Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Europe, 1952–53”

Memorandum by Leon W. Fuller of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of That Staff (Bowie)¹

top secret

Washington, December 10, 1953.

Subject:

• EUR and JCS Views on EDC Alternatives

Certain recent developments seem to complicate the problem of getting an agreed State–Defense draft on alternatives to EDC.

EUR has been considering the S/P draft with a view to presenting a consolidated EUR position in the matter, but this has not as yet been forthcoming. Meanwhile there is evidence of substantial divergence of opinion within EUR on the question.

GER, in general, accepts the analysis and conclusions of the S/P paper but has offered a number of constructive comments, most of which were incorporated in the summary version of my paper I gave you on December 2 [1?].²

RA and WE, apparently, dissent from the S/P paper in important respects. First, they mistakenly assume that our paper is based on the premise that we will be faced with outright French rejection of EDC, and must act accordingly. There is, of course, no such assumption in the S/P draft—it merely recognizes the possibility that the French, whether by rejection, or delay, or counter-proposals, may eventually force us to the conclusion that we can no longer build our policy on hopes of getting EDC. It then faces frankly the necessity of an alternative course of action in such event.

An RA proposal (approved by WE in a memorandum from Jones to Bonbright of December 7)³ avoids the issue by dismissing all actual alternatives as impracticable, and proposing what it frankly admits “is not really an alternative but rather an interim solution consistent with the attainment of EDC.” This would be to have the US and UK give partial effect to the Contractuals within their zones and authorize the Germans to create military units to be attached to the US and UK forces in Germany under US–UK command. This, it would seem, would be intended as a tactical device to induce the French eventually to ratify EDC.

This seems to me characteristic of much of the thinking in EUR concerning the problem. Every attempt to grapple with the problem resolves itself into an effort to develop a tactical approach that is aimed mainly at getting the French ultimately to espouse EDC. The real issue of alternatives is avoided. It is quite natural that EUR desk people should do this, first because of the unsatisfactory nature of all conceivable alternatives, and second, because it is their main business to get EDC, from which they do not wish to be diverted even in their thinking.

Even as an interim measure, it seems to me that the RA–WE proposal is highly objectionable. It would be obnoxious almost equally to the French and Germans. It would constitute unilateral US–UK action to begin rearming the Germans without French approval in clear violation of present tripartite agreements. To the Germans, now more impatiently demanding full equality than ever, it would offer only the “privilege” of providing mercenary troops under alien command for an indefinite period, i.e., until France chose to ratify EDC. It must be that the real intent behind this proposal is to use it as a tactical device (the threat to go through with it) to induce the French to accept EDC.

Meanwhile the JCS have produced their own proposals⁴ in the form of briefing notes for Admiral Radford in connection with NSC discussion of the problem. The line of thinking is much nearer the S/P draft than the RA–WE proposal, except that the JCS paper makes a purely military approach. The paper sees only full German membership in NATO as a possible alternative (most desirable from the military viewpoint) but considers that the French will almost certainly reject this. Other conceivable alternatives are dismissed for the same reasons as in the S/P draft. Its conclusion is that, in default either of EDC or German membership in NATO, we will be forced to review NATO policy, adapting it to a peripheral (insular-peninsular) defense strategy in Europe.

The JCS paper does not consider the far-reaching implications of withdrawal to a peripheral strategy with respect to US political objectives in Europe, but presents it solely as a course that military considerations may force upon us.

Thus at present there exist:

1. An S/P draft that attempts the difficult task of presenting an actual alternative to EDC, in the event one is needed, which seeks to salvage and extend our political gains in Europe while offering a compromise arrangement for getting a German defense contribution on terms conceivably acceptable both to France and Germany;

2. An RA–WE proposal that dismisses the possibility of real alternatiyes and presents an interim plan for building German armed units, mainly as a tactical device to induce the French to accept EDC; and

3. A JCS draft that dismisses all alternatives except full German membership in NATO, but, considering that unacceptable to the French, indicates that, lacking either EDC or admission of Germany to NATO, we will be forced to a retrogressive peripheral strategy of defense in Europe.

It seems to me that further thought needs to be devoted to this problem, with a view to arriving at what Mr. Cutler wanted—a single State–Defense position—before any decision is taken by the NSC. There is still, I hope, a possibility of reaching an agreed State position. Judging from the JCS draft, it should then be not too difficult to arrive at a joint proposal for presentation to the Planning Board.

1. Sent also to Jacob D. Beam of the Policy Planning Staff.
2. Not printed; but see the second editorial note, p. 859.
3. Supra.
4. Not found in Department of State files. A memorandum from Beam to Bowie, Dec. 9, on the subject “Defense Department Paper on Alternatives to EDC” appears to summarize the reference proposals; a copy is in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Europe, 1952–53”.