Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–354: Telegram

No. 405
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

secret priority

Berlin, February 3, 1954—1 a.m.

Secto 73. Department pass OSD. Following summarizes first part eighth meeting on February 2:²

Meeting opened at 1506, Secretary presiding.

Secretary delivered first statement, text of which being transmitted separately.³

Bidault began his statement⁴ by noting that apparently all are now agreed Germany is central question of present conference. He noted that USSR wishes priority to be given peace treaty as proposed in its amended 1952 proposal,⁵ whereas France considers peace treaty should be negotiated after, not before, establishment of German government. There would be no point in drawing up a treaty as proposed by Molotov if it were going to be disowned immediately by government of united Germany. Apparently Molotov fails to recognize that four powers cannot at this moment determine what will of German people is. Germany must speak with one voice, not with two voices saying opposite things.

There is inconsistency between Molotov’s statement of yesterday that leaders of Western Germany do not express sentiments of German people and his proposal that Bonn government be invited to express its views on Germany settlement. Bidault did not understand why Molotov has altered stand he took in July 1946⁶ at which time he felt it necessary to form German government before beginning treaty negotiations.

Bidault also noted Molotov’s reference to following provision in draft treaty of March 10, 1952,⁷ which provided that “it goes without saying that peace treaty of that type should be drawn up with participation of both Germanies represented by government of whole of Germany.” Bidault construed this as meaning that four occupying powers, which have discharged control functions in Germany, should also consider question of creation as soon as possible of unified and representative German government.

Bidault refused to discuss history of Versailles Treaty on grounds that conference has enough difficulties to cope with in 1954, without dealing also with those of 1919. He thought essence of problem is that no peace settlement can be imposed on German people without that peace becoming precarious. It therefore is necessary for four conference members to agree among themselves first on free elections before negotiating with German government.

Unfortunately, Molotov appears opposed to the only view which can lead to concrete results during this conference. Furthermore in regard to Germany Molotov has raised general East-West problems and has impugned our motives.

In its long indictment, particularly as respects Bonn and Paris agreements, Soviet delegation has levelled contradictory charges that, on one hand, occupation of Germany is being maintained on more or less permanent basis and, on other hand, hands of German militarists are being freed. Bidault thought it unnecessary again to set record straight on erroneous interpretation given by Soviet delegation to Bonn agreement. He also rejected discussion on state of French opinion as respects Paris agreements, and he could not see why Molotov feels entitled to speak on subject. In any event, if Molotov believes Bonn and Paris agreements are bad treaties, why should he be so reluctant to subject them to free decision of future government of united Germany? In this connection it also is surprising that Soviet delegation agreed that freedom of choice Bidault wishes given to German government would be valid only after conclusion of peace treaty, while according to Soviet delegation Bidault wants to postpone indefinitely conclusion of peace treaty. Bidault expressed belief that German government should have complete freedom in assuming obligation as soon as it is set up, even before peace treaty. As far as treaty itself is concerned, Bidault would have no difficulty in accepting eighth clause suggested by Molotov. He would like to see same spirit embodied in seventh clause concerning Germany’s association with other states. Bidault thought that clause should be deleted.

Bidault went on to challenge statement that Bonn and Paris agreements are substitute for peace treaty and emphatically rejected thesis that agreements would prevent reunification of Germany. He noted that it would be contrary to welfare of German people for Molotov to put as a preliminary condition for holding of free elections denunciation of agreements by Federal Government.

Bidault thought it necessary to set record straight as regards Molotov’s contention that Western policy, and particularly French policy, is behind division of Europe and renders impossible unification of Germany.

It is a blinding fact, he said, that since 1945 Western side has demobilized its forces and is trying to reach peace settlement while simultaneously it is faced with bloc of states becoming progressively more integrated politically, economically and militarily by close network of pacts, all made between 1945 and 1948. This bloc is essentially based on USSR itself. Bidault noted that while these pacts may be directed against renewal of German aggression, nonetheless, they can also be brought into play against any other state USSR may choose to consider as associated with Germany. Between 1945 and 1948, armies of Soviet bloc have been reorganized and trained along strictly Soviet pattern. In those years there was not even the beginning of such a system in Western Europe, and what has developed since then is strictly defensive and directed against no one.

