Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

751.00/6–2854: Telegram

No. 642
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

confidential

Paris, June 28, 1954—7 p.m.

5069. After first week of Mendes-France Govt following are our impressions and conclusions:

1. His Assembly support, despite outward appearance to the contrary, has narrowed since he received 419 votes for investiture on June 18. Although he obtained 421 votes on June 24, number of radicals in that total dropped from 72 to 63 and Social Republicans (ex-URAS) from 59 to 56. Overall increase was due to larger vote of the classical right (Independents, Peasants and ARS) which is definitely in opposition but merely vote yes to give him all the rope he needs until July 20. (MRP abstained for similar reasons.)

2. Cabinet contains some “fresh, young blood” but it is essentially weak. Mendes tried hard to obtain MRP participation but got only two mavericks who have since been thrown out of their parlimentary group. He also tried to induce minority Socialists to enter his govt but even the lone wolf Lacoste, who had long been regarded as available, refused. He wanted Soustelle in his cabinet to guarantee de Gaulle’s support, but Soustelle did not come in and de Gaulle on June 21 again scathingly denounced “present regime which, whatever may be intentions of individuals, can only produce illusions and fumblings.”

3. His investiture appears to have caused widespread hope and relief particularly in quarters desirous of peace in Indochina, but no real enthusiasm except in leftist and intellectual circles and there seems to be no wave of sentiment comparable to that caused by his near-successful investiture attempt year ago. Even the magazine L’Express, which is warmest supporter of Mendes-France, does not claim that his investiture has stirred the country this time and even speaks of “an immense need for explanations and reassurances required to nourish the practically universal hope” among the people.

4. Mendes has adroitly proceeded to provide those explanations and reassurances directly to the people and in this he is breaking important new ground. (Laniel’s broadcast reply to the strikers last year was amateurish bluster whereas Mendes has excellent fireside chat manner.) To what extent he can consolidate public support and if necessary use it to pressure Assembly to pass specific legislation remains to be seen. Certainly Assembly itself does not like to see Premier appeal “over its head” to the country.

5. Even if Mendes obtains Indochina truce by July 20 it does not appear likely at present writing that he would be able then to broaden his cabinet. Socialists, although under considerable pressure to participate, would first wish to discuss his economic program and MRP would probably require commitment re EDC. However, we are not sure Assembly could hold him too closely to July 20 deadline if by that time agreement on Indochina seemed imminent. On other hand it seems clear that if he does not produce such agreement fairly soon after the deadline, he will be pole-axed.

6. What would happen after Indochina settlement if he obtains one is hard to predict, but we are inclined to feel that wave of national gratitude and upsurge of his prestige predicted by some observers may be smaller and briefer than expected; for the psychological atmosphere is not at all comparable for instance to Munich: In 1938 everybody feared imminent war and was relieved when it did not happen. Today most people expect imminent peace and will be greatly disappointed if it not obtained soon but not necessarily startled or overjoyed when it comes: Early peace in Far East is now widely taken for granted.

7. Because Mendes would probably benefit only from brief period of euphoria in Assembly after possible Indochina settlement, he would have to act fast if he is to put even initial part of his economic program through, for opposition to that program is considerable. Communists will most likely switch back from support to opposition and MRP, which is now virtually an opposition party, would at best give only limited support to economic program as long as EDC not decided. Moreover, Radical and Social Republican support bound to decline after IC settlement. Consequently we feel Mendes faces tight squeeze in getting economic program going. However, we believe he will seek some Assembly action in that field before EDC showdown.

8. Assuming, then, that he produces Indochina settlement before summer recess and that he is able to get at least some special powers from Assembly in economic field (which in that case is not improbable), he would still carry considerable weight in EDC debate. We believe if he were willing to throw that weight to side favoring ratification without amendments (or with minor face-saving conditions for deposition of ratification instrument), he could achieve satisfactory majority. But his intentions in that regard are at best cloudy at present. In any event such action on his part would probably produce exodus of Social Republicans from his cabinet and their substitution by MRP, which would change entire complexion of Govt, necessitating new appraisal of his prospects.

Dillon

1. Repeated to London and Bonn.