Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 210: Telegram

No. 407
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

priority

Berlin, February 3, 1954.

Secto 70. Department pass OSD. Following is text Secretary Dulles statement in eighth plenary session February 2.²

“Yesterday, Mr. Molotov delivered himself of a major polemic.³ Apparently, he felt that we had left far behind us the first agenda item. That item dealt with the relaxing of international tensions. But, since we were on the second agenda item, Mr. Molotov felt moved to intensify international tensions, so he made bitter accusations against France, the United Kingdom and the United States. He charged us with conspiring to start a new world war with the help of revived German militarism.

If it is desirable to relax international tensions, and I think it is, I wonder whether it is not desirable for us to seek this all the time, and not merely as item 1 of an agenda.

I have said that I was prepared to assume, at least for the purpose of this meeting, that the Soviet Union honestly wants peace.

I do not know what the Soviet Foreign Minister really thinks about us. Whatever his judgment is, he must know that he is not infallible. He has sometimes been wrong, and he might have been wrong when he accused us yesterday of being the enemies of peace.

I recall that Mr. Molotov was wrong in October 1939 when he condemned France and Britain as being aggressors and praised Hitlerite Germany as being the peace-seeking country. I have in my hands a speech which the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs made in Moscow on October 31, 1939. Already the war was on and, in Molotov’s words: ‘It needed only one swift blow to Poland first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing remained of this ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty.’ In that speech, Mr. Molotov boasted of the rapprochement and the establishment of friendly relations between the USSR and Germany.” He then said that ‘as far as the European great powers are concerned, Germany is in the position of a state which is striving for the earliest termination of the war and for peace, whereas Great Britain and France, which but yesterday were declaiming against aggression, are in favour of continuing the war and are opposed to the conclusion of peace.’ ‘It is’, said Mr. Molotov, ‘not only senseless, but criminal to wage such a war—a war for the “destruction of Hitlerism” camouflaged as a fight for “democracy”.’

Perhaps Mr. Molotov would admit that he then made a mistake—we all make mistakes. That fact should lead us not to be so confident of our judgment that we hurl across the table accusations of criminal intent.

It is quite natural that we should disagree with each other and reason with each other in an effort to get agreement. But I suggest that we should not here recklessly attack each other’s motives.

I should like to reason with Mr. Molotov about his plan for solving the German problem with major dependence upon the so-called German Democratic Government of East Germany.

The Soviet Foreign Minister has made yesterday one statement with which we completely agree. He says:

‘The German problem is first and foremost a problem to be solved by the German people themselves,’ and that Germany should participate ‘at all stages of the peace treaty’s preparations.’

Precisely for that reason we believe that the first task is to establish a single German government which can speak authentically for the German people as a whole. It will not help us to have a tumult of conflicting opinions.

It is the thesis of the Soviet Union, if I understand rightly, that in the making of the peace treaty we are to consult with the German people through what the Soviet Foreign Minister calls ‘the representatives of Eastern and Western Germany.’

We know that in West Germany there is a government which draws its authority from the German people as a result of free and vigorously contested elections. The people of the West German Republic had an opportunity to hear all the issues debated from opposing viewpoints and to vote for candidates of their own choosing. The Government of the West German Republic is, without question, entitled to speak for that large majority of the German people who reside in the West German Republic and we do not doubt that it reflects the overwhelming judgment of the West Germans as well.

But how about the so-called ‘government’ of the German Democratic Republic which rules in East Germany? According to the Soviet Foreign Minister, it was ‘called to power by the overwhelming majority of the population of Eastern Germany’.

It is true that 98 percent of the eligible voters appeared at the polling places. They came because they had been told that, if they did not come, they would be treated as “enemies of the peace” and subjected to grave penalties as such. The entire population of many villages was forcibly rounded up and marched to the polls.

It is true that 99.7 percent of the voters were recorded as having ‘elected’ the government of the German Peoples Republic. The story behind this is that after the voters arrived at the polls, they were handed a ballot. It was a ballot which had been secretly printed. And it was not made public until election day. I have a copy of that ballot here. It is simply a list of names. No place is provided on the ballot to indicate approval or disapproval. There was no way to vote ‘no’. There was not even a way to mark the ballot with a ‘yes’—a privilege, which as I recall, even Hitler conceded to his subjects. The voters were merely ordered to put the ballot in the ballot box.

