740.5/10–252: Telegram
The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State 1
priority
Polto 395. Subject: Informal NAC mtg October 1.
Ismay asked Alphand to introduce Fr Govt papers.2
Alphand gave brief topical summary and said he realized some points raised might be embarrassing to some govts and that all questions contained in paper cld not be answered now. He knew many problems wld be dealt with during course AR but felt discussion probs by NAC wld provide fitting prelude to AR. Fr Govt had felt it necess give expression to certain apprehensions, and they had not felt it was [Page 331] mistake in timing to present paper now. He said that part of paper treating strategy was really elaboration Ismay’s paper3 and that there was little divergence between two. Fr paper had been drafted before NAC discussion with Gen Bradley4 which had thrown light particularly in question new weapons, but Alphand thought NAC wld discuss this question further. He thought milit advice shld be obtained on certain other questions posed in Fr paper.
In summary Alphand thought discussion can be carried to point where no difference of views existed between individual nationals and between civilian and milit auths in NATO as to NATO strategic policy.
Ismay then requested comments other reps and after prolonged silence called on US to begin discussion.
Merchant observed that silence other reps tended confirm impression that Fr paper directed primarily at US Govt. It raised questions of greatest importance and US Govt has not had opportunity to give it consideration and study deserved. Therefore, he spoke personally and without instrs.
He said policy on forward strategy unchanged as far as he knew and if any doubt existed on this point, forthcoming visit SG wld provide opportunity fully to discuss.
US shared disappointment that there has been slippage timewise in defense build-up and knew this disappointment existed with other govts.
As to poss effect new weapons on over-all requirements, Gen Bradley had adequately dealt with this point and had, he thought, largely dispelled any doubts as to need for further build-up.
Merchant agreed on desirability developing coherent production plans in Eur and said US OSP policy shld help on this score, A start had been made by aircraft production program and progress wld be continued with completion of ammo study. In implementing its OSP policy US wld be influenced by NATO staff recommendations on production programs, and it was hoped that development of EDC wld broaden poss area of progress.
Treating econ and finan aspects of paper, Merchant said that in US view there has been a real performance in burden sharing. He cited fact that over $10 billion had been appropriated for end-item assistance by US since 1950 and over $13 billion econ aid provided since 1948.
He then rejected idea that any one country is residual underwriter of any deficit, particularly when, as may be the case, size of gap is affected by deficiencies in efforts other countries in meeting agreed goals.
Re proposal for long term planning resting on assured assumptions all cld agree that this desirable in theory; however, Merchant said in [Page 332] his personal opinion there was no practical possibility any US Cong committing future Congresses. Reasons for this were obvious and probably existed in most if not all parliamentary systems.
Merchant then said he cld not accept assumption which seemed to underlie paper that def resources limited to present levels. Forecasts of increases in GNP held out poss for defense budgets to continue on present upward slope. Furthermore, it shld always be borne in mind that an increase in risk translated into increased willingness to sacrifice wld present poss of further increased def budgets.
In summation, Merchant observed that paper required further study but said it shld not interfere with progress AR since many answers to questions posed wld come from AR. He then said NAC might consider poss over-all re-examination policy, strategy and programs some time next year based on results AR and papers now in preparation by milit agencies.5
Hoyer-Millar expressed appreciation to Fr Govt for producing paper which clearly stated important questions requiring consideration. He doubted value detailed study by NAC prior to AR since many questions raised wld be discussed and considered during process of AR and subsequently. UK Govt regarded AR as continuing process and Dec 15 mtg mins6 as first in series addressed to problem of balancing requirements and capabilities.
He agreed certain parts of paper shld be sent SG for info and felt attention shld be called particularly to question proportion between reserves and front line forces.
With respect to that part paper suggesting some process of screening and pruning natl milit budgets, UK felt most Eur govts so hard pressed financially that they cld be relied upon to screen their own budgets.
In any event UK wld not favorably view proposal for NATO screening world wide programs or suggestion that SG auth shld be extended globally.
Canad rep spoke without instrs but welcomed paper since in his view it went to heart of matter and was frank. He believed all main strategic issues raised shld be discussed with SG at forthcoming joint mtg. As to econ and polit questions, these wld be dealt with during AR but still it was right that they shld be brought forth now. He hoped both Fr and SecGen papers wld continue be discussed by NAC and felt such consideration wld inevitably influence AR.
