 ff. Regarding the agreements signed at Paris, May 27, 1952, see the editorial note, vol. v, Part 1, p. 684.
6. Infra.
7. For Eden’s statement, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 116–117.