Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 423

Record of Background Press Conference by the Secretary of State¹

official use only

Paris, December 16, 1954.

Secretary Dulles: I think you probably better start asking questions right away.

Question: Mr. Secretary, I think I speak for a great many—if not all—in asking if you could say anything at all about what you expect to discuss with Eden and Mendes-France. That would be a very good starting point.

Secretary Dulles: I imagine that while we have not any fixed agenda or any limitations we probably will, in the first instance, discuss some of the questions that may come up at the meeting; notably, the discussion revolving around this paper that the Military Committee put in about the prospective defense of Western Europe.

There is a good deal of talk which raises, I think, a somewhat artificial issue on the question of if it is agreed that considerable dependence should be placed upon atomic weapons, certainly tactical weapons, in defense of Western Europe and that the approval of that military plan and the preparations would in some way involve political considerations, at this time, to use atomic weapons. Naturally, the fact that you have atomic weapons increases the likelihood of their use. Still, there is not the difficulty, that I know of, of making a political decision today which would be binding on some unpredictable date—a date which we hope will never arrive—as to what should actually be done.

This is a part of military planning and military preparation which every country goes through but I think in no country—certainly not in the United States—does the fact that your military equipment includes atomic weapons mean that there is any automatic decision to use them. That would be decided in circumstances and events which call for such a decision. I assume that it would be the same here.

In other words, what I understand the Council will deal with tomorrow is a program which the military people have devised and which involves a certain dependence upon atomic weapons. That is for planning preparation purposes not involving political decisions as to the use.

Question: Will there be any discussion at the meeting as to how a political decision as to the use of atomic weapons will be arrived at?

Secretary Dulles: I wouldn’t be surprised if there were some discussion about it. I would also be surprised if there was any agreement about it because to my mind it is the kind of thing that does not lend itself to any rigid formula.

I know that our planning in the United States assumes that in the event of an all out war there might be a very considerable interruption of communication facilities, for example. It cannot be assumed that it would be possible to pick up a telephone as was done in the last war when President Roosevelt and Churchill talked over the phone for five or ten minutes and made a decision. It is quite unlikely that that facility of communications would exist today with communication facilities jamming, cable cutting, and the like. All those things require that you take different premises for your thinking and whereas it was permissible during the last war—and while the principle of consultation is something which is readily acceptable—the assurance that that can be implemented is quite a different matter so that you cannot make your military decisions wholly dependent upon the facilities of communication that may be nonexistent. There probably will be an exchange of views on that general subject.

I doubt whether any rigid formula would emerge.

Question: Mr. Secretary, under our law can the President delegate his authority to decide on the use of atomic weapons to any subordinate?

Secretary Dulles: Well, I would prefer not to go into that question. It is somewhat of a classified matter.

[Here follows the record of a series of questions and answers regarding the Saar question.]

Question: Can the remarks of the President with respect to the atomic business² be taken to mean that we recognize a right to veto on the part of all fourteen, or ultimately fifteen members of the NATO in regard to this matter?

Secretary Dulles: I don’t think that is the correct interpretation of what the President said.

Question: Do we have an attitude that we take, sir, on this French proposal for an Atomic Standing Group parallel to the Military Standing Group?

Secretary Dulles: I have not seen any such proposal. I understand that it was referred to in an editorial in Le Monde last night. That is the first I heard.

[Here follows a lengthy series of questions and answers on the situation in Indochina and the possibility of an Austrian State Treaty.]

Question: Mr. Secretary, could you clarify for a moment your position with respect to this military paper? Am I correct in the assumption that you will support the principle of SHAPE having the right to base its defense plans on the assumption that they will be able to use atomic weapons in the event of war? But there will be no decision here on the execution of those plans?

Secretary Dulles: I will put it a little bit differently. I would say that it is the view of the United States with reference to NATO forces just as it is our view with reference to US forces, that the job of the military is to plan for the most effective defense that is possible. That is their job.

Now the question as to when and under what circumstances you would use that defense invokes all of those elements that are matters decided on in the light of actual events and as decided, I might say, by the civilian branch of the government and not by the military themselves.

Question: Don’t you have to solve that latter problem before an emergency develops, or before the danger of a surprise attack develops? Isn’t it something that can’t be left up in the air?

Secretary Dulles: I am afraid that it is something that to some extent has to be left up in the air. We found that is the case with reference to our own military planning. That is, that it is not possible to make in advance the decisions as to just when atomic weapons will be used and whether they will be used for tactical purposes or strategic purposes. All of those decisions have to be left for decision in the light of events and are left for decision in the light of events.

