762.00/1–1354: Telegram
No. 334
The United States High
Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State1
2237. This telegram discusses present state of German expectations with regard coming four power conference.
[Page 763]Death of Stalin and subsequent developments in USSR, especially fall of Beria,2 have, as elsewhere in Europe, resulted in change of atmosphere in Federal Republic, though owing German fear of Soviets, this had taken place more gradually here. Soviet propaganda about new course in USSR and indications of conciliatory Soviet attitude, specifically release of large numbers German POWs have had some direct effect on German opinion, but main reason for change of atmosphere here is growing conviction that while present Soviet gestures may be merely tactical, genuine if undesire [sic] social and structural change away from doctrinaire Communism taking place within USSR which will have inevitable by-product of lessening chances of Soviet aggressive action.
Coming on top of this changing appraisal of USSR, Germans also see pronounced change of course in US policy as indicated by announced plans to cut defense budget, realignment of armed forces, signs of possible redefinition US policy toward China, and, perhaps most important of all, developments following President’s proposals for atomic controls.3 Germans have now therefore received what they regard to be valid indications from both sides that there has in fact been some relaxation in cold war and there is more to come.
Nevertheless, few Germans believe that these changes have gone far enough to create any real possibility that problem of German unity can be solved in any complete or final sense at coming conference; it is not believed that Soviets are now ready make necessary sacrifices. Taken together, these apparently confliciting appraisals have resulted in a growing feeling that Berlin Conference should not be allowed to break down completely and that four-power talks on German unity should be continued in some form rather than attempting assign complete guilt to Soviet for failure to agree on major issues. Tendency to follow this course regardless of actual developments at conference is, as might be expected, strongest with SPD. (We believe party will continue after conference with its present deliberate ambiguity of approach, suggesting on one hand that SPD recognizes necessity of joining forces with West in common defense effort and on other hand that neutrality might be acceptable price for German unity.) SPD emphasizes one or other of these approaches depending on foreign developments, especially its estimate of Soviet willingness make concessions on unity and with approach of Berlin Conference, neutralist tendency is in ascendant. This demonstrated during luncheon discussion with US High Commissioner, January 11, when Ollenhauer openly [Page 764] declared that “Swedish-type solution”—here he actually means compulsory military neutrality—“for German unity completely satisfactory to party and Austrian type of arrangement would offer many advantages.” (Wehner and other SPD leaders have already advanced proposals for continuing or recommencing negotiations if it becomes apparent that no agreement on major issues can be reached Berlin.) Desire to keep talks going also widespread in coalition circles (as well as among press and radio commentators), though coalition leaders see considerable difficulty in bringing about EDC ratification in France while talks are still going on, even though negotiations were no longer on Foreign Minister level. Of course, coalition leaders are not as suggestible as SPD where Soviets are concerned and their final attitude on continuation of talks is more dependent on actual course of conference.
General change in atmosphere has therefore resulted in situation where Germans are discounting in advance Berlin Conference’s chances for major success at this time but at same time feel that complete breakdown would be regression and attempts at gradual progress on smaller issues should be made. Soviets presumably will do everything prevent abrupt termination of conference and should find this German attitude useful if it continues. If Soviets can actually be forced to make definite and unequivocal refusal permit German unity within relatively short time, present German attitude will pose no problem. If Western opinion should support negotiations on less important issues in event no agreement can be reached on major ones, and no acceptable way is found quickly to incorporate German forces in Western defense structure, Chancellor could lose some of his hold over coalition and public opinion where unity issue concerned, to advantage of SPD, unless he shifts ground. That is tactic at which he has shown himself adept.
- Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, and Moscow.↩
- Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs and State Security, had disappeared from public view at the end of June 1953.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 326.↩