Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 420
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)1
Participants:
- Secretary Dulles, Secretary Anderson, Ambassador Hughes, Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Bowie, Mr. McCardle, and Mr. Martin.
- Sir Anthony Eden, Sir Harold Macmillan, Sir Harold Caccia, Sir Christopher Steel and Sir Gladwyn Jebb.
- Mr. Pearson, Mr. Campney and Mr. Wilgress.
Sir Anthony opened the meeting by asking the Secretary what he thought of the British form of resolution which had been approved by the Cabinet (attached Annex A2).
The Secretary said he would first like to say a few words about the situation as he understood it. MC–48, which was a unanimous report by the military experts, set forth their judgment as to the best way and perhaps only way to defend Europe against a Soviet assault, and asked authority to make plans and preparations on this basis. This presents a different question from how such plans were to be put into operation in the event of hostilities. It is the difference between making “war plans” which is for the military authorities and declaring war, which is for the civilian authorities in the United States.
At its meeting the Council must decide whether to approve planning on the basis recommended by the experts. Since the European members have always favored a forward strategy it is hard to conceive that the Council would direct the military authorities to plan on a [Page 548] negative basis. If it did, that would raise serious questions for the U.S. in keeping its troops in Europe as it might for the British. The resolution should make clear that the question of deciding actually to go to war is not involved. The early draft of resolution may have been ambiguous. Of course, such a resolution would not solve that question but it would at least allow the military authorities to go ahead in planning without waiting for the Council to settle on how the forces would be ordered into action. In practice the effort to answer that question may pose issues which can be solved only by the event. No member can delegate authority to declare war; yet any procedure requiring approval of all NATO members to oppose an attack would seriously hamper both the deterrent effect and the defense. In actual hostilities it might be impossible even to consult because of difficulties of communication. An effort to create a standing political group for such decisions would raise many new problems. Maybe these will have to be faced ultimately, but we have got on so far without solving this problem.
The Secretary therefore suggested changing the resolution to make clear it relates only to planning and preparations by the military.…
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The Secretary suggested that the issue might be resolved by a resolution which (1) approved MC–48 as a basis for planning and preparation of the forces and (2) noted that the approval did not involve any delegation of responsibility of the governments for putting plans into action in the event of hostilities. Secretary Anderson said the resolution must avoid implying that NATO had not settled the issue of use. Otherwise, the resolution would impair the deterrent effect. Messrs. Pearson and Eden thought the Secretary’s suggestion was a good solution. Sir Harold Macmillan said that it was not practical to plan both for defense on the Rhine and a forward defense at the same time, but still that it would comfort the public to know that the statesman had not abdicated to the military authorities.
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