Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/2–2353: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State ¹

secret

Paris, February 23, 1953—2 p.m.

Polto 1551. Cotel. Subject: Length of Planning Period for 1953 Annual Review.

1. You will have noted in Polto 1522² that there has been virtually no objection to what is now a UK proposal (AC 19–D/8³) that the 1953 AR cover the three-year period 1954–56. In sharp contrast to the situation last spring, sober consideration is even being given to the desirability and feasibility of adding a fourth year. The time is rapidly approaching when we must firm up our own position on this issue.

2. We have little doubt that this change in the attitude of our partners is related to the fact of a new US administration and stems from their universal desire to obtain at the earliest possible moment a statement by the administration of its longer-range policies. In our view, the successful completion of an AR in October looking beyond 1955 depends upon our ability to offer such a long-range statement, even more than it depends upon such practical matters as the volume of work involved, the ability of the military to forecast and make force recommendations so far ahead, etc.

3. We are, of course, conscious of fact that FY ‘55 MSP must be related to forces in ‘56 and ‘57 and of desirability having soonest basis for planning NATO production of long-lead items. However, it is only on the assumption there will be a further build-up, that NATO agreed force targets for those years are essential to the development of our aid program. Given our present knowledge of European capabilities and estimated costs of maintaining forces at the 1954 levels, we foresee a leveling off before 1956, unless the US indicates to our Allies a long-term US intention to continue aid at a high level.

4. The availability of new 1956 requirements by mid-summer and the inclusion of a real study of the cost of maintaining 1954 forces in the 1953 AR will force us to face squarely the question of further build-up beyond 1955 whether or not an attempt is made to agree on 1956 forces. Given the magnitude and fundamental nature of this problem, we doubt and need guidance as to the wisdom of attempting an answer translated into force goals in an October meeting, so soon after the basic data have been made available and so short a time after the US has undertaken a basic review of its policies. Among other things, agreement on 1956 forces in October will force the US to indicate in its submission whether it plans to maintain the present strength of its forces in Europe. It hardly requires saying that an indication in July that the US was planning a reduction in these forces would have disastrous impact on NATO and EDC. On the other hand, it would presumably be difficult for the US to arrive at a decision so early, before the completion of our review of basic security policy.

5. Of course, the ideal solution would be for the US to be prepared by July to indicate its own policies and plans covering the period through 1956 and 1957. If this is possible, would strongly support coverage these years with reasonable prospect concluding full AR no later than November. If, however, in July submission US is unable forecast beyond FY 1955, can see positive disadvantages in attempting obtain agreement in October on goals for 1956 or 1957, and would expect difficulty even in coping with 1955 targets.

6. If US cannot come up with submission reflecting review of and decisions on longer-range policies by July, we have concluded that the far safer course is an October meeting confined to agreement on firm 1954 and tentative 1955 targets, and a review of new requirements and the prospects for a further build-up. In the light of Ministerial decisions and US basic policy which we assume could be stated at that time, the development of force targets for later years could then be undertaken.

7. On this two-phased approach, we believe that it should be possible to develop in time a force basis for FY 1955 programming after October. If NATO Commanders set to work immediately after the October meeting, we believe it should be possible to have their recommendations for 1956–1957, reflecting new requirements and decisions reached by Ministers, by the end of the calendar year, which we can use for programming and NATO can process through as the second phase of the 1953 AR, perhaps concluding with a Ministerial meeting early in 1954.

Draper

1. Repeated to London.
2. Not printed.
3. Not found in Department of State files.