740.5/9–2252: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State

top secret

Polto 340. Limit distribution. Subject: Informal NAC mtg Sept 22.

Lord Ismay introduced General Bradley. Latter described military [Page 328] organization NATO and emphasized each country via military reps and staff members on commands has access plans affecting it. He then asserted that there were certain detailed plans and data which no one shld want to know. It was fully recognized that the civil authority has final approval of all that military may advise and further that there were economic and political aspects in deciding strategic concept, setting force goals etc.

General Bradley said NATO still needs large forces for absolute security but recognized they cld not all be organized right away. He thought point was being reached where it might be assumed that war was not quite as likely to happen as earlier but re new weapons a considerable wishful thinking was apparent. It was necessary to have ground forces to prevent overrunning Europe and in order to cause such enemy concentrations as to be remunerative A targets. The USSR is increasing its atom capability all the time and it is hoped that the US is increasing even faster. He concluded by emphasizing that there cld be no reliance on atom weapons by themselves.

Ismay introduced subject his paper and its ref to military agencies (as discussed last NAC mtg1). Council accepted a suggested US redraft for the proposed message to the SG (cabled separately2).

Alphand asked General Bradley when the SG cld conveniently come to Paris for a joint mtg with the Council. Bradley replied that it was up to NAC and wondered whether it wld be better before AR or after. He said the revised strategic guidance wld probably not be ready for military reps until Nov 15. In the ensuing discussions it was agreed that General Bradley shld consult SG on his return and suggest to NAC a date when talks wld be of maximum use.

De Staercke then noted that recent statements on atomic weapons by Mr. Dean, General Collins and General Bradley seemed to be in conflict. He thought General Bradley implied that large ground forces would always be needed. Was it possible that atomic weapons might have an effect on strategic plans or on the current AR.

General Bradley said there was in fact no conflict between the statements mentioned. His own statement had been cleared by all US agencies concerned and the White House. General Collins was in full accord with it and with the view that A weapons will not reduce requirements below the maximum obtainable within the next two years. He said General Ridgway had been informed of the number of weapons he wld probably have in 1956 and had been asked to make a study of forces needed then. Such a study wld probably require six to eight months.

Ismay thanked Bradley and in summation said expected hear from [Page 329] him re SG visit (which wld probably be about three to four weeks hence and two or three days duration).

General Bradley’s informal talk this morning had a most favorable effect on NAC and made relatively simple the task of resolving what seemed last Thursday to be a very difficult matter. Also, his discussion went long way toward answering many of the difficult points raised both in Lord Ismay’s paper and the paper distributed just today by the French rep.3

Draper
  1. See Polto 317, Sept. 18, p. 321.
  2. The message from the Secretary General to the Standing Group, transmitting a copy of Ismay’s paper, was sent in Polto 339 from Paris, Sept. 22. (740.5/9–2252)
  3. Regarding the French paper under reference here, see Polto 395, Oct. 2, p. 330.