Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/12–1453: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State ¹

top secret

Paris, December 14, 1953—5 p.m.

2282. Following summary conversation afternoon December 13 Adenauer with Secretary Dulles² accompanied by Conant and MacArthur.

Secretary congratulated Adenauer results German elections. Later [Latter?] stated outcome elections gave German Government presently much needed stability and consistency. Secretary commented on importance of government on continent of Europe which could take strong and constructive positions with respect any common problems confronting us. Constructive leadership especially important now. Adenauer replied objectives Germany and United States alike in European as well as world problems.

Secretary stated implementation EDC immediate task and hoped EPC would follow shortly since without European unity Europe had little future.

Adenauer said he more optimistic after arrival Paris. Thought would be helpful if Italy ratified EDC near future and before vote in French Assembly. Secretary said he had impression Italian action improbable prior settlement Trieste. Added such settlement would require time although United States trying hard bring it about. Adenauer agreed adding his talks with Italian officials and Yugoslav Ambassador Bonn indicated firm desire both sides for settlement.

On French Parliamentary situation re EDC, Adenauer said according his calculation there about 310 voted in favor EDC and 300 against. Much therefore depends on mood of Parliament when vote taken. He likened situation to that prevailing at time of vote on Schuman Plan. To help situation in France and create proper mood in Parliament Chancellor said he considering announcing a German decision purchase more wine and meat in France at appropriate moment. Believes this would have good effect among French farmers and in turn upon peasant and conservative vote in Parliament. Secretary expressed belief it possible obtain ratification through combined influences which might be exercised when EDC came to vote and that important thing was to bring EDC to vote in French Parliament.

Adenauer saw less difficulty bringing EDC to vote and felt after presidential elections new government would initiate parliamentary process leading to definite vote.

Secretary pointed to Saar and projected four-power meeting with Soviets³ as delaying factors. Adenauer agreed vote would be delayed till after four-power meeting but confident Saar would be solved. Referred to communiqué following his talk with Bidault December 12 as best yet issued on subject.

Secretary said Saar settlement would require sacrifices on Chancellor’s part but these would lead to tremendous benefits Germany and Europe.

Secretary referred to possible impression elements in Germany might have received from United States visitors and military figures to effect EDC not really important and failing EDC, United States would develop some alternative solution with Germany. Said he wished make clear this was not the case. Chancellor expressed full understanding of United States position in this respect.

Adenauer referred to four-power meeting and expressed concern over opportunity for delay which it presented. His principal worry is French would fall for Soviet delaying tactics. Said if conference came to dead end, it very important that public opinion, especially in France see failure as result Soviet obstructionism. Secretary agreed and replied that general agreement had been reached at Bermuda⁴ that meeting should last no more than two or three weeks. Adenauer indicated that if conference could be terminated in four to five weeks West would be well out of it. Secretary assured Chancellor that if four-power meeting held we would work in close contact with him but in manner best calculated take account French sensibilities. Adenauer said he fully recognized French sensibilities had to be taken account particularly by Germany.

Secretary said from standpoint Europe’s security presence United States forces in Europe is deemed very important. United States hoped to continue this kind of contribution so long as it serves really useful purpose. Chancellor replied everyone in Germany convinced usefulness United States forces in Europe and Germany, adding that relations between United States forces and German population excellent. Secretary referred to rumors that in event EDC and development German forces this would be signal for retreat United States forces from continent but stated in his opinion reverse is true.

In answer to Secretary’s query regarding paper (United Kingdom-French draft)⁵ which French had given him regarding declaration on European security, Chancellor said he had examined it and had some suggestions. He felt text of paper did not adequately reflect EDC–NATO relationship. He said paper in present form referred to “strictly defensive character of EDC, of which the forces cannot be employed except for the protection of the territory of member states against an armed attack in Europe”. This phrase he said did not take account of (1) where NATO forces not in EDC are attacked; (2) if an attack is launched against UK or UK forces in EDC countries; and (3) if other NATO countries are attacked. He made reference to EDC–NATO protocols and to treaty between UK and EDC. He said Germans would give their comments to French but felt in general there should be deletions of existing text to bring it in line with envisaged relationship between EDC and NATO, and particularly to emphasize its defensive aspects. Secretary agreed paper in present form needed change.

In reply question we would receive German comments on German elections and formation and status of all-German government, Hallstein replied a short paper would be given to US, UK and French.⁶ He added it essential this paper be amplified by oral explanation since conflicting views within different German ministries made it impossible to sum up entire situation in paper. He envisaged Dr. Grewe would be present in Paris during tripartite working group meetings so he could give oral explanations as required.

Secretary expressed personal agreement on desirability Dr. Grewe’s presence Paris, but United States would have to consult with UK and French before giving definitive reply. He again emphasized United States desire have closest possible contact and cooperation with Chancellor Adenauer. Chancellor expressed great appreciation and said one of his guiding principles for long time had been belief in absolute necessity to cooperate with United States.

Achilles

1. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Moscow.
2. Dulles was in Paris for the Twelfth Session of the North Atlantic Council; for documentation on the Council meeting, see pp. 454 ff.
3. Documentation on the Four-Power Conference at Berlin, Jan. 25–Feb. 18, 1954 is presented in volume vii .
4. For documentation on the Bermuda Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, see pp. 1710 ff.
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. The paper under reference has not been identified further.