PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Germany 1953”
No. 202
Memorandum by Leon Fuller of the
Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff (Bowie)
Subject: Talks with Lilje and Blank
I had the opportunity last week to be present at meetings, first with Bishop Lilje of Hannover and later with Theodor Blank and his group of military experts.1 There were certain points developed in these meetings that might be of interest to you.
Bishop Lilje who has been frequently in Berlin and East Germany of late, made one point repeatedly about the recent uprisings in those areas.2 He was deeply impressed with their spontaneous character and the fact that the people of these areas looked to the West for material and moral assistance. He was of the opinion that expectations of a change in their status were exceptionally high at this time among these people, but that they saw no possibility of achieving this without Western help. Their mood was such, he asserted, that if there should be no definite moves on the part of the West indicative of its readiness to exploit the situation, there would be a serious letdown in popular morale. In fact, he said, if these people see no chance for getting assistance of some kind, their situation might well be worse than if the uprisings had never occurred. He did not indicate precisely what the West might do, but indicated that the moral factor was a significant one in the situation. The important thing, he thought, was to demonstrate our purpose and intent to do something about it.
Upon being questioned concerning the possible attitude of the Germans toward a Soviet neutralization proposal for Germany, he replied that he was confident that the Germans, of their own free will, would never approve such a solution. Their attitude was strongly antiCommunist and pro-Western. However, if in a show down the Germans were forced to choose between unity with neutralization or no unity at all, he did not feel so sure what decision they would make. He implied that if such a dilemma arose, it might require all resources of Western statesmanship to resolve it.
[Page 483]Theodor Blank —most of the points made by Herr Blank and his advisers in these talks, in which he was questioned by various Departmental representatives, related to the work of the EDC Interim Committee at Paris in seeking to perfect the organizational structure and joint military plans for EDC, and to German plans for raising and equipping a German EDC contingent.
Herr Blank felt that good progress had been made on the French protocols regarding the EDC treaty, and also regarding the British relationship to EDC. There remained a few unsettled matters, such as the initial status of the French forces in EDC, the question of whether British relationship should be by treaty or by unilateral declarations and the problem of US aid for EDC, which the French want clarified. But he felt that agreement was near on all of these matters.
The most significant point made by Herr Blank in connection with the EDC civilian and military structure was that planning was so far advanced at this time that the organization could readily be set up on short notice once ratification of the treaty is complete. Plans for the commissariat are well advanced, and it was intended that it should function rather as a unified defense ministry for the whole EDC rather that as a cabinet composed of national representatives. Military preparations for a general staff, and land, sea, and air services, and for EDC delegations to operate within the various countries of EDC are also well advanced. Much detailed work had been done in the fields of logistics, standardization of equipment, transport, production and procurement. In regard to all of these matters, Herr Blank constantly stressed the fact that rapid implementation would be possible once the treaty is ratified.
With respect to specifically German preparations for the EDC, Herr Blank stated that much progress had been made on both legal and technical aspects. There was need of a German law on recruitment and a completed draft law was now ready for consideration. However, much technical preparatory work had already been done even in the absence of a law. The first recruits would be volunteers. Eventually, a conscription law would be needed, but not until about one year after the treaty had gone into effect. Other preparations respecting status, pay, retirement, etc., had been worked out in detail.
Plans were also advanced with regard to utilization of forces. Because of the refugee situation in Germany, much new building for the troops would be required. Many decisions must wait upon the necessary legal and financial actions. Slightest progress had been made regarding the tactical air force.
When questioned closely concerning planned production for the new force, Herr Blank was most emphatic in his insistence that [Page 484] there would be no difficulty regarding any type of equipment except tanks, artillery, and planes. Ample productive facilities were available, he said, for non-military supplies, equipment, and facilities of all kinds, and also for small arms. He believed that there would be no serious problem of plant conversion in connection with the types of production required.
- Blank and the military advisers had arrived in the United States on June 30 for a 2-week stay that would include the inspection of various military installations and talks with officials in the Departments of State and Defense.↩
- A further report on Bishop Lilje’s activities in Washington is in the memorandum by Jackson, Document 722.↩