Question: Are you optimistic over passage or ratification of the WEU Treaty next week, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Dulles: By the French Chamber of Deputies?

Question: Yes.

Secretary Dulles: I have no reason to doubt it, but as I say, that means guessing a political situation of a foreign country.

Question: Is it your understanding that the operations that might be carried out by the Strategic Air Command are not subject to the same restraints or vetoes that might apply to the use of tactical atomic weapons in Europe?

Secretary Dulles: When you refer to the Strategic Air Command you are referring to the US?

Question: Yes.

Secretary Dulles: That would not necessarily be bound by any arrangements that were made here in relation to NATO because the President said yesterday³ that there are some areas where the United States has an unquestioned right to act alone. That would apply at least to certain operations of the Strategic Air Command. It might not apply to their operations when they proceed from foreign bases, but there are many areas where the Strategic Air Command could act without any occasion or requirement of consultation, although broadly speaking, under any circumstances which seem likely to involve a general war involving ourselves and our allies, we would just as a matter of decency and enlightened judgment want to have a maximum, agreed change of views with our allies.

Your allies are far more effective allies if they feel that they are in on the consultation, than they are if they are not. The broad principle of consultation, to the extent practicable, is one that we not only accept but welcome as one of the ingredients of a wholesome relationship.

Question: I was thinking of SAC operations against the NATO area in Europe.

Secretary Dulles: SAC doesn’t operate against NATO areas.

Question: Areas which directly concern NATO: that is to say, Europe.

Secretary Dulles: SAC operates on the assumption of a war with the Soviet Union. SAC operates against Russia.

Question: Yes.

Secretary Dulles: Then comes the question, I would suppose, as to where the various strategic air operations take off from. They could take off from anyplace around the world.

Question: Mr. Secretary, you don’t feel that there is a tendency on the part of some of the smaller nations in respect to NATO forces to restrict their use of atomic tactical weapons so as to make Europe safe for local wars?

Secretary Dulles: Well, I don’t know. I have not had contact here yet with the representatives that you refer to as “small” countries. I have not had contact with either the British or the French.

In general, there has been a strong sentiment in Europe that what they wanted was not a condition which would permit their being liberated. They said that it was not worthwhile being liberated if the Russians came in. They wanted to be defended. Now, we believe that a situation can be created where Europe, if invaded, would be liberated. We believe that if the great industrial capacity of the United States can be preserved, which we think can measurably be done through our continental defense system, then Ave would eventually win a war but that would not necessarily stop an invasion of Europe. If Europe depends for its defense wholly upon conventional weapons, then, according to the military people, it would not be defensible. They have worked out this plan, which is the plan they think enables Europe to be defended and the only way Europe can be defended.

It is to a considerable extent up to the people here whether they want—military people provisionally at least—a working basis to plan and operate on strategically on which they could defend Europe, or whether they don’t want them to.

Question: Mr. Secretary, you expressed a desire to get along with our allies in the general sense. Do you think this could be extended to the possibility of restricting America’s freedom of choice to use available weapons, including all nuclear weapons?

Secretary Dulles: You are not talking about the defense of Europe in general?

Question: The general defense of the world.

Secretary Dulles: As the President said yesterday, there are a number of respects in which the United States must be and remain free to act alone. In other words, Ave do not accept a general, global right of nations to restrict our actions so that no action can be taken unless a large number agree. One of the main purposes of all this atomic business is not to fight a war but to deter a war. If your deterrent measures are so restricted that the potential enemy could feel reasonably confident that you would be subject to political delays and inhibitions, you lose your deterrent power and make more and more likely a deterrent to be ineffective. It must be something that the potential aggressor thinks will work and work quickly. If you so enmesh it with political machinery and requirements to action which many times cannot work or work only after long delay, then you lose the main purpose of it which is not to fight a war but to prevent a war.

(Whereupon, at 3:07 O’clock, p.m., Thursday, December 16, 1954, the press conference was closed.)

1. The source text indicates that the conference was held at Ambassador Dillon’s residence in Paris at 2:50 p.m. There is no indication of the name of the recording officer.
2. During his press conference on Dec. 15, 1954, President Eisenhower commented at length on questions which one reporter characterized as concerning “the atomic defense of Western Europe”; for the text of the press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1954, pp. 1103–1113.
3. See footnote 2, above.