Bidault then referred to his understanding that USSR would like to see established a European system in which France, USSR and Germany would together safeguard European security. He thought that desirable, provided other two governments represented at conference table are not excluded. He welcomed Molotov’s statement that other states in Eastern Europe wish to become friends of France and welcomed the invitation. In this connection, however, he noted resistance on Eastern side to fact that France wished to keep her independence agreeing with Molotov that conference should seek German settlement which will prevent birth of German militarism, Bidault noted that, though aims are shared, no agreement has been reached on methods to be employed. Bidault referred to Molotov’s statement that three powers had not yet reacted to Soviet draft treaty of March 10, 1952, and in this connection explained that it would have been idle and dangerous to embark on treaty negotiations without legitimate representation of whole Germany.

As respects Potsdam agreement, Bidault agreed with Molotov’s observation that many of its provisions have become obsolete. He agreed also that Germany should become peaceful, democratic and independent state, but he recalled that at Moscow conference Molotov had considered democratization of Germany as involving measures analogous to those applied by USSR in her own zone, measures which are direct source of division of Germany. It would be regrettable, Bidault thought, if reference to Potsdam agreement would return us to exact situation we are trying to leave.

Bidault believed it essential that Germany not be permitted to have, under full sovereignty, unlimited military forces and said he failed to perceive any third course of action apart, on one hand, from outside control and, on other hand, from association. Molotov, he said, is urging repetition of experience which has twice failed, first after 1806 when, despite Napoleon’s limitation of Prussian powers, 7 years later resurgent Prussia defeated Napoleon at Leipzig and, second, after Versailles Treaty which limited to 100,000 men German army which so rapidly grew to Wehrmacht under Hitler. From this tragic experience, Bidault said, France is unshakeably convinced that reconstitution of new German army is dangerous for German democracy and incompatible with security.

Soviet plan for Germany, according to Bidault, calls for a Germany isolated in heart of continent. She would have to rely on herself alone for her defense, for her freedom to contract agreements with other states would be severely limited. Such a concept forces one to recognize that Germany perforce would be entitled to maintain considerable armed forces to protect herself from possible attack. Danger in such a formula lies in fact that isolated Germany with powerful army would soon throw off restrictions imposed by treaty. Molotov’s formula to limit German forces to minimum level would not insure security of Europe. It would lead again to situation which followed Versailles, when a Germany subjected to restrictions tried to get rid of them by playing off one group against the other. Soviet proposal appears open to criticism even outside strictly European field where its consequence would be to bar Germany from UN and prevent her from expressing herself on subjects under discussion.

Summing up, Bidault expressed belief that Soviet draft treaty of March 10, 1952, does not jibe with reality and, indeed, is in line with treaties which Molotov has himself criticized. If Molotov feels it impossible to return to a system which has not prevented Germany from becoming a militaristic power, then we must use imagination and change our ideas. France has tried to do precisely that, and we must hope that French formula will so appeal to others that they will be able to associate themselves in their turn to that formula. It is in this framework that place has been set aside for Federal Republic so that, instead of being isolated, Germany, which has so often proved fatal for herself and for Europe, can associate herself with other states whose good faith is indubitable. Europe which we are trying to build threatens no one.

Meeting was recessed at 1800.⁸

1. Transmitted in two sections. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, and Vienna.
2. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of this meeting, USDEL PLEN/8, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 194.
3. Secto 70, Document 407.
4. For Bidault’s statement, circulated as FPM(54)27, see Cmd. 9080, pp. 66–71, or Berlin Discussions, pp. 85–88 and 138–142.
5. For this proposal, see FPM(54)24, Document 512.
6. Reference to the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in Paris in 1946.
7. Document 65.
8. For a record of the second part of the meeting, see Secto 74, infra.