Secretary’s Letters, lot 56 D 459, “DOD–1953–4”
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs (Parsons)
Subject:
- Meeting with Lord Ismay.
Participants:
- Lord Ismay
- Mr. Peter Scott, Private Secretary
- Mr. Robert Barnes, NATO International Staff
- Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under-Secretary
- Mr. Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor
- Ambassador Frederick L. Anderson, Dep. Spec. Rep. in Europe
- Mr. Geoffrey Parsons, NATO International Staff
- Brig. Gen. Royden E. Beebe, Department of Defense
- Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Dep. Director, Ofc. of Eur Reg. Affairs
- Mr. Joseph Wolf, EUR/RA
- Mr. Robert Kranich, EUR/RA
1. Alerts.
The meeting was opened with a discussion of the “Alerts” problem, “Mothball”.1 Mr. Matthews reviewed briefly the progress of work on this problem indicating that we hoped very shortly to have Standing Group agreement. Lord Ismay said that he did not want to be thought of as pressing unduly on the question, but General Gruenther had mentioned it in urgent terms to the 14 Permanent Representatives at a recent briefing session. Mr. Wolf then outlined the substance of the U.S. position which the U.S. member of the international planning team, Standing Group staff, will submit when we hear that the British are ready to move.
During the meeting, Mr. Matthews made it clear that after the Standing Group had acted and their action had been made known to the Military Representatives Committee, the paper would be brought up through Lord Ismay to the NAC for its consideration. He made it very clear that there could be great disadvantages if the matter were discussed in the Council before the Standing Group paper was [Page 361] ready. Lord Ismay had not realized previously how close we were to having a position agreed by the Big Three or that there had been so much exhaustive work done on this matter. He indicated awareness of its delicacy and its relation with fundamentals of the North Atlantic Alliance.
After expressing his satisfaction with the situation, Lord Ismay asked if we thought this should be discussed at the April 23rd meeting or whether the Permanent Representatives should be asked to receive the Standing Group paper. It was noted that at a Ministerial meeting there would, of course, be many people around, including the press in great strength. Mr. Matthews pointed out that if anything on this subject should come out at the time of the Ministerial meeting it would be judged in the context of the general situation and the state of international tension at the time. To avoid misapprehension, he thought that the Permanent Representatives should deal with this. Lord Ismay evidently agreed.
Before turning to another subject, Lord Ismay mentioned one further aspect which concerned him namely, that there was already evidence that the new Soviet rulers were “hotting up” the cold war. He envisaged the possibility of their holding big maneuvers on the border. In that case, he wondered if NATO could act. General Beebe explained that in that case it was SACEUR’s function to recommend to the Council and that SACEUR did have his emergency defense plan to institute. He would, of course, be dealing with people who were not well versed in all the implications and procedures of the emergency defense plan if it had to be instituted in the near future. Later on, of course, it was hoped that everyone would know much better what it was all about and what they should do.
Lord Ismay then said that he was quite happy with the situation but was worried that the Council itself has nothing in the nature of a War Book. Where would it go, for instance? What would it do? How would it protect its records if NATO found itself at war? This led, he realized, to the basic question of who was going to run the war, which no one wished to raise at this time. Nevertheless, it was a basic question which had to be thought about.
2. Standing Group Liaison Office.
Lord Ismay said that he was concerned that the SGLO was merely a liaison officer. He wanted this officer to be more than that and to be on his staff. We felt that the SGLO should provide a link between the military and the civil side. As a matter of fact, he was wondering if he was something around which the high command functioned in wartime or if, as he would be quite happy to do, he just faded out.
General Beebe noted that when the “Alert” paper was brought formerly to Ismay’s attention by memo from the Standing Group, it would give him an opportunity to raise in the Council the question [Page 362] of the NAC War Book, what procedures should be worked out for use in wartime, etc.
Returning to the SGLO, Ambassador Anderson asked for Lord Ismay’s further views on what this office should become. Lord Ismay indicated that his objective was to give the office more formal status and stature. In that connection, General Beebe commented that while we all wanted to improve this situation we had to remember the Standing Group was a national body like the Council, not an international one like the International Staff. In closing discussion on this subject, Lord Ismay said that he just wanted to say that rumors that he was trying to effect the removal of the Standing Group to Paris were completely wrong; he had no such intention. He did want the Standing Group to meet more quickly on problems and in this connection cited the Danish problem in connection with their troops in Schleswig-Holstein.
