Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–354: Telegram

No. 408
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

secret

Berlin, February 3, 1954—9 p.m.

Secto 78. Eden dined with Molotov last evening and following is Eden’s account (supplemented by Roberts who was also present) of conversations:

Molotov appeared tired and although courteous he made no effort to raise any subject with Eden during course of evening. Consequently, Eden had to make all conversational overtures of substance.

Almost entire conversation was about Europe, with emphasis mainly on Germany, NATO, EDC, and western military bases. Eden spent considerable time explaining to Molotov organic structure of NATO and EDC, pointing out that system by its very structure was purely defensive and that west military forces were not under control of single country. Therefore, they could only be used if participating members agreed. This was in itself best guarantee against aggression. Molotov countered with long speech about aggressive intent of west as shown by NATO, EDC, military bases, et cetera, saying that despite Eden’s explanation NATO military forces were under command of an American general, implying that US could use them at will. Eden countered by saying SACEUR although an American was responsible to an international body (NAC) and that therefore he did not have freedom of action to use NATO military forces as he might wish. In other words, while Soviet generals were responsible only to higher political Soviet authority, NATO commanders were responsible to higher international political authority. Re American generals, Eden then said he thought Molotov had met President Eisenhower during or shortly after war, and no one could accuse him of harboring any aggressive intentions or purposes. Molotov confirmed that he had met President and indicated he had seemed a reasonable man. He added, “of course, soldiers don’t like war”.

Eden asked Molotov what alternatives he had in mind for NATO and EDC since he was opposed to both. Molotov made no reply. Earlier when Eden made point Soviet had tight military arrangements with satellites, Molotov replied these were directed against Germany as threat whereas NATO was aimed not at Germany but at Russia. Eden said current four-power discussions on Germany were disappointing and asked if Molotov wanted an agreement. Molotov replied he did want an agreement. Eden then said he hoped something could come from the Berlin conference and asked what about Austria. According to Eden, Molotov replied, “possibly, but I would have to have something on Germany”. Molotov then referred to the Eden proposals re German elections as a sort of ultimate.² He said from past experience, USSR had good cause to be suspicious of Germany. Eden countered by saying Adenauer was a wise man who would not lead Germany back on path of militarism. Molotov nodded reflectively but said Adenauer was old and would not live long. (During dinner Eden asked Molotov what he thought of Secretary’s statement yesterday. Molotov replied by saying he thought it seemed “defensive”.³)

Eden also asked Molotov whether there was any chance for any kind of an agreement on Far East matters. Molotov simply replied, “possibly yes”.

1. Repeated to London and Moscow.
2. For the British proposals, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.
3. For text of Secretary Dulles’ statement at the eighth plenary meeting, see Secto 70, supra.