S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 72 Series
No. 895
Memorandum by the Planning Board of the National Security Council to the
National Security Council1
top secret
Washington, May 11, 1953.
- Reference: NSC 72/62
- Subject: Recommended Action by the National Security Council on Negotiations with Spain
The Secretary of State should proceed with the negotiations to obtain air and naval facilities in Spain, recognizing the need for providing continuing aid to Spain over a period of several years totalling approximately $465 million for the Fiscal Years 1954 to 1957 (of which $210 million has been requested for FY 1954). The economic aid furnished will provide peseta counterpart funds, a substantial part of which will be utilized for the peseta cost of the construction of bases.
Discussion
- 1.
- In accordance with NSC 72/6, “US Policy Toward Spain” (see attachment A3), we have been negotiating with Spain for over a year for the use of air and naval facilities in Spain.
- 2.
- These negotiations have now reached a critical point. Our
negotiators believe, and the Department of State concurs, that the
Spanish Government will conclude and carry out a base agreement
satisfactory to the United States if the Executive Branch will
undertake a program of continuing military and economic aid to Spain
over a period of several years.
- a.
- The following amounts of aid are involved for FY 1954:
- (1)
- $125 million now available; and
- (2)
- $85 million in new funds which have been requested for FY 1954.
- b.
- With regard to continuing aid after FY 1954, our negotiators are convinced that no agreement can be reached unless the Spanish Government can be told that the FY 1954 aid funds initiate a [Page 1938] program to be completed over a period of several years. It will not be necessary to indicate to the Spaniards any specific amounts beyond those already requested of Congress for FY 1954. It should be understood within the Executive Branch, however, that the completion of the aid program would involve expenditures estimated to average approximately $85 million for three successive years beginning with FY 1955.
- 3.
- The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff state that the use of the air and naval facilities in Spain are of urgent importance to U.S. national security. They are, in fact, more important today than when negotiations were opened one year ago. From the military point of view, there are no equally satisfactory alternative areas for the bases.
- 4.
- An agreement with Spain would add to the Western alliance in the event of war a country which could provide depth to the defense of Western Europe against the most probable enemy of NATO and whose military forces, if properly equipped, could make a substantial contribution to a European army, thus helping to fill the vital need for immediate augmentation of Europe’s military manpower. Spain could also be a safe haven, in case of the invasion of Western Europe, for U.S. and allied civilians pending their orderly evacuation. Utilization of bases in this area by the United States would (1) provide greater flexibility of movement for military forces; (2) provide additional means for dispersion of bases in the conduct of offensive or defensive operations, particularly the counter air effort; (3) permit continuity of effort in the event other bases become temporarily untenable; (4) fulfill a requirement for expansion of counter air attack; (5) guarantee control of Gibraltar and the Western Mediterranean; (6) provide additional bases for anti-submarine warfare; (7) increase the protection of the sea approaches to southern France and assist in preventing enemy submarine egress from the Mediterranean and (8) give a right of overflight of Spanish territory, which is essential in case of global war.
- Circulated under a covering memorandum by Lay, May 11, which noted that the recommended action was based on a Department of State draft.↩
- For text of NSC 72/6, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iv, Part 1, p. 820.↩
- Not printed; it was an 11-line summary of NSC 72/6.↩