3. French Reply to the SHAPE Recommendations.
Lord Ismay announced that he had received a further telegram from Paris indicating that Alphand had said the French reply would be submitted on March 12. He had no further information.
4. U.S. Cold War Policies.
Lord Ismay mentioned briefly that as he had said in yesterday’s meeting,2 he thought it most useful and important for the Secretary of State to outline some of the new Administration’s thinking in the next North Atlantic Council meeting.
5. Infrastructure.
Lord Ismay inquired if there was opposition in the Standing Group to the proposal for dealing with the remaining infrastructure requirements in one package over the next three years. General Beebe replied that there was no problem. Lord Ismay then said that he would not raise this question with the Standing Group as he had intended.
6. NAC and Position of the Secretary General.
Lord Ismay said that he conceived of the Council as a sort of North Atlantic Cabinet for NATO affairs and that he thought it should develop in the direction of executive powers of decision. He thought also that it should provide political guidance to the military, should make plans for the home front and should assure the military of solid support. He asked whether this concept fitted with U.S. views. Mr. Matthews expressed agreement following which there was some further discussion of our general attitude of trying to build up cooperation and close relations through the NATO.
[Page 363]7. Article II.
Lord Ismay spoke of his interest in promoting action under the very broad principles of Article II and of the complications caused by the fact that on the economic side, appropriate economic projects seemed already to be within the purview of the OEEC which NATO had no desire to compete with. In discussing Article II, Mr. Parsons pointed out that we were constantly endeavoring to take a receptive and positive attitude towards any projects suggested and to distill from them, elements which might make a practical contribution just as we did in connection with foreign policy consultation in the Council. He also mentioned that we were particularly mindful of the interest of the smaller partners in NATO in Article II.
8. Production.
Speaking upon request of Lord Ismay, Mr. Barnes outlined the International Staff’s concern with getting ahead on NATO production planning and the very difficult problem of maintaining equipment given by the U.S. After briefly reviewing the problem he concluded that it was Lord Ismay’s belief that only solution was a long-term—say three year—“Marshall Plan” for laying an adequate European military production base that would permit maximum European reliance upon its own capabilities for maintaining the forces being created. Lord Ismay asked whether there was any U.S. receptivity to the notion of such a long-term plan and whether the U.S. would consider a major financial contribution, through OSP or otherwise, to such a program. Ambassador Anderson supported the view of the need for long-range planning and after citing some of the progress being made, notably in aircraft and ammunition production planning, asked whether the U.S. could possibly have a position by the April Ministerial Meeting; at which [time it was?] conceivable the matter may be proposed for discussion by some of the continental countries.
Mr. Matthews expressed doubts whether the new administration could formulate its views on such a proposal by April, but assured Lord Ismay that as a matter of principle the U.S. was completely sympathetic to the proposition of long-range production planning. In the ensuing discussion it appeared to be the consensus that any “Marshall Plan” for European military production could not really be faced until later in the summer and that then it might but be considered in the context of the 1953 AR during the course of which all nations would have to face squarely the problem of annual recurring costs of maintenance. Notwithstanding the ever-present financial problem, General Beebe suggested that certain practical planning could move forward particularly in areas involving allocation of production responsibility as between countries within present financial limitations.
Mr. Kranich suggested that long-range NATO production plans should not look exclusively to U.S.–OSP financing, but that some effort [Page 364] must be made to induce the European countries where necessary to shift funds in their procurement budgets to finance higher priority production tasks. He also remarked that the problem of “building an adequate production base” should be recognized as probably 85% activation of existing idle facilities and only 15% expansion or creation of new facilities—such as in the field of ammunition and spare parts.
9. Annual Review.
Lord Ismay then asked for U.S. views on the creation of another deputy job in the staff for handling future AR’s. He pointed out, with details provided by Mr. Barnes, that the staff did not feel it wise to submerge the positions of the Assistant Secretary-Generals (Hopkins and Sargent), both of whom have a vital role in the AR, by placing another deputy over them. Mr. Parsons related that although the U.S. had given this problem active considerations some weeks back, it was now rather dormant, and he suggested to Mr. Matthews that the problem be taken up anew with Mr. Merchant next week as Mr. Merchant would be intimately alive to the problem from both the U.S. and Paris viewpoint. In accordance with this suggestion Mr. Matthews promised Lord Ismay we would communicate further views to him on the matter.