Office of the Historian

740.5/9–2252: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State

top secret
priority
Paris, September 22, 1952—9 p.m.

Polto 333. Cotel. Subject: US Objectives for NATO Annual Review.

Consider it essential provide US negots AR broad outline US basic objectives for this operation. Wash comments desired soonest on fol text:

1.
Firm mil goals for 53 based upon complete reconciliation between MRC–121 53 targets and pol and econ capabilities each participant.
2.
Definitive plans to increase mil effectiveness of existing 53 forces.
3.
Definitive plans to make most effective use defense budgets.
4.
Programmed further expansion of mil forces for 54–55 on basis realistic appraisal of capabilities, with emphasis on action necessary in 53 to attain this expansion.
5.
Assessment of NATO continuing maintenance and replacement requirements in determination of and on basis of agreed force goals.
6.
Development definitive realistic NATO supply plan on basis agreed force goals and maintenance and replacement requirements, including acceptable NATO recs to US re end item allocations and OSP.
7.
The acceptance by each country of an appreciation of common danger no less vivid than US appraisal that danger, to the end that larger def efforts are accepted and regarded as first charge on national revenues.
8.
Review shld proceed on assumption that cost of def will remain high for indefinite future. Major portion of any expansion of GNP of other NATO partners and Germany shld be devoted to increasing def budgets.
9.
Provision of effective mechanism for continuing inspection and reporting progress toward fulfilling commitment accepted by participants, with provision for follow-up action.
10.
Program itself and process of negotiation shld be of a character which, when presented to public, will justify continued US support.
11.
A positive plan for reassessment of NATO strategic concept during 53 shld be adopted, but prospective re-examination of resultant NATO requirements shld not be permitted to affect the firmness of 53 goals, nor necessary forward planning against 54 and 55 programs.
12.
Strengthening NATO’s capacity to arrive at sound common decisions for attainment of major objectives vital to defense of NAC.2

Draper
  1. The paper under reference has not been identified further.↩

  2. In the source text Ridgway Knight had written “O.K.” next to all the numbered paragraphs except 7 and 8. Next to 7 he had written “Intell[igence]?” while next to 8 he had written only a question mark.

    The Department of State replied at length to this telegram on Oct. 17, indicating general agreement with the substance of the message, but pointing out that the brevity of the statements might “evoke comments which might not apply if statements were expanded to provide more precise content to and relationship amongst objectives.” Draper was informed particularly of the special need to stress the objectives in paragraph 3. (Telegram Topol 255; 740.5/10–1752)

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