EUR files, lot 59 D 233, “Letters—France, July–Dec. 1954”
No. 643
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)
Dear Livie: Here are some further thoughts on the new Mendès-France Government. I feel that these thoughts are somewhat more [Page 1425] important than those in my last letter,1 and I think it would be worthwhile for you to pass them along to the Secretary and others in the Department.
Mendès himself has continued to show a most complete spirit of cooperation, and he has apparently instilled that spirit in all his people at the Quai d’Orsay. I had a visit with Guerin de Beaumont, which I did not report by telegram as our talk contained nothing that was startlingly new, but Beaumont on his own emphasized Mendès’ wish to have the best possible relations with the U.S. In talking about the EDC Beaumont mentioned his own plan briefly, but only referred to the part of his plan which postponed the entry into force of certain provisions of the EDC. He did not even mention that part of his plan which changed the functions of the Commissariat.
By far the most startling change in the Quai d’Orsay is the attitude of Parodi whom I have seen several times. Parodi is obviously very pleased with the new government. He told me that he had served as a Minister in de Gaulle’s original government with Mendès and had known and respected him ever since. Prior to the last two weeks, Parodi, whenever I have seen him, has always been very correct and formal. His attitude could even have been described as chilly. Now, on the contrary, he is friendly in the extreme and says every time I see him that he is making it his personal responsibility to see that Franco-American relations continue to be of the closest.
To my complete surprise the other day, he brought up the question of the EDC, and said that he felt that Mendès might be able to finally put it through the National Assembly. He said that he had served under Robert Schuman and Bidault, and that while Schuman had been responsible for negotiating the EDC, he had never even submitted it to the French Parliament. Bidault, according to Parodi, always avoided the issue and never made a determined effort to push the EDC to a vote. On the other hand, Parodi said that he now expected some action from Mendès. His whole attitude was as if he were in favor of the EDC. Since his opposition in the past is well known it is difficult to know exactly how to evaluate his new attitude.
This changed attitude by Parodi and the other career people in the Quai d’Orsay has been confirmed to me by Harold Callender of the New York Times and Kleiman of U.S. News and World Report. They both report to me that now that the career elements in the Quai d’Orsay have a much greater responsibility for the actual conduct of foreign relations, their attitude on EDC has changed very [Page 1426] considerably. They are apparently very afraid of the prospect of having to negotiate some new agreement alone face to face with present-day Germany. Therefore, the EDC looks far better to them than it ever has in the past.
All this leads up to the more or less surprising conclusion that Mendès, if he should stay in power, probably will have much more power and ability to obtain ratification of the EDC with only minor face saving changes than a government headed, for instance, by Bidault. Mendès is known as a person who is more or less uncommitted on EDC, and if he should come out strongly for it as he indicates he will, it would have a powerful impact on the wavering vote in the Assembly, particularly if he has been successful in obtaining an Indochina settlement. Therefore, more than ever before, the fate of EDC in France seems to depend on the decision of one man—Mendès-France.
I think it is a safe assumption that the confrontations now going on between Bourges-Maunoury and General Koenig will not result in any agreement, and that Mendès will have to then write his own ticket. If he confines himself to changes which are really minor and face saving in nature, and then pushes hard for ratification, my own feeling is that he will be successful. If, on the other hand, he should insist on changes of principle, the EDC would be dead, at least for some time to come.
In view of this fact, and coupled with Mendès’ very evident desire to work closely with us, I think it is most important that we act in the most friendly manner possible towards him personally, and thus encourage him in his evident desire to cooperate with us.
While some of the entourage surrounding him when he came to power were, to say the least, questionable, his appointments to his personal cabinet at the Quai d’Orsay have been excellent. This does not apply, however, to his cabinet as Président du Conseil in which there are a number of individuals about whom we are not too happy. Therefore, I feel it is important that we should do nothing to force or push him towards the views of his more neutralist minded supporters.
It is clear that Mendès knows very little of the problems of conducting foreign relations—he has said as much to me several times, and in particular, he has never studied the problem of Franco-German [Page 1427] relations and the EDC. He has a lot to learn and I think we should try and be as helpful as possible during this educational process.
Best wishes.2
Sincerely,