Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/9–1952: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

confidential

Washington, September 19, 1952—7:25 p.m.

Topol 180. Sent Paris for action SRE and Emb.

1. Major elements in dissatisfaction NAT members with former Council Deps were tendency become immersed in detail and failure to deal with policy questions. One of principal purposes Lisbon reorg was to correct this and to endow Perm Council with stature and authority sufficient to encourage consultation on important questions. Report of Atlantic Community (Comite of Five) endorsed at Lisbon by NAC also stressed importance of this subj.²

In recent weeks Dept has heard comments NAC was drifting toward situation in old CD. Incident last Jul 9 over tripartite reply -to Sov note on Ger was particularly damaging and has caused us renew efforts correct situation.³ Realize no org change can substitute for willingness govts to discuss major NATO and other fon pol questions in NAC but believe it useful for Dept in this tel to review reasons for its support of principle of fon pol consultation in NAC and to suggest steps which might bring about regular and substantive discussion. Desire emphasize this tel relates to NAC handling of pol policy questions of common interest rather than to problems connected with def buildup; i.e. NATO as a developing association of states rather than as a mil alliance only.

2. Consultation in NAC important in natl interest for fol reasons:

a. It is fundamental to NATO concept which as indicated in NAT Preamble and in Art 2 clearly contemplates more than medium term mil coalition to cope with present Sov threat.

b. Continued progress of Fr–Ger–Ital–Benelux integration leading to solid core of Eur community requires concomitant evolution of well-knit larger grouping of Atlantic states within which new EUR grouping can develop, thus ensuring unity of purpose of entire group and precluding possibility of Eur Union becoming third force or opposing force.

c. US leadership of free world is crucial. Consultation which wld permit elucidation of US problems, motives and concepts shld serve to strengthen confidence in US leadership. At same time contribution of fresh ideas and viewpoints of others thru consultation in NAC shld give greater range and bal to US determinations.

d. Believe experience in CD, NAC and elsewhere indicates that explanations of US viewpoints more often than not results in smaller powers preferring position of US to that of UK or Fr.

e. Advantageous to emphasize willingness proceed multilaterally in NATO as offset to some of bilateral aspects of relationships under MSP.

f. Polto 40 Jul 9⁴ on reply to second Sov note clearly demonstrated that presenting smaller partners with fait accompli on matter of legitimate, in fact vital interest to them can cause serious difficulties. Leaders of govts having to ask parliaments to support policies face much more difficult task if they have had no share in determining policies. Altho prior discussion of some polit matters by Big Three has proved desirable, we shld bear in mind that prior determination of policies in trilateral forum tends to raise headaches similar to those of old SG problem on mil side. Practice of fon pol discussion in Council shld minimize this risk.

g. If Art 5 NAT is ever invoked it wld obviously be crucial test solidarity of NATO as govts committed take only such action each deems necessary. Practice of fon pol discussion may help predispose them to prompt parallel action thus minimizing a very basic problem.

3. Given incentives which exist for fon pol consultation and fact that smaller countries tending increasingly to insist on discussion of various questions (cf. Polto 110⁵ re Grk request for discussion on Near East and Polto 219⁶ re Ital request discuss Yugo), question arises how to make NAC fon pol discussions more than perfunctory in nature without (a) limiting US freedom of action unduly, or (b) incurring unwarranted security risks. In this connection, Dept believes NAC has developed useful device in informal Thurs mtgs at which, as we understand it, attendance is limited to perm reps plus one asst each, no minutes are recorded, and no decisions taken. This of course is not complete safeguard against leaks but shld materially reduce risk. Problem of avoiding premature US commitment shld be manageable in most cases not only because there wld have to be agreement by us to discuss any topic suggested, but also because US cld have some control over how far discussion shld go. Success of recent NAC discussion on Ger (Polto 260 and 228⁷) confirms our view as to importance of objective of affording others opportunity for comment and suggestions. US comment can range from rather full exposition of problem with suggested course of action to frank exposition of difficulties we see in any given subj (which are often not known to or properly evaluated by smaller powers) and reasons why we cannot go beyond certain point in discussing it. If our reasons well founded and convincingly presented, believe they will be respected by NAC partners who readily recognize our global responsibilities and often merely seek reassurance as to our attitudes.

4. Even tho we all agree in principle that reg and substantive discussion in NAC important step toward giving Council and hence Atlantic Community real vitality, progress in this direction certain to be gradual and may not take place at all unless effective means are found to stimulate it. This task may be eased somewhat if other NAC countries, esp UK and Fr, are clear on purposes of consultation. In gen these are implicit in para one this tel, particularly as regards US purposes. However, it equally important that all realize consultation as rule is not for purpose of reaching final agreements or of drafting in 14-nation forum any doc embodying agreement. Purposes are rather to exchange info, create broader understanding of problems discussed, and generate mutual support as well as, where feasible, common attitudes. Above all consultation shld create sense of participation in important affairs which is often dangerously lacking even to point of fostering propaganda that small NATO powers are becoming mere satellites. In problems external to NATO area it is of course always essential to keep in mind danger of lending substance to propaganda alleging NATO is white imperialist bloc or is encroaching upon or creating conflicts with UN.

