814.2612/2–552

Memorandum of Conversation, by Edward W. Clark of the Office of Middle American Affairs

secret

Subject:

  • Roadbuilding Equipment for Guatemala
  • Participants: MID—Mr. Nufer1
    • Mr. Siracusa2
    • Mr. Clark
  • AR—Mr. David Clark
  • E—Mr. Evans3
    • Mr. Pollard4
  • Department of Commerce
    • Mr. Wythe5
    • Mr. Rafferty6
    • Mr. Strassman
    • Mr. Merrell7
    • Mr. Dunning8
  • National Production Authority
    • Mr. Brister9
    • Mrs. Dulles10
  • Bureau of Public Roads
    • Mr. MacDonald11
    • Mr. Harrison12

Mr. Clark (MID) began the discussion by stating that information had been received from our Embassy in Guatemala that the Guatemalan Government desired to purchase a large quantity of road-building equipment in the United States and was expected to send a special agent or mission to Washington to assist the Guatemalan Embassy in arranging for the purchase of this equipment. In view of the special situation in Guatemala and our policy with regard to providing assistance to that country, it had been deemed advisable to call a meeting of those with whom the Guatemalans would probably come into contact in their efforts to obtain the desired equipment in order to formulate a common policy as to how they should be handled.

As all those present were aware, our policy toward Guatemala, stated briefly, was to refrain from extending priority assistance for materials and equipment in short supply; also to cut back on quotas and allocations as much as possible without, however, exposing ourselves to charges that we were violating any of our Inter-American commitments. It was necessary, therefore, to be selective and relatively cautious in the application of this policy in order to avoid the possibility that Guatemala could document a case in the Organization of American States or elsewhere that we were engaging in economic warfare in violation of our commitments.

[Page 1029]

The reason for this meeting, then, was to prepare for the arrival of the Guatemalan mission. Obviously, it was highly important that we all had the same understanding with regard to strategy and tactics and that we all pursued the same line when talking to the Guatemalans.

It was our view, Mr. Clark said, that our objective should be to see to it that Guatemala obtained as little of this equipment as possible. We should be careful, however, not to reveal this fact to the Guatemalans. We should receive them with the utmost courtesy and conduct ourselves in such a way as to give the impression that we were trying to be as helpful as possible. We should stress and restress the tight supply situation as the basis for inability to issue licenses or provide priority assistance. At no time during conversations should reference be made to the political situation in Guatemala or to United States–Guatemala relations. If the Guatemalans suspect or conclude among themselves that we are not being fully cooperative, we will have succeeded entirely in our purpose. However, we should never by our actions give them proof that we are not being cooperative.

Some of the equipment which the Guatemalans would be seeking would not, of course, be in short supply. We would no doubt have to license this equipment and this fact could be pointed to as evidence that there was no embargo on shipments to Guatamala.

Mr. Wythe stated that Mr. Chocano13 had been in yesterday to talk to Mr. Rafferty and Mr. Strassman about licensing procedures. He stated that they had discussed the situation in general terms with Chocano and had made an appointment for him to see Mr. Merrell of the Project Licensing Division on the following day. Mr. Rafferty and Mr. Strassman had been careful, he said, to restrict the conversation to the technicalities of licensing procedures and the general supply situation. Mr. Wythe said the problem now was whether Mr. Merrell should advise Chocano to apply for a project license or suggest that it would be better to apply for licenses on an individual order basis.

A general discussion ensued and it was ultimately decided that Mr. Merrell should follow normal procedure and explain fully to Chocano the advantages and disadvantages of obtaining a project license. He would, during the conversation, express grave doubts that the National Production Authority would give the project as a whole priority status and would refer to the two cases of roadbuilding projects in Peru and Turkey which had been turned down by the NPA. He would mention that in all probability the project would need the strong support of the State Department to obtain consideration from the NPA and inquire whether Chocano had discussed the matter with the State Department. [Page 1030] He would suggest that perhaps it would be best to put the project on an individual licensing basis and offer to make arrangements for Chocano to see Mr. Dunning, Chief of the Licensing Branch of the Office of International Trade. In his turn, Mr. Dunning would explain licensing procedures and stress the fact that much of the equipment which Guatemala needed was in extremely short supply.

It was emphasized several times during the discussion that the Guatemalans should be treated on the surface in the same way as the representatives of any other country trying to obtain materials and equipment in this country.

Mr. Dunning mentioned that his section has been holding up licenses for several months on a number of orders and that the pressure by U.S. suppliers for his section to issue the licenses was increasingly sharp. He mentioned in particular an order of jeeps by the H. J. Nichol Company and a number of road scrapers. Mr. Dunning said that these items were not in short supply, were on the docks waiting for shipment and there was no proper basis for continuing to hold them up unless we were to classify Guatemala as a security risk. It was agreed that under these circumstances licenses would have to be issued for at least a part of these orders.

It was the consensus of opinion that the key to the success of the Guatemalan mission was whether or not it was able to obtain heavy tread tractors. Without them much of the other equipment the mission might succeed in getting would be useless. There was general agreement that tractors of this kind could not be obtained without priority assistance.

When the meeting adjourned, general agreement had been reached that all parties would follow the course outlined above when approached by Guatemalan officials.

  1. Albert F. Nufer, Director, Office of Middle American Affairs.
  2. Ernest V. Siracusa, Officer in Charge, Central America and Panama Affairs.
  3. John W. Evans, Deputy Director, Office of International Materials Policy.
  4. George M. Pollard, Chief, Machinery and Manufactured Products Branch, Manufactured Products Staff.
  5. George Wythe, Director, American Republics Division, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.
  6. William A. Rafferty, Chief, Mexico–Central American Section, American Republics Division, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.
  7. Mark Merrell, Assistant Director, Projects and Technical Data Division, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.
  8. Carroll W. Dunning, Director, Producer’s Equipment Division, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce.
  9. William C. Brister, Chief, Latin American Branch, Foreign Division, Policy Coordination Bureau.
  10. Eleanor Lansing Dulles, detailed to the National Production Authority from the Department of State.
  11. Thomas H. MacDonald, Commissioner, Bureau of Public Roads, Department of Commerce.
  12. John L. Harrison, Assistant to the Chief, Inter-American Regional Office.
  13. Alfredo Chocano Becerra, Counselor, Guatemalan Embassy.