Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

No. 896
Memorandum of Discussion at the 144th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 13, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

May 13, 1953

Present at the 144th meeting of the National Security Council were the following: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 1); the Director of Defense Mobilization; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 1); General John E. Hull, for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Adm. Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the President; Major General J. S. Bradley, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Item 1); the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion and the chief points taken at the meeting.

[Here follows discussion of item 1, the eligibility of representatives of foreign governments to receive classified United States security information.]

2. Negotiations With Spain (NSC 72/6; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 11, 1953²)

After Mr. Cutler had explained the background of the negotiations with Spain for U.S. bases, with particular reference to the desire of the Defense Department to conclude the negotiations and secure the bases, he asked Secretary Smith to give the views of the State Department.

Secretary Smith said that he could add but little to Mr. Cutler’s exposition. However, he said that he was now in a position to give the Council an estimate of the total cost of the military and economic assistance which it would be necessary to give the Franco Government if we were to get our bases in Spain. This amounted to $465 million to be expended over a period of four years. Most of this sum would be spent on improving the effectiveness of the Spanish armed forces. The question before the Council was, therefore, in brief—do we want these bases so much that we are willing to pay this amount to conclude the negotiations and secure them? If we were not prepared to expend this sum, the negotiations would collapse.

Secretary Wilson observed that according to his understanding the total cost of these bases to the United States would be in the neighborhood of $800 million, including the cost of building the bases and of the military and economic assistance noted by Secretary Smith. The $800 million, however, did not include the cost of maintaining the bases once they were built. The decision seemed to Secretary Wilson a very difficult one. If we propose to spend all this money in Spain, in what other areas could we hope to effect an equivalent saving? Of course, said Secretary Wilson, the expenditure would secure us another ally. It would provide us with bases behind the Pyrenees; it would afford us an area into which we could bring evacuees from elsewhere in Western Europe in the event of war. The Air Force was very keen for the proposal, and Secretary Wilson personally thought that bases in Spain would be more secure than bases in North Africa. On the other hand, we should be involved in these arrangements with Spain for at least a ten-year period, and the expense would be heavy.

The President inquired whether the Air Force was prepared to state that the creation of these bases in Spain would justify abandonment of the bases in North Africa.

General Hull replied in the negative. It was his understanding that the Air Force still desired to secure bases in Britain and in North Africa as well as in Spain. The Air Force believed that it would need the North African bases in case it lost the British bases. It could operate with two sets of bases, but wanted the added insurance of an extra set in case any one were lost.

The President observed that if this was characteristic of the reasoning of the Air Force, the latter was certainly presenting a very good argument in favor of the value of Navy air.

In any case, said Secretary Wilson, he proposed to have these bases in Spain built along the most austere lines. There were to be no luxurious facilities and no large-scale housing. He proposed to look upon them as emergency bases rather than permanent installations.

Mr. Cutler explained what he understood to be the position of the Spanish Government and General Franco’s anxieties. Spain would commit itself to an alliance with the United States in the eyes of the Soviets if it granted these bases, and Franco therefore felt the need of a long-term agreement with the United States. Specific appropriations of money were less important to Franco than assurances that the United States proposed to play ball with Spain for a long time.

Secretary Smith stated his agreement with the position of General Franco as set forth by Mr. Cutler, and also noted that the French and the British were not hospitable to our negotiations with Spain. Secretary Smith further warned the Council that one sentence in paragraph 4 of the present report erroneously implied that the conclusion of the agreement with Spain would promptly add Spanish contingents to the European army. This, of course, was not the case, and Secretary Smith urged that the sentence be stricken.

After further discussion of the comparative desirability of securing bases in Spain and in North Africa, Secretary Smith informed the Council that the Congressional attitude on Spain must be taken into account in its present deliberations. Sketching briefly the history of the actions of Congress with regard to Spain, Secretary Smith warned that whatever the Executive branch did, the Congress was certain to insist on the provision of financial aid to Spain in the budget.

