Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/3–1253

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)

secret

Washington, March 12, 1953.

Participants:

• The President
• Secretary Dulles
• Douglas MacArthur, 2d
• Lord Ismay¹

After an exchange of salutations and greetings, the President opened the conversation by saying that there was one question which he would like Lord Ismay’s views on. The question is whether the NATO countries are making a maximum effort both in terms of their resources and capabilities and in terms of their will to face up to some of the hard decisions which must be made if NATO is to continue to make progress.

Lord Ismay replied that by and large he believed the majority of NATO countries were straining themselves to the very maximum of their capabilities and resources. On the other hand, it is true that certain countries might exert greater leadership. France, for example, has a weak government largely because of the composition of the present French parliament. It is difficult for France to have a strong stable government because the views of the different elements in the parliament are divergent if not often completely contradictory.

While some of the smaller countries might make a slightly greater effort, given their resources and capabilities, the net result in increased strength of NATO would be very little and Lord Ismay doubted the wisdom of trying to push these smaller countries to the limit if the result were to mean only a slight increase in over-all strength. The President said he felt that Denmark could make a somewhat greater effort, particularly in terms of implementing the existing legislation calling for 18 months’ military service. Lord Ismay agreed that this was true and said that he believed Belgium also could make a somewhat greater over-all contribution at present. President Eisenhower said that the Belgians had taken the lead in going to 24 months’ military service and had been badly disillusioned when none of the other continental countries followed their lead. It was therefore understandable that they had an internal political problem with respect to 24-month service.

The President then asked Lord Ismay if he had any information concerning the British plane which had been reported shot down in Germany.² Lord Ismay said that he had no information on this other than press reports. Some discussion ensued as to the meaning of the shooting down of the US plane³ and the British plane. The general consensus of this discussion seemed to be that this indicated that the new Soviet leadership⁴ wished to make it clear to the Western mind that it would not show any signs of weakness and, on the contrary, would take steps to make clear that it was prepared to go to some lengths with a view to establishing the fact that as a result of Stalin’s death there was to be no vacillation or evidences of weakness displayed.

There was then some discussion in very general terms of the relationship between the NATO military and civilian authorities in Europe. Lord Ismay said that with the establishment of the NATO Council in Paris, the situation had evolved since the time when the President was Supreme Allied Commander. The President said that he believed the Supreme Allied Commander as well as Lord Ismay had to work together to stimulate and encourage the government leaders of the different NATO countries to make maximum efforts in all directions. He did not feel that the Supreme Allied Commander could confine himself to military subjects alone but that part of his mission involved showing an understanding of economic, political and psychological factors and encouraging and lifting European leaders’ hearts. The President said that he hoped that progressively European leaders would speak out more strongly in favor of what we are trying to do in NATO in order to get greater public and parliamentary support in different countries.

1. Secretary General Ismay visited the United States Mar. 11–21 at the invitation of the U.S. Government. In addition to his stay in Washington Ismay also visited the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic at Norfolk and went to New York City. For the text of his address to the National Press Club on Mar. 12 concerning the development of NATO, see Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 23, 1953, pp. 427–430.
2. On Mar. 12 two Soviet Air Force MIG–15’s had shot down a British Lincoln Bomber near the boundary between the British and Soviet Zones of Germany.
3. On Mar. 10 two Czech Air Force MIG–15’s had shot down a U.S. F–84 over West Germany. On Mar. 11 the United States protested this attack in a note to the Czech Government, and on Mar. 13 delivered another note which rejected the Czech reply of Mar. 11. For the texts of the two U.S. notes, see Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 30, 1953, pp. 474–475.
4. Documentation on the death of Marshal Stalin on Mar. 5 and events relating to the takeover by new leaders in the Soviet Union is presented in volume viii .