De Staercke spoke without instrs and observed that strategic aspects of paper were in essence same covered by Ismay previously. Study was already under way in milit agencies on these issues. As to various econ [Page 333] questions raised, he knew Belg Govt wld strongly support move for integrated production program and some form burden-sharing arrangements. He called particular attention to Belg proposals for pre-financing system.
Starkenborgh observed strategic aspects Fr paper largely same as those raised in Ismay paper. As regards relation between NATO and non-NATO program, he thought Fr paper properly sought to establish link between two. However, he did not agree that SG shld be injected into non-NATO field and expressed hope that when SG gave views on NATO strategy three powers wld give some general idea global (non-NATO) strategy.
As for econ questions raised, they were all essential part AR and there wld be little value in discussing them separately. He spoke favorably of proposal find some means for long term programming and for development integrated production program.
Pipinelis thought Fr and Ismay papers shld be taken together and emphasized factor of degree of danger as controlling in reaching polit decisions on def effort. He felt it not necess await final completion AR to draw conclusions which wld benefit mins in Dec 15 mtg; in particular, he felt it poss to reach conclusions soon as to degree of danger. He viewed Sov threat as spreading in areas other than NATO and consequent effect in these areas, while not legally NATO’s concern, as vital concern to each member country.
He concluded by observing that if risk not diminished and if NATO cld not count on help for “others” there wld have to be supplementary effort.
Alphand replied to some comments. Fr Govt most grateful and fully understood importance US contributions. Merchant had said no one country cld accept respon for deficit. Fr Govt agreed that Eur effort cld and shld be more but felt in aggregate it so small as to be infinitesimal in relation to gap. Fr Govt felt choice had to be made if strategic objectives were as stated whether or not means were available.
In brief summary Ismay suggested paper be transmitted SG under same type covering memo as for his paper and that certain problems raised be discussed in forthcoming joint mtg.
He then commented that it was imposs to compartment strategy. NATO’s strategy must be considered in context global strategy and not separately. Problem was who shld consider global strategy and how shld it be done.
Entire discussion was of a very prelim nature, most reps speaking without instrs. Fact that Ismay’s paper had already been subj of considerable discussion largely took edge off strategic aspects Fr paper. Further there was general recognition that politico-econ problems pointed up were inherent part AR and that most decisions or answers to them cld not be reached separately. Coming discussion with SG [Page 334] will probably serve to ventilate further main strategic points raised both in Ismay and Fr papers, altho probably few reps, if any, expect conclusions now held to be altered significantly. Both papers remain on agenda for informal discussion NAC and next round will be two weeks hence.
- This telegram was transmitted in two sections.↩
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No copy of this paper, sometimes referred to as the Alphand paper or memorandum, has been found in the Department of State files. Alphand had given Draper a copy of the paper on Sept. 20 and had had it circulated to the North Atlantic Council on Sept. 22, explaining that it was nothing really new, but merely an attempt to put the whole defense problem into a broad political, economic, and military complex. (Telegram Polto 329, Sept. 20, from Paris; 740.5/9–2052) The Department of State summarized the paper in NATOP D–10/6, dated Dec. 15, a negotiating paper for the December North Atlantic Council Ministerial meeting, as follows:
↩“1. In the French paper of September 1952, it is proposed that the authority of the Standing Group be extended toward global competence and that global military requirements on NATO countries be related to ‘equitable’ sharing of cost on a long-term basis. French objectives appear to be:
- “a. To obtain voice in global planning.
- “b. To obtain further formal international recognition and long-term guarantee of French military support in Indo-China.
- “c. To obtain a calculation which would show the widest possible gap between requirements and capabilities, thus demonstrating need for a long-term U.S. aid program.” (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 128)
- Not printed; but see footnote 8, p. 327.↩
- For a report on General Bradley’s meeting with the North Atlantic Council on Sept. 22, see Polto 340, Sept. 22, ibid .↩
- In Topol 193 to Paris, Sept. 30, the Department of State had transmitted the outline of a suggested comment on Alphand’s paper along the lines made by Merchant in the meeting on Oct. 1. (740.5/9–2952)↩
- Regarding the December Ministerial meeting, see the editorial note, p. 348.↩