The President inquired whether the French and British Governments were likely to permit us to go ahead and conclude our agreement with Spain without kicking up a terrible fuss.

Secretary Smith replied that while they were not happy about the proposed relationship between the United States and Spain, they were less recalcitrant than in the past.

Secretary Humphrey inquired the grounds of British and French resentment about our attitude toward Spain, and the President explained to him both the ideological dislike of the Spanish Government in London and Paris, as well as the fear that in seeking bases in Spain the United States was contemplating abandoning the rest of Western Europe in the event of a Russian attack, and using Spain as a last stronghold from which to fight the Soviets elsewhere in Western Europe.

There ensued a lengthy discussion of the costs of building the Spanish bases and of the possibility that if the Air Force got its bases in Spain it would be willing to renounce other costly installations elsewhere.

In the midst of the discussion, the President said that to him the problem could be summed up in this fashion: Are we prepared to give reasonable assurance to Spain that we will continue to provide military assistance to her over a period of years in return for bases? This question, it seemed to the President, should be decided by the Department of Defense, who should then outline their position to the committees of Congress, since it was obvious that the Executive branch could not bind future Congresses.

Mr. Cutler read to the Council an action along the lines suggested by the President, but Secretary Humphrey intervened to state his firm belief that the whole problem required further study. It seemed to him, from the course of the discussion, that this Government was not sure of what it wanted from Spain, and that the Council had no authoritative information on which to base a decision to spend $800 million.

Secretary Wilson said that his own people were certainly sold on the desirability of these bases, and the President said he could not imagine that we did not know what we wanted, in view of the fact that we had been negotiating with the Spanish Government for a period of over two years.

Mr. Cutler added the reminder that the funds for military and economic assistance to Spain, as well as the funds for the construction of bases, would all have to fall within the levels of expenditure authorized for Fiscal Year 1954 in NSC 149/2.³

After further involved discussion of the question as to whether the budget for 1954 really provided the funds needed for Spain, Secretary Wilson stressed his conviction that the provision of funds for military assistance to Spain and the provision of funds for the construction of bases in Spain should run along together. He pointed out that the Spanish felt the same way. They were not seeking from us any mere moral agreement. If we did not specify the amounts of money we proposed to give them, there was danger of the charge of bad faith. Accordingly, we must enter this deal in good faith and make quite clear the limits of our assistance. Secretary Wilson said he didn’t blame the Spaniards in the least for desiring a quid pro quo from this deal, but he was also afraid that they might be raising the ante. All in all, however, if the Council decided that this was a good proposition from the military point of view, there was much to be said for concluding negotiations favorably at this particular time. We were, said Secretary Wilson, being accused on all sides of collapsing the whole program of the Air Force. Getting the Spanish bases could, therefore, be used to counteract this propaganda.

Secretary Humphrey replied that he remained wholly unconvinced by any of the arguments he had heard. He reminded the Council of his own view that the days of free spending by this Government were definitely at an end. He prophesied that, thanks to the President’s prestige and power, the Administration could get by without balancing the budget this year, but if we failed to do it in the following fiscal year it would “just be too bad.” A revolt in Congress would certainly be the upshot. it was essential, therefore, that the Administration get these wild expenditures under control. $800 million, said Secretary Humphrey, is a hell of a lot of money. If this was what State and Defense wanted, he would not object provided they were willing to give up something else as compensation for securing what they needed in Spain. In conclusion, Secretary Humphrey said that we should wait two weeks to get the answer from State and Defense before reaching a decision.

Secretary Smith pointed out, in answer to Secretary Humphrey, that this was too long to wait. The point of decision in the Spanish negotiations had been reached. Spain, too, had its internal problems. Many Spaniards were worried about granting these bases to the United States and incurring Soviet wrath. We might be able to stall off a few days, but no longer.

Secretary Humphrey remained unconvinced, and again insisted that we should not commit ourselves to spending $800 million until Secretary Wilson could tell us exactly what the Defense Department is prepared to give up in the way of other programs if it secures the bases in Spain.

