Office of the Historian

715.00/11–2954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Honduras 1

secret
Washington, November 30, 1954—8:07 p.m.

98. While aware difficulties faced in present situation Department disturbed implication Embtels 1592 and 1603 since subject interpretation we seeking influence political decision in Honduras which was specifically decided against during Washington consultation.

While it is correct to have informed Villeda and Williams you cannot be witness any political pact (Embtel 159) it also should be made clear that listening to their statements after pact completed does not involve US approval, disapproval or responsibility. Department hopes Mejia has not obtained impression US considers there only two possibilities, that Carias become President if Congress meets or Galvez (or Lozano) continue in office if it fails meet (Embtel 150 [160]). Department does not wish to exclude other solutions including assumption power by Liberals however unlikely that may now appear.

[Page 1322]

Department will appreciate your continuing keep it informed developments.4

Dulles
  1. Drafted by Mr. Newbegin, cleared by Mr. Murphy, and signed by Mr. Sparks.↩
  2. Telegram 159, from Tegucigalpa, dated Nov. 27, 1954, is printed supra.↩
  3. In telegram 160, from Tegucigalpa, dated Nov. 29, 1954, Ambassador Willauer stated in part the following: “Gabriel Mejia, close confidante General Carias, called this morning at latter’s instruction ask my position present electoral situation. I said I saw only two possibilities: Carias will be President if Congress meets; Galvez (or Lozano) will continue if Congress fails to meet. I said either these governments would enjoy United States support but would have profound responsibility to Honduras, United States and Hemisphere for maintenance internal order.” (715.00/11–2954)↩

  4. Telegram 170, from Tegucigalpa, dated Dec. 3, 1954, reads:

    “Assure Department Mejia (Deptel 98) understood Embassy’s mention ‘two possibilities’ meant mathematical probabilities and implied no United States preference. Am similarly confident Villeda and Williams understand Embassy readiness ‘listen to their statements’, after any pact they may complete, by no means implies US approval, since this made abundantly clear by statement Embassy would listen only for ‘reporting’ purposes.” (715.00/12–354)

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