Problem of agreement to discuss many subjs is also closely related to timing of discussion. It is our belief that some subjs (such as Sov notes on Ger) shld be introduced into NAC at early stage. Belated discussion creates adverse reaction whereas early discussion makes it possible for natl reps to set forth pros and cons of a particular position without committing their govts or even revealing their preferences.

5. Dept has considered possible techniques for promoting fon pol discussions incl Nor suggestion for polit comite. As you aware, we oppose Nor proposal which wld lead backwards toward creation another CD and risk perm reps abdicating from what shld be important field for them. Wld seem to us more fruitful to remember that another major purpose of reorg was to create strong internatl staff with real responsibility for guiding and stimulating NAC actions. In view Ismay’s concern at progress of reorg thus far believe he might agree that Fenoaltea as asst SecGen for polit affairs shld have as major continuing duty consideration of fon pol problems of concern to NATO members and selection of those on which in his opinion useful purpose wld be served by NAC discussion. Info as to what problems are of concern wld reach him from various sources incl those perm reps who proposed subjs for NAC discussion. Before bringing forward such subjs for agenda, however, it wld be his function to sound out appropriate dels incl Big Three as to feasibility of introducing them and as to timing of NAC discussion. Assignment of Cumming as Dep to Fenoaltea inclines us toward this possibility.

Variant of foregoing wld be to have Fenoaltea assisted in this function by comite set up by NAC to be composed of three perm reps, one from Big Three and two from other dels. Membership on this comite wld rotate frequently, say every 3 mos. Possible disadvantage this variant is increased danger of leaks or of comite itself getting into substantive discussions which belong in NAC.

It is apparent others in NAC likely avail themselves increasingly of right to propose discussion on fon pol topics as Grks and Itals have lately done. It shld be recognized that any NATO rep is free to propose an exchange of views on any subj. When such proposal made directly in NAC believe it might be referred to Fenoaltea who wld consider it from standpoint of (a) importance, (b) timeliness, (c) priority in relation to current business of NAC, (d) whether or not members cld or wld make really substantial contribution thus making it worthwhile topic for agenda. He wld also consult and give particular weight to views of dels from countries whose interests most affected by proposed discussion. Only at that stage wld Fenoaltea come back to NAC with recommendation as to whether or not subj shld be discussed and, if to be discussed, define its scope, and suggest a method of proceeding. In some cases at least might have internatl Staff paper as basis for discussion. Usually more profitable for members have specific doc to discuss and often preferable for US be in position of commenting upon staff paper rather than either putting forward US paper or commenting on paper put forward by another member. Wld for instance have been less desirable to discuss in NAC Anglo-US differences on basis UK or US paper than on basis recent Ismay paper.⁸ On other hand disadvantages of proceeding on basis staff paper wld sometimes be controlling. Disadvantages we see are (1) danger formalizing discussion prematurely, (2) increased risk of leaks, (3) scanty resources of internatl Staff for preparing adequate studies based on sufficient info, (4) time factor. Also it is possible that countries reluctant to discuss a particular issue cld make their objections known to Fenoaltea who might then in reporting to Council not wish to identify such countries thus permitting them to escape onus of frustrating Council discussion. Accordingly strong leadership by internatl Staff wld be required.

6. Would therefore appreciate comments and suggestions both pro and con. Must emphasize Secretary has not made up his mind whether or not to proceed with this course of action or how far to proceed.⁹

Acheson

1. This telegram, which was drafted by Parsons on Sept. 11, cleared with Merchant, Perkins, Jessup, and Martin (S/MSA), and initialed for Secretary Acheson by Bonbright, was repeated on Sept. 20 to the other NATO capitals.
2. For the text of C9–D/8, Feb. 19, “Report by the Committee on the North Atlantic Community”, see p. 180.
3. Regarding the discussion under reference here, see Polto 40, July 9, p, 309; for documentation on the tripartite note to the Soviet Union, July 10, see volume vii .
4. Ante, p. 309.
5. Not printed; it reported that on July 24 the Greek Representative had proposed that the North Atlantic Council discuss the situation in the Middle East. (740.5/7–2952)
6. Not printed; it reported that the Italian Representative had asked his Greek and Turkish colleagues to inform the Council concerning their talks with Yugoslavia. (740.5/8–2752) Further documentation on the talks for a Balkan Pact is presented in volume viii .
7. Neither printed; the latter reported on a closed NAC session on Aug. 28 at which inter alia Germany was discussed; while the former reported that an informal NAC session on Sept. 4 was devoted entirely to the German question. (740.5/8–2952 and 9–452)
8. Regarding Ismay’s paper, see Polto 317, supra; Topol 150, Sept. 9, p. 319; and Polto 208, Aug. 26, p. 315.
9. No immediate reply to this telegram has been found in the Department of State files; however, in telegram Topol 1476, June 23, 1953 (p. 413), the Department of State informed the Embassy in France that the U.S. position on political consultation in the North Atlantic Council was that set forth in Topol 180.