Secretary Smith replied with a statement of the many intangible advantages which would flow from the conclusion of a base agreement with Spain, while General Hull outlined the military advantages which the Air Force believed would accrue from these bases. They would add enormously to the flexibility which the Air Force required in carrying out its war plans. The strategic advantages were of the greatest importance.

The President observed that the trouble was that the Air Force can never be induced to say that if we get this we will give up that. What was needed was a statement by the Air Force as to what it needed most which could be bought with $800 million.

Secretary Smith, however, pointed out that from his own experience it was impossible for military men to state precisely the answer to the President’s question. The fortunes of war were too uncertain. We would, however, have been glad in the last war to have been assured of continued Spanish non-belligerency, and would willingly have paid $800 million for such assurance.

The President then inquired as to how much of the reduction in the 1954 program for the Air Force involved reduction of its actual combat strength. He also noted his firm agreement with the view earlier expressed, that whatever the Council did, the Congress would provide money for assistance to Spain. While he was not apologizing for the cuts which it was proposed to make in the Air Force over the next few years, he did feel that there was weight in the argument that provision of bases in Spain would help to counteract the current propaganda as to the dangerous cuts that it was proposed to make in the Air Force. In conclusion, the President stated that he was frankly in favor of getting the bases in Spain, but that he would still like to have a clear and forthright exposition of the advantages that the United States would derive from securing these bases.

The Vice President inquired whether the program under discussion was the only program of assistance to Spain. Is it, in short, he inquired, $800 million or nothing?

Secretary Smith replied that we were “buying” Spain with this military and economic assistance, and would be obliged thereafter to build the bases. He again warned that Congress would certainly reappropriate the $125 million of unexpended funds for Spain, and would probably provide even more.

The Vice President expressed his wholehearted agreement with Secretary Smith’s statement, and went on to say that such provision would be made for Spain even if the Congress knocked out assistance to some other country, such as Yugoslavia.

The President then suggested that the Council postpone its decision for a week, and listen to a representative of the Air Force explain the full story of the problem of bases in Spain, so that the Council could act with full knowledge of the facts. Was it possible, inquired the President, to delay for a week?

Secretary Smith thought the interval was not too long.

After further discussion, however, the President suggested that the Secretary of Defense himself should ascertain the facts and decide whether it was a net advantage to the United States to expend the sums necessary to go through with the base program. If he decided in the affirmative, the President said he should then so report to the Secretary of State, who would report to the Congressional committees and conclude the negotiations. The President also said that he would wish the Secretary of Defense to report his decision to the Council.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted that the Acting Secretary of State requested the deletion of the following words in the first sentence of paragraph 4, page 2, of the reference memorandum:

“, and whose military forces, if properly equipped, could make a substantial contribution to a European army, thus helping to fill the vital need for immediate augmentation of Europe’s military manpower.”

b. Noted a report by Mr. Cutler that the following corrections should be made in the figures contained in the enclosure to the reference memorandum:

• Page 1, line 5: Change “$210 million” to “$225 million”.
• Page 2, par. 2–a–(2), line 1: Change “$85 million” to “$100 million”.
• Page 2, par. 2–b line 10: Change “$85 million” to “$80 million”.

c. Agreed that the Secretary of Defense:

(1) Should be given the opportunity of studying this matter further, including the possibility of realizing some compensating savings in other Air Force programs as a result of the proposed action.

(2) If he is convinced after such study that the recommended action on this subject contained in the reference memorandum is a desirable program, should so advise the Secretary of State, who would thereupon be authorized to proceed with the negotiations after discussion with the appropriate committees of Congress.

(3) Should report the action taken to the National Security Council at its next meeting.

Note: The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense for implementation.

[Here follow discussion of items 3–4, an analysis of possible courses of action in Korea and the possibilities for psychological operations based on Thailand, and a noting of the position of the United States with respect to Switzerland.]

1. Drafted by Lay on May 14.
2. See footnote 1, supra.
3. NSC 149/2, approved by President Eisenhower on Apr. 29. For text, see vol. ii, Part 1, p. 305.