It might be noted in passing that the name which heads the list on the ballot which I hold here in my hand is the name of Mr. Ulbricht, a one-time Soviet citizen.

I wonder whether Mr. Molotov really believes that this type of so-called ‘election’ gives the so-called ‘government’ a mandate to speak for the people of East Germany.

I myself doubt that that performance provides the means of finding out what the East Germans really want. That doubt springs not only from the character of the so-called elections themselves, which I have described, but also from what has happened since.

Since the October events that I describe,⁴ nearly a million East Germans have fled the East Zone to the West Zone and West sector of Berlin. Does that prove the popularity of the rulers and their capacity to speak for the ruled?

Last year hungry Germans under the rule of their so-called government sought and obtained five million food parcels from the West. Does that prove that the people are satisfied with their rulers?⁵

In the Eastern area there is an armed force of 250,000 to keep order. That is one guard for 80 persons. In West Germany there is one policeman for 330 persons. Does this shocking discrepancy prove that the East Germans freely accept the order that their rulers impose?

If the facts I mention do not suffice to prove to Mr. Molotov my point, I can mention more. But I hope it will not seem necessary to do so.

As I understand the proposals of the Soviet Union, they treat it as of the essence that four of us should accept the so-called German Democratic Republic as one of the principle organs whereby the German problem is to be solved. We cannot accept that position.

We know that the German people would regard as contaminated any decisions which were fastened upon them through the interposition of the ‘German People’s Republic’.

Mr. Molotov has said: ‘Only they themselves, only the Germans, can really solve the German problem. Any other solution of the German question would be unreasonable and unfair to the German people.’

Because we believe that premise, we are compelled to reject the Soviet proposal and return to that which the three Western powers support.

We urge that Mr. Molotov agree to create quickly by free, all-German elections, a German government which can genuinely speak for all of Germany and thus provide the indispensable basis for a peace that will last, because it will be a peace of consent.

In his speech yesterday, the Soviet Foreign Minister sought to divert us from the serious discussion of this urgent topic by injecting a series of charges against the United States, Great Britain and France, which he claimed ‘are trying to form a military bloc directed against the Soviet Union.’

I will not take time at this conference to reject these charges in detail. There is nothing new in them. The same familiar charges have been made year after year in the United Nations. They have been refuted time after time, year after year.

For example: Mr. Molotov says that $100,000,000 was appropriated by the US Congress for ‘subversive’ activities within the Soviet satellite countries. That charge, often made, was completely rejected when raised by Mr. Vishinsky in the United Nations. I refute it again as being totally untrue. That legislation has been utilized solely for the purpose of assistance to refugees fleeing from the Soviet bloc, such as the one million who, as I mentioned, fled from East Germany to the West.

It is elementary kindness to assist these refugees to make a new start in life.

Perhaps there would have been fewer of them if, in 1948, the Soviet Union had allowed its satellites to share the thousands of millions of dollars which the United States made available to relieve conditions of economic distress abroad. Perhaps then, too, a Soviet mistake was made.

I would recall to the Soviet Foreign Minister that the United States is one of the nations which paid a very heavy price for two German aggressions. We came into World War I, and we came into World War II, when it seemed that German militarism might gain decisive victories in Europe and dominate the Eurasian continent.

It would not be profitable for us here to engage in unseemly competition as to the importance of our relative contributions to the ultimate defeat of Nazi Germany. That defeat required blood and steel, and the United States contributed both. There was a time when the Soviet Union paid tribute to that contribution.

In light of that history, the United States feels that it has earned the right to shrug off, as foolish chatter, the accusation that it now seeks to recreate the very force that has twice so cruelly hurt it.

The United States is dedicating its material, intellectual and spiritual resources to building a world of peace.

We took a leading part in creating the United Nations. We take seriously our obligation under that charter to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. That obligation will apply to Germany when she becomes a member of the United Nations.

