740.5/8–2852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1

top secret
priority
niact

Topol 150. Ref Polto 208 Aug 26 and Polto 223 Aug 28.2

Fol are our reactions to Ismay paper for ur guidance in closed NAC discussion: [Page 320]

1.
As we understand memo, purpose is to provide basis for discussion broad political, econ and mil factors for eventual development NAC guidance in forthcoming AR. Such purpose indicated by informal comments Ismay on need for statement of broad pol objectives for NATO similar to heads of states pronouncements during last war and on competence of new perm reps which Ismay considers much greater than former Council of Deps. Similarity of Ismay views to trend recent Brit thinking may be coincidental but chances are basic thoughts of memo are of Brit origin.
2.
Ismay memo raises two basic problems: (a) Completion of AR as conceived at Lisbon to establish firm goals for 1953, provisional goals for 1954 and planning goals for 1955; and (b) review and reassessment of Allied strategy. These two aspects discussed separately below. Believe as primary point you shld bring out clearly that these two aspects involved and that it is US view that Council discussion of overall strategic factors shld not be permitted to interfere with or delay in any way completion of AR. (Ref Deptels 1257 Sept 4 to Paris, rptd London 1555 and 1326 Sept 8 to Paris, rptd London 16793)
3.
Completion of AR at Dec 15 min mtg. As set forth in ref Deptels para 2, US desires completion of AR at Dec 15 mtg and you shld urge all efforts be made to achieve this objective. NATO in urgent need psychological uplift of continued buildup NATO strength to counteract recent feeling of slump. (Eden has recognized need for booster in recent urging of Oct mtg.) Ismay paper as a whole does not carry sufficient emphasis on this point and impact on other countries may be to reinforce their tendency to relax their efforts. Necessity to evaluate 1952 accomplishment and to set goals for 1953–55 therefore of paramount importance. However “completion” of AR as contemplated at Lisbon is not inflexible requirement. Goals established for 1953 shld be firm and feasible. Goals for 1954 and 1955 are progressively less firm and are inflexible only to extent of long lead time requirements.
4.
Reassessment and review of Allied Strategy: US glad to see this example of initiative and leadership in Council by Ismay and hopes it will be followed by others. In US view Sov threat is long-term and continuing. Periodic review of mil, econ and pol factors therefore necessary and US welcomes and supports such action. Such review, however, shld be deliberate and undertaken as carefully thought out process to enable all relevant and current info to be considered. Such process, by very definition, cannot be concluded in a few months and almost certainly not before AR. It is US view that undertaking of such a review might well be a matter for NAC to recommend at an early date for completion in 1953, such an assessment to take full acct of 1952 AR decisions. US notes that discussion of problems raised in Ismay memo is under way in appropriate NATO agencies but that [Page 321] NAC might well undertake concentration of effort to effect a more coordinated result. Logic of Ismay memo itself dictates consideration of various elements of strategic review by competent NATO Agencies, in particular SG advice on mil problems.
5.
To sum up, US supports idea of Council initiative in matter of review of broad pol, econ and mil considerations and wld assist Council efforts, to extent practicable, in this regard. US considers that forward progress in AR is more immed and attainable goal on which NAC shld set sights. It is obvious that no NATO country shld undertake Def program which wld bankrupt its natl economy. However, problem with which we are jointly confronted in this year’s AR, as in last year’s TCC exercise, is how much can each country contribute to common effort within limits imposed by need to maintain solvency on the one hand and to meet Sov threat on the other. We feel countries will agree that this point has not yet been reached and buildup must continue.
6.
US recognizes that strength of NATO is dependent upon morale, unity and pol will as well as size of mil forces. Progress to date with respect to all these factors is so encouraging that given “the determination to continue to make sacrifices” of which Lord Ismay speaks, we shld be able to reach objectives of making both Eur and Free World secure.

Acheson
  1. This telegram, which was drafted by Moore and Parsons and cleared with Perkins, Nitze, Martin (S/MSA), the Department of Defense, and the Office of the Director of Mutual Security, was repeated priority for information to London.
  2. Polto 208, p. 315; no copy of Polto 223, a cosmic top secret telegram, has been found in the Department of State files. Presumably, it transmitted the text of Ismay’s paper.
  3. Telegram 1326, supra; regarding telegram 1257, see footnote 2, supra.