Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part 1

740.5/9–852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

top secret
priority

Washington , September 8, 1952—7:26 p.m.

1326. Eyes only Draper and MacArthur. Ref Deptel 1257 Sept 4 to Paris rptd 1555 London, fol is text of Memo of Comments on Eden msg.² Memo was handed to Brit Chargé this A.M.³ and was cleared with Def, DMS and MSA.⁴

“Mr. Eden’s msg states in substance that he now agrees that an Oct min mtg of the NAC is impracticable and that any report on the Annual Review prepared for a mid-Dec mtg cld be little more than a consolidation of national replies and a statement of the main problems to be solved, leaving the reconciliation phase to a mtg in the spring. He gives as reasons for this view the fol:

1. Revised force requirements in the light of new mil and strategic info can not be ready until Dec so that any report on the Annual Review in mid-Dec wld take no account of the strategic reconsideration.

2. The Council will not have before it the latest appreciation of the Soviet threat.

3. The Brit submission for the Annual Review can not be provided until about the end of Oct.

Mr. Eden’s understanding of the difficulties which made an Oct min mtg impracticable for the United States and his willingness to abandon the proposal for an Oct mtg will be greatly appreciated throughout the govt.

Since the receipt of Mr. Eden’s msg, the North Atlantic Council has agreed that a min mtg shld be held in mid-Dec in Paris for the primary purpose of considering the AR. Therefore, in connection with Mr. Eden’s request for State Dept comments on his assessment of the situation, there remains only the question of what can be accomplished at the Dec mtg in connection with the Annual Review. This question can perhaps best be handled by taking up in turn the three points mentioned above.

1. It appears that there may be some misunderstanding in regard to the study of future force requirements which Gen Ridgway has stated to the Standing Group that he will prepare. According to our info, this study is for the year 1956. Moreover, we understand that a future study of the magnitude which Gen Ridgway is going to prepare will require at least six to eight months and, therefore, will not in any event be available for consideration in connection with an Annual Review useful for 1953 budgetary purposes whether it be fully concluded in Dec or even early spring. This being the case, we do not understand the relevance of this new and future strategic reconsideration to the Annual Review which has as its object the determination of firm goals for 1953, provisional goals for 1954, and planning goals for 1955.

The emphasis in this year’s Annual Review, as clearly laid down by the action of the Council at Lisbon, will be to firm up our goals for 1953, and to develop tentative goals for 1954 and 1955 primarily as guides for actions which must be undertaken in 1953 to make possible a further buildup. It wld, in our view, be most unlikely that the force goals which can be developed for 1953 and 1954 will be of an order of magnitude which wld be inconsistent with the requirements for 1956 and after to be developed as a result of Gen Ridgway’s study. The current deficiencies and the degree of danger to be faced over the next several years are such that the planned increase of forces in 1953 will partially remedy weaknesses rather than create an excess of strength that may possibly not be required in 1956. Furthermore, we cannot fail to take steps to increase the presently inadequate level of deterrent strength in Eur in the hope that the present estimate of mil targets might by 1956 be lowered sufficiently to be then attainable.

2. We entirely concur that the latest appreciation of the Soviet threat must be before the Council when it meets to discuss the Annual Review. The Standing Group is already at work on a revision of the current appreciation and it is believed that there is adequate time before Dec 15 for it to complete this work and to pass its conclusions through the mil reps and the Mil Comite to the Council before it convenes.

3. If, as Mr. Eden’s msg indicates, the UK will not be able to take necessary decisions and provide NATO with its basic data for the Annual Review before the end of Oct, it will doubtless cause serious difficulty in carrying the work on the Annual Review forward so that the reconciliation may take place at the mid-Dec mtg. We wld hope that HMG wld find it possible to submit at least the broad outlines of its program by early Oct, with full details to be submitted later. Unless this is done the danger wld certainly arise that the annual cycle agreed by the Council at Lisbon wld indeed be impossible of completion. It will be recalled that the Council agreed that the process shld be completed well before the end of the year.

However, to accommodate the work of the Annual Review to this situation, this govt is prepared to support all steps so as to postpone as long as possible consideration of the U.K. submittal without jeopardizing the overall schedule. According to current indications most, if not all, of the submissions from the other members of NATO will be available by mid or late Sept. It shld, therefore, be possible to complete, with the exception of the United Kingdom, the country interview stage without too great deviation from schedule and to study the broad outlines of the U.K. program so that the actual drafting of the report to the Council can proceed expeditiously as soon as the detailed Brit data are received and examined and fitted appropriately into the picture as a whole.

As the foregoing will indicate, our principal comment on Mr. Eden’s msg is that we cannot agree that it is impossible to complete the current Annual Review by mid-Dec. Moreover, as this govt is fully committed to a policy of administering the Mutual Security Program in accordance with agreed NATO plans, we wld face, as indicated in previous communications, special difficulties in connection with the presentation to our Congress of requests for appropriations for that program for our fiscal year 1953–1954 if agreement on a force plan were too long deferred. Other govts, we are sure, wld be faced by similar difficulties if the AR is delayed. We therefore believe it to be in the general interst of NATO that the United States continue to strive, and urge all other NATO govts to strive, to expedite the Annual Review. It will be our desire to discuss in detail and on a continuing basis with the United Kingdom Govt any special difficulties which must be overcome in order that the mid-Dec Council mtg just agreed upon by the Permanent Representatives may successfully conclude the AR. In the meantime, it shld be very clear that this govt believes it essential to overlook nothing which wld contribute to completion of the Annual Review, as agreed by the Council in time for the mid-Dec mtg.”

Acheson

1. This telegram was drafted by Parsons and cleared by Bonbright: it was repeated priority for information to London with instructions to limit its distribution. The source text bears the typewritten notation “No distribution inside or outside Dept.”
2. Telegram 1257 is not printed (740.5/9–452); it transmitted the text of the message from Foreign Secretary Eden to Ambassador Franks which is summarized in the memo of comments presented here. A copy of the message, left at the Department of State on Sept. 2, is in file 740.5/9–252.
3. A memorandum of Bonbright’s and Parsons’ conversation with Steel on Sept. 8 is in file 740.5/9–252.
4. The first draft of this memorandum was prepared by Parsons on Sept. 4 and sent to Perkins, Nitze, Martin (S/MSA), Moore, Vass, Raynor, and Merchant. It is the same in substance as the text transmitted here. (740.5/9–452) The text sent in this telegram was also drafted by Parsons, apparently on Sept. 8 and was cleared by Parsons with General Bradley, Admiral Davis, Lovett, Halaby, Nitze, Ferguson (S/P), Merchant, Perkins, Raynor, Moore, Vass, and Martin. (740.5/9–252)