We take seriously the undertaking of that organization to insure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with that principle. That undertaking applies to Germany until she becomes a member.

Mr. Molotov has claimed that the North Atlantic Treaty is aimed at the Soviet Union. That treaty, made pursuant to the United Nations Charter, contemplates the use of force only if there is an armed attack against one of the parties. I hope that Mr. Molotov does not imply that the Soviet Union intends to bring that tragedy to pass. If it does not, then it need not fear the treaty.

The Soviet Union, which dominates a military bloc of 800,000,000 people, seems to be fearful if any other nations combine for their defense. The reasons for such combination are simple, and the combination conceals nothing sinister.

If any one of the Western European nations were alone to be strong enough to defend itself against possible attack from the Soviet bloc, it would from an internal standpoint endanger its economy and from an external standpoint, endanger its neighbors.

The Soviet Union proposes that Germany should be allowed to have defensive strength on a national basis. But if Germany had national forces strong enough to defend itself from external attack, it would be so strong that it would threaten all of Western Europe.

The only way in which nations can obtain necessary defensive strength without themselves becoming an aggressive menace is by community efforts. Under those circumstances no single nation is strong enough to attack alone; but the combined strength deters aggression. This system, it is true, sometimes involves one member of the community helping to maintain deterrent forces on the territory of another member of the community. Mr. Molotov had particularly complained of this aspect of the security arrangements participated in by the United States, the United Kingdom and France in cooperation with their associates. The fact is that such arrangements are a mighty safeguard against aggression. They mean that only the combined will of many nations can set the defensive system into action.

The greatest danger to world peace lies in the fact that in some cases a vast military establishment can be made to attack by the decision of a single nation, sometimes indeed by the decision of a single man. That is a situation which is understandably terrifying.

But where a military establishment cannot act without the combined will of many countries, then only a clear defensive need can bring about the necessary concurrence of national wills.

Furthermore, in this way, it is possible to get adequate defense without forcing the people, and particularly the workers to suffer by requiring them to toil unproductively. It is understandable that the Soviet Union should want to force on the free nations a system which will drag down their higher standard of living. But, we shall have none of that, Mr. Molotov. We shall have both security and human welfare.

When I spoke here a week ago today,⁶ I pointed out the United States’ course of conduct following World War II. We promptly withdrew our vast armies and air and naval forces from Europe. We largely dismantled our military forces to a mere fraction of about one-tenth of their World War II strength. We reversed that course only when Communist aggression in Korea aroused us to the fact of danger. Then, in concert with the many others who shared our fear, we undertook to recreate a reasonable defensive posture. Now that that position is in sight, we are levelling off our national expenditures for military purposes and the NATO countries are doing the same.

This conduct cannot be reconciled with any aggressive purpose.

The Soviet Minister must know that fact. If he does not admit it, it can only be because he believes that to misrepresent the truth will serve some ulterior purpose.

Mr. Molotov has rightly said that we live in a modern age, and should take into account the lessons or models of modern history. That is precisely what we are trying to do. We are seeking to apply in the international field these principles which every civilized community applies as among its members to get peace and security at bearable cost. That is the effort in which the United States wholeheartedly joins with others who are likeminded.

No single act that the United States has taken or will take carries any threat to the Soviet Union so long as the Soviet Union itself abides by the principles of the United Nations to which it has solemnly subscribed.

Let this conference now get back to the problem of Germany and of how to welcome and nurture the desire of the new Germany to find for her energies an outlet which, better than unbridled nationalism, will serve the needs of Germany, of Europe and, indeed, of all the world.”

1. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.
2. For a record of the eighth plenary meeting, see Sectos 73 and 74, Document 405 and supra.
3. For a summary of Molotov’s statement at the seventh plenary, see Secto 66, Document 399.
4. Regarding these events, see Document 788.
5. For documentation on the delivery of food parcels to the people in the German Democratic Republic during 1953, see Documents 734 ff.
6. For Secretary Dulles’ statement at the second plenary meeting on Jan. 26, see Secto 24, Document 360.