Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/1–1354: Telegram

No. 333
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

confidential
naict

Washington, January 13, 1954—7:49 p.m.

3616. Re Bonn’s 2213.² British Emb here received instructions ascertain US and French views as to three alternative courses of action proposed by Eden which might now be taken re stalemated Berlin talks.³ Assume addressees can get text British instructions from their British colleagues. Secretary has examined Eden analysis and following represents his reaction which should be passed Eden and Bidault:

1. We fully agree with British criteria that we avoid postponement Berlin conference beyond Jan 25 and that our final stand these preliminary issues should be such as to carry Western public opinion.

2. We therefore disposed reject first course of maintaining pressure at Berlin level in favor three-one formula. Soviets may well refuse accept this formula on basis that break on this particular point would in terms of public opinion cause more problems for West than for Soviets. This could result in postponement of conference.

3. Second course proposed involves tripartite approach to Molotov by three Ambassadors in support of three-one ratio. If Molotov refused we would then suggest that place of meeting might be transferred to Switzerland or Vienna. We believe this has grave disadvantages. First, by approaching Molotov we tend by our action to convert these procedural questions into major substantive issues on which it would be unfortunate to break or retreat. Second, by suggesting new locale for conference we afford Soviets splendid opportunity drag out preliminary proceedings well beyond Jan 25, thus leaving proposed meeting without either definite place or date.

4. Because of difficulties presented by above alternatives and particularly possibilities for indefinite postponement Berlin Conference, we believe third course suggested by British, i.e., to cut short argument and accept alternate meetings ACA building and East Berlin seems preferable. Procedure of alternate meetings should impress Western public opinion as more than fair and cut ground out from under Soviet dilatory tactics. We believe however that in order there be no further pretext for delay our acceptance alternate East-West sector meetings should be coupled with agreement that location first meeting be determined by lot. We have in mind that in presenting this proposal to Dengin we would stress concessions we have made re place and date of conference. Now in order further to facilitate convening this conference we are prepared as indicated above to accept Soviet position on alternate meetings in two sectors. Under these circumstances if they are not able to agree to our present proposal, we shall feel impelled to make public reason why no agreement has been reached at these preliminary talks. Refusal of Soviets to accept this package difficult to conceive from public opinion viewpoint. At same time, while increasing somewhat physical difficulties of conference, such procedure should not obstruct attainment our basic tripartite objectives.

If agreement reached along above lines we do not anticipate any particular difficulty re following past practice rotating chairmanships. If first meeting should be held Soviet sector it would be natural for one of us suggest Molotov as chairman that day, whereas if first meeting held West sector one of three Western Foreign Ministers would be logical candidate for chair. Thus there seems no reason why chairmanship question should be raised now in present preliminary talks with Soviets.

Please send UK and French reaction soonest. Would also appreciate receiving urgently views HICOGs and Moscow.⁴

Dulles

1. Drafted by MacArthur, Morris, and Thurston; cleared by Merchant; and initialed for Secretary Dulles by MacArthur. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Moscow, Berlin, and Bonn.
2. Telegram 2213 reported HICOG’s view after discussions with British and French officials in Germany that the time had come to insist on the right of each Foreign Minister to determine the place of his meeting. (396.1 BE/1–1254)
3. According to telegram 2606 from Paris, Jan. 13, these alternatives were: (1) continue to insist on the present Western position; (2) appeal to Moscow; or (3) accept the one-to-one ratio. (396.1 BE/1–1354)
4. On Jan. 14 the Embassy in London reported that Eden and Churchill agreed on the third course of action (telegram 2990, 396.1 BE/1–1454), while on the same day the Embassy in Paris reported that Bidault was adamantly opposed to the one-to-one ratio proposal. (Telegram 2625, 396.1 BE/1–1454) HICOG on the other hand favored the approach to Molotov, while the Embassy in Moscow believed a proposal offering a choice of either the three-to-one ratio or alternate meetings with the first ACA building might be successful. (Telegrams 2248 from Bonn and 853 from Moscow, Jan. 14, 396.1 BE/1–1454)