An interesting insight on the thinking that may now be going on in the
Casa Rosada appears in a remark Ambassador
Margueirat2 (who was present at
my interview with Peron) made to an officer of this
Embassy: “Did you notice that all Peron’s points
were related to Hemispheric defense against Communism?”
[Enclosure]
Meeting of Ambassador Nufer With President Perón September 3,
19533
I saw President Perón this
morning at my request to present him with a personal letter4 and a collection of trout flies from Dr.
Milton Eisenhower and to take leave from
him in view of my impending trip to Washington.5 Our meeting, at which the Foreign Minister, Dr.
Remorino, and the Chief of
Ceremonial, Ambassador Margueirat, were
present, lasted from 10:15 a.m. to 12 noon.
The President was delighted with the trout flies and asked me to
translate Dr. Eisenhower’s letter for him.
[Page 443]
He requested me to listen to a recording of an interview which he
gave yesterday to the representative of the National Broadcasting
Company, and which is to be televised in the United States. The
President said that the interview had taken over twenty minutes and
would have to be cut in order to bring it within the proposed ten
minute limit. He asked for suggestions as to what parts of the
interview might best be eliminated as of only marginal interest to
the Amerian audience. After listening to the recording, he then
offered to furnish me with a copy of the text so that I could go
over it with my associates. He also instructed Sr.
Apold,6
Sub-Secretario de Informaciones to furnish me
a copy and asked that we be good enough to let him have our ideas
today if possible.
I then took up with the President certain items of interest to
several local American enterprises. I requested a meeting with him
on behalf of the American meat packers who are facing a difficult
situation, and also discussed the American & Foreign Power
Company’s difficulties with the provincial authorities in
Mendoza. The President agreed to see the
meat packers on his return from Cordoba and promised to look into
the problems of the American & Foreign Power Company; also to
let me know whether the discussions looking toward the acquisition
of the company’s properties by the government—such negotiations
having been suspended early in 1952 because of the then difficult
local economic situation—might be resumed at this time.
I also mentioned the interest of Mr. Herman
Metzger, head of the local ESSO branch, in meeting
with him again to discuss further the possibility of ESSO
cooperating in the development of Argentina’s oil resources. The
President agreed to see Mr. Metzger as soon as
possible.7
I also mentioned the fact that several issues of the New York Times had been confiscated by the
customs authorities during July and August, and Peron promised to take steps to
prevent future incidents of this kind.
The desire of Panagra to invite
six Argentine boys to visit the United States at its expense (as
part of Panagra’s twenty-fifth
anniversary celebration) was also mentioned, and the President said
he would designate the six youngsters before September 13, the date
on which Panagra wishes to make
the corresponding announcement.
[Page 444]
The President referred to the hearings now being held in Washington
with regard to a possible increase in U.S. wool import duties. He
asked me to express to my government his grave concern over the
possibility the increase might affect carpet wool; if so, he said,
it would deprive Argentina of one of its few remaining sources of
dollar exchange which Argentina urgently needed to acquire certain
American products indispensable for its economic well-being. I said
it was my impression that carpet wool was on the free list but that
I would telegraph8 the Department immediately.
The President said that he would like to enlist our assistance in
several other matters of great interest to his government. He
prefaced his remarks by saying that although many people did not
believe that there would be a third world war, he personally was
convinced that such a war was inevitable; it was therefore
imperative that every effort be made by the countries of the Western
Hemisphere to utilize to the utmost the present breathing spell to
prepare for such an emergency.
He was deeply concerned over the fact that Argentina was producing
only about 45 percent of its oil requirements. This was all the more
serious because of Argentina’s commitments under the Hemisphere
Defense Plan.9 It was,
he thought, vitally important that Argentina become self-sufficient
in so far as its oil requirements were concerned in order that it
might contribute effectively to the defense of the South Atlantic.
An emergency program to bring this about was therefore needed.
The President was not clear just how he thought the United States
could assist him in expediting the development of Argentina’s oil
resources, but I got the impression that he thought it was mainly a
job for private U.S. capital. He said the problem, as far as
Argentina was concerned, was largely political because YPF, despite its evident shortcomings,
was strongly entrenched. There were, moreover, certain laws which he
could not ignore and which made it impossible for him to turn over
Argentina’s oil resources to foreign enterprises. He thought,
however, that some way could be found for foreign companies to
cooperate with the Argentine Government in their exploration and
exploitation. The President was somewhat vague on this point; he did
say that it would not be possible to give the foreign companies
title to the
[Page 445]
land, but
that they would presumably have to operate under what he described
as a contrato de locación de obra (project
lease), and to agree to turn over part of their production to YPF. In any event, the President said
something had to be done in the immediate future in view of the
strategic importance of the matter to Hemispheric defense.
The President then discussed the possibility of obtaining some
assistance from us in connection with the proposed development of
Argentina’s shipyards and dry docks. The shipyards (astilleros) at Rio Santiago, he said, were
already equipped for fairly large vessels, but additional equipment
was needed not only for Rio Santiago but for the six dry docks now
under construction in Tigre. These shipyards and dry docks, he said,
would be of vital importance to the countries of the Western
Hemisphere in the event of another world war. There were, he
remarked, no other facilities in this part of the Hemisphere where
large vessels could be overhauled and repaired. World War III, he
said, would be characterized by an attempt on the part of our
enemies to destroy the free world’s industrial potential, and
Argentina was outside of the range of Russian bombers.
The President then discussed the possibility of obtaining help from
the United States in building a plant for the large-scale production
of fighter planes, such as the Pulqui II which the Argentine
Government has been constructing on an experimental basis. He said
that such a plant would, as in the case of the shipyards and dry
docks, be beyond the range of Russian bombers and would constitute
an important contribution to Hemispheric defense. The plant he had
in mind would be equipped to produce complete planes, including
motors, etc., and in return for our assistance Argentina would agree
to place the entire production thereof at our disposal in the event
of an emergency.
The President also hoped the United States might find it possible to
assist Argentina in the construction of a steel mill. Argentina was
already producing ordnance and ammunition, including guided
missiles, and was currently experimenting with guided torpedoes. It
was likewise producing small amounts of recoilless guns. Production
of all this material could be tremendously stepped up if Argentina
had a modern integrated steel mill, and Argentina’s contribution to
the defense of the Hemisphere could thereby be immeasurably
increased.
The President also discussed the need for greatly expediting the
production of uranium ore and beryl. Argentina, he said, had large
undeveloped uranium and beryl deposits but it needed technical help
if large-scale production was to be forthcoming within any presently
measurable period. Such production, he said, would be sold to the
United States.
In connection with all projects he spoke of the need of assistance
from the United States but at no time did he mention the possibility
of
[Page 446]
public credits except
indirectly when he remarked that if these projects could be carried
out by private capital it would, of course, be preferable.
I told the President that while I was, of course, unable to venture
an opinion on the questions he raised, I would be glad to make a
memorandum of our conversation and submit it to my government for
its consideration. I suggested, however, that it would be extremely
helpful if he could let me have a brief memorandum on each of the
subjects mentioned, giving me in more detailed form just what he had
in mind and exactly what, in his opinion, the nature of our
contribution to the several projects might consist of. The President
promised that he would have his technical advisers furnish me with
such memoranda before my departure for the United States.
When I took my leave Peron
asked me to give President Eisenhower an “abrazo” from him. “Tell the President”, he
said, “that he is the senior General and that I will carry out his
orders.”
