Bruce Diaries, lot 64 D 327
No. 203
Extract From the Diary of David K.E. Bruce, Thursday,
July 9, 1953
Messrs. Hallstein and Blankenhorn came down to La Lanterne this morning. They said Adenauer felt absolutely certain the Russians would shortly make a new move designed to defeat him in the German elections which are set for September 6. He believes, therefore, he should take the initiative so as to exclude the possibility of the Russians being the first to offer a plan that would appeal to German public opinion regarding the reunification of the two parts of the country.
It has occured to him that the most courageous and useful action in this regard would be for the Western Powers themselves not to demand a four-power conference and set a basis for discussion. Of course, no conference should take place without the prior acceptance by the Soviets of the basic conditions determined upon by the Western Powers. In the offer of the three occupying Western Powers it must be stated that nothing will be acceptable to them that would interfere with European integration. It should point out to the Soviets that the EDC is an excellent starting point toward a wide system of security. For example, only by unanimous consent of the six participating Governments can Germany have more than a stated number of troops under arms. The same applies to the limitation on armament manufacturing in Germany and on the armaments allowed in the possession of the Germans.
The Chancellor during the course of last night prepared a letter which he instructed Blankenhorn to take immediately to Washington and deliver to Secretary Dulles as President of the present meeting of the three Foreign Ministers.1Hallstein translated the letter to me. It advocated an offer for a four-power conference by September at the latest by the three occupying powers to the [Page 485] Soviet Government. The Chancellor wishes this discussed in Washington and if the decision is favorable then immediate announcement to be made. This he thinks would strengthen his position and electoral prospects in Germany.
They asked me to advise the State Department that Blankenhorn was on his way. I asked Hallstein and Blankenhorn whether they had already taken up this matter with Dr. Conant and if not, why not, since that was the proper way to handle it. They said the decision of the Chancellor had been sudden and the text had been put together largely by telephone conversations between the three of them. The Chancellor himself was somewhere in a retreat where he was supposed to be taking a vacation. They had tried to reach Dr. Conant in Bonn yesterday but he had been away and was only returning there this morning.
I informed them that under the circumstances I would advise Washington that Blankenhorn was to depart from Paris by air in a few hours and would be carrying a letter from the Chancellor. I asked Hallstein if he would not arrange to return immediately to Bonn and lay the whole matter before Dr. Conant, which he said he would be delighted to do and recognized this procedure as the way it should be handled.
We had an interesting talk on other matters regarding the German situation and then broke up our cop-and-robber conference.
I called Jim Conant on the telephone and told him as best I could in guarded language, since our telephones are undoubtedly tapped both by the French and Germans, of what had happened. He said Hallstein had already called him and made an appointment to see him at 10:00 o’clock tonight.
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- Regarding Blankenhorn’s presentation of the letter in Washington, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1606–1607.↩