Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

EUR files, lot 59 D 233, EUR subject files

No. 641
The Defense Adviser to the United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Voorhees) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hensel)¹

top secret

Paris, June 24, 1954.

Dear Struve: General Bill Donovan came over here with me from New York and stayed with me for two days before starting on for Bangkok.² Both of us met with David Bruce and later with Douglas Dillon. Their appraisals of certain aspects of the present situation may be of interest and use to you, although in considerable part they may merely duplicate, or perhaps serve further to corroborate, information which you already have. I, of course, present this subject to inevitable inaccuracies in recollection of long conversations of which I took no notes at the time.

General Donovan believes that the partition of Vietnam will occur, with the complete surrender of Hanoi, Haiphong and the Delta area; that Laos and Cambodia are likely to be neutralized, and therefore left without defense; that the infiltration of the Communists into Laos and Cambodia, which has already occurred and which will increase, will probably result in these areas later being taken over by the Communists; that it is critically important to develop strength west of Indochina to prevent the above factors from resulting in the collapse of Southeast Asia. He counts strongly on the Thais. He recommends that the United States, by agreement with Thailand—an agreement which he considers could be made without difficulty—establish a U.S. air base near the eastern border of Thailand (there is a site for this which he considers suitable); that the U.S. station there a USAF air wing of 75 fighter planes. He feels that this would be a tremendous strengthening factor to the entire area. If this is done he believes that the British will furnish additional air strength to protect Malaya. He considers also that the increasing threat, both to Thailand and Burma, will tend to draw these countries closer together, and that the Burmese will also take more effective steps for their own defense. He thinks this will not be done by the Burmese particularly publicly, but that it can be done in conjunction with the British. He is optimistic that if these vigorous measures are taken, the collapse of a substantial portion, or perhaps all, of Indochina will not result in the loss of Malaya, Thailand and Burma.

Ambassador Bruce is, I believe, a uniquely well informed and wise counselor in connection with EDC. It was an excellent move, in my judgment, for the Republican Administration to keep him on active duty. He is obviously tired and weary of his job, but I think will continue to furnish to the United States, and to you, invaluable counsel. I shall try to make arrangements for you to have an adequate private conference with him on your proposed trip here.

He talked with General Donovan and me at length and with the utmost frankness. He believes that the French are likely almost completely to surrender in Indochina. As to getting EDC through, he feels that our most serious source of weakness is the British. He says that the British for the past several weeks have been negotiating with leading Frenchmen opposed to EDC on possible modifications of EDC, and considers that such negotiations under present conditions are literally poison for EDC. He states flatly that there have been the votes available in the Chamber of Deputies for the past nine months to pass EDC, and that the failure to do so has been entirely a result of the maneuvering of the politicians rather than a lack of votes. He says that the Benelux countries are bitter over the French inaction and that any attempted passage of EDC with modifications would not be accepted by them and would be a loss rather than a gain. He considers that Adenauer’s position will become precarious by fall unless EDC is passed. He still feels that it may be possible to pass EDC in its present form, and that, if this should fail, the only alternative is a German entry into NATO. If the latter should occur he believes that it can only be done upon the basis of unrestricted equal membership for the Germans, not a second-grade membership as some are now thinking would be possible.

In efforts to get the French to pass EDC, he considers that our greatest obstacle is the weakness of the position taken by the British, and particularly, Eden. He feels that the French are gravely concerned about U.S. independent negotiations with the British without the French being included, and that if a firm, strong, united stand could be worked out by the United States with the British it would have a great influence on the French. He thinks that if this were not sufficient negotiations between the Americans and the British on the one hand and the Germans on the other, without including the French, would exert a further influence. He feels, therefore, that a very strong stand is necessary with the British. General Donovan underlines this with colorful accents.

In our meeting with Ambassador Dillon, he independently emphasized the damage to the prospects of EDC resulting from the recent negotiations by the British with leading Frenchmen who are opposed to EDC in its present form, seeking an acceptable modification of EDC. Both he and Ambassador Bruce feel that any French modification of EDC would inevitably involve the elimination of the supranational authority, and would therefore not only prevent the accomplishment of EDC, but would also undermine the coal and steel community already in existence on a supranational basis.

As to the relation of the military assistance program and offshore procurement to the above, we discussed this subject with Ambassador Bruce but only touched on it with Ambassador Dillon. Mr. Bruce feels that it would be desirable for us radically to slow down our offshore procurement contracts and our deliveries of end item equipment pending clarification of EDC’s status. He thinks that this should be applied not only to France and Italy, which have not approved EDC, but generally to the European countries. He feels that such action should not be announced publicly, but believes that it would be very promptly understood by the European countries. He feels that this would have some benefit in promoting EDC, although the benefit would be marginal in character and that the main reliance for approval of EDC must be on obtaining a firm position on the part of the British under which they would line up with the United States. Nevertheless, he considers that such retardation of MDAP deliveries and OSP contracts would result first in some pressure by industrial firms upon the governments when the firms do not get the OSP contracts which they so much desire. This would be akin to the industrial pressure groups with which we are so familiar in our own Congress. He also feels that the slowing up of OSP contracts and MDAP deliveries to other countries which have ratified EDC might well lead to their exerting pressure on the French so that the pressure would not primarily be coming from the United States alone. He thinks that it is most desirable for such pressure to come from other countries also, such as the Benelux countries. He believes that the latter are prepared to press the French.

As a footnote to the above, the following is a general comment: The Defense Department alone now has large funds available for European aid, both through deliveries of military end items, through offshore procurement contracts, infrastructure aid, and funds for military bases. Economic aid through FOA is now nearly at an end for the principal countries. Our military aid program, and particularly our OSP program, has under present conditions, perhaps even greater political than military significance. The time has come when it is critically important that the Defense Department’s resources of military aid and OSP be effectively mobilized in U.S. negotiations.

It is equally important, I believe, that a reexamination be made of these programs. While all of the present funds have been “programmed”, the programs were largely developed under a military concept as to conditions, weapons, and military strengths different from those which at present seem probable. Even if EDC is approved, the number of divisions will fall very far short of those planned 2½ years ago as the minimum necessary. The types of weapons and fighting will probably be different from those contemplated in the plans developed at Lisbon. The military threat, instead of being one which would become most acute in two or three years as contemplated at Lisbon in February 1952, is now one which may last for forty years. The roughly 7½ billion dollars unspent for military aid for Europe represents almost all—at least, so I believe—of the only money which we will have available for European military aid. We are continuing to spend this money and deliver the items on a program and plan which may be in greater or less degree outmoded.

The responsibility which you have to bring order out of this situation is a very great one and the opportunity which you have is correspondingly challenging. Under present conditions it is my belief at least that your position in the Defense Department may well be a post second to none in importance.

With warm regards.

Yours faithfully,

Tracy

1. Attached to the source text was a memorandum by Hensel, dated June 28, which indicated that this letter was forwarded to Merchant for his information. Markings on the text indicate that it was circulated by Merchant to RA.
2. William J. Donovan was en route to Thailand where he was serving as Ambassador.