Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/9–1852: Telegram

The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Draper) to the Department of State

top secret

Paris, September 18, 1952—9 p.m.

Polto 317. Subj: NAC restricted meeting, September 16.

Full report discussion Ismay strategic paper¹ follows by airgram.² Highlights herewith:

Chaired by M. Pearson, session lasted three hours in which all permanent representatives except Portugal, Luxembourg and Iceland spoke at least once.

Ismay briefly introduced subject making following points:

1. Mistitled “Background for AR” and important should not delay progress AR.

2. Origin entirely personal.

3. Addressed in part to eminent military opinion given him to effect concentration required in Europe at expense Korea and Indochina which view he considered fatal.

4. Necessary consider character of war with which we might be confronted.

Van Starkenborgh opened discussion with tribute imp [to importance of?] paper which reflected level of activity for which NAC designed. Agree Ismay evaluation present situation, risk and need husband resources. Emphasized importance early German contribution via EDC³ and necessity NAC learning essence military plans for defense Europe on which strategic concept military requirements based. Said lacking knowledge former intelligent action on latter by NAC impossible.

Alphand followed with long speech, obviously foreshadowing upcoming French paper, burden of which was statement risk exists and exposure prolonged by failure provide authoritatively stated military requirements needed to meet it. Said NAC must decide if threat now reduced and implications new weapons “rule of equitable cost sharing of the burden” must prevail. European economies already overstrained. Implication was clear that answer lies in elastic US economy and latter’s large non-NATO budget.

Kraft, De Staerke, Rossi Longhi and Pipinelis all paid fulsome tributes to Ismay paper and in varied degree emphasized importance NAC making major politico-strategic decisions which in turn must rest on more complete knowledge military plans.

Hoyer Millar recommended paper be forwarded to SG for military comments after consultation with MRC with view SG joining NAC in late Nov for joint discussion for purpose of submitting agreed paper to ministerial mtg Dec 15.

Heeney objected latter course after indicating general agreement with subject paper but agreed in cross-play with Hoyer Millar that military advice needed but object not necessarily agreed paper but NAC document for Ministers after receipt military advice.

Skaug agreed above procedure but commented on Ridgway July 12 report⁴ as “80 percent dismal” and asked what are facts re relative atomic strength and our strategic plans for its use. Asked “are Ismay assumptions correct?”

I congratulated Ismay on paper as thought provoking and opening NAC discussions of its proper business. I urged SG be requested for military comments on it. Adding US felt military threat undiminished, I said paper raises basic strategic considerations which could not be adequately considered in period less than six months and in any event not prior to this year’s AR. Such reassessment, in US view, I said, wld not affect build-up contemplated for 1953 and 1954 at Lisbon. I omitted any discussion strategic concepts or atomic weapons.

Turk sturdily commended Ismay paper and said while agreeing need for military advice on its content, all shld go to limit their economic capabilities since maximum collective effort required to meet obvious risk.

Pearson closed animated debate with highly helpful, lengthy statement, commenting Ismay paper asked more questions than it answered. He emphasized economic capabilities as much matter of national will as statistics and stated his opinion, contrary to growing public opinion, that risk is as great as year or two ago. If risk remains, he said, we must be concerned not only with building forces to meet attack but also with those needed to launch counter-attack. He added this raised query were Lisbon goals high enough. Pearson then referred to disturbing contents Ridgway July report and cautioned against announcement of higher “firm goals for 1953” in December until we had in fact met 1952 goals.

Debate closed with agreement to transmit Ismay paper to SG with covering note to be agreed by NAC Sept 18 stating paper still under study by NAC which desired SG comments after consulting MRC with view early discussion with SG in NAC in expectation preparation by NAC paper to be submitted to Ministers Dec 15.⁵ Meanwhile subject paper will be further considered by NAC.

The discussion on whole lively and deadly serious with obvious intent to continue and majority interest in delving deeper into military aspects of alliance. I consider it milestone in movement NAC to proper plane and sphere with no serious risk it will overstep bounds necessarily set by considerations of military security.

Draper

1. Not found in Department of State files.
2. Polto A–46, Sept. 24. A copy of this six-page report is in file 740.5/9–2452.
3. For documentation on the European Defence Community (EDC), see pp. 571 ff.
4. The report under reference here has not been identified further. However, at a press conference on Aug. 11, General Ridgway stated inter alia that the military means available to NATO to carry out its defensive purposes were still seriously inadequate in certain vital categories and that the threat of a communist attack had in no way decreased. (New York Times, Aug. 12, 1952, p. 1)
5. On Sept. 20, Draper reported that the Council was still considering sending Ismay’s paper to the Standing Group, but that he had asked General Bradley about the possibility of meeting with the Council on Sept. 22 to give a broad outline of the defense plans under consideration by the Standing Group. (Telegram Polto 328 from Paris; 740.5/9–2052)