PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Administrative Transition”
Paper Prepared by Charles Burton Marshall and John H. Ferguson of the Policy Planning Staff1
suggested outline for white house conference with the president-designate
1. The President and General Eisenhower Alone
The President might begin by setting forth his general reasons for suggesting the meeting:
Under our Constitutional System we have the periodic problem of a break in continuity of political authority and the continuing nature of the foreign policy problems which the Government faces.
The Constitution leaves the power and obligations of the presidential office on the out-going President until the inauguration of his successor. It does not permit the President to turn his powers over to another until he leaves office.
Any President-elect feels reluctant to be fastened with any of the political responsibilities of the office before taking on the legal powers as well.
In reviewing the experience with the problems of changing over Administrations, running back to 1796–97, it is clear that the pattern [Page 19] has varied with the attitude of the men concerned and with the prevailing situation in domestic and foreign politics.
This time there are particular differences from past experience.
One of these differences results from the recent 21st Amendment which:
- Shortens the time for the old Administration to wind up its affairs and the new Administration to get ready,
- Eliminates the short-session of the Congress as an opportunity for a retiring Administration to wind up its legislative program,
- Eliminates the nine-month lag between the arrival of a new Administration and the convening of the new Congress.
The second and principal difference arises from the world situation—the scope and the urgency of the problems in foreign affairs. This last makes this meeting necessary. The President then might emphasize these points:
This Administration does not expect the new Administration to take on responsibilities prematurely.
On some emerging issues giving other nations assurance of the continuity of our policy might prove essential to success in our undertakings. In such cases it would obviously be good to have the concurrence of the new Administration. This, however, is something beyond the power of the present Administration to determine. In any such instance it would welcome concurrence but it would not press for it. It is realized that this is a matter on which the next President must make up his own mind.
The President might then say that he has invited the Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury to join him and the General, but before they do so he would like to mention the subject of atomic energy.
The President may wish to explain to the President-elect that atomic energy matters2 requiring his decision are referred in the first instance to a Special Committee of the National Security Council (the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission) for consideration and appropriate recommendation to him. Among the problems which will require attention in the coming months is the complex of relations with the United Kingdom and Canada and the several raw material supplying countries, in the field of atomic energy. On the military side there is the specific question whether, and in what way, military information concerning atomic weapons should be shared with the NATO countries.
The President could then say that the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission will arrange at a later date to brief the President-elect [Page 20] on the status of the United States atomic energy program.
2. The Larger Meeting
The President might open the larger meeting by stating briefly the purposes for this meeting:
The first purpose is to establish the framework for full understanding of our problems and our purposes in the interim until January 20 so as to avoid needless differences between the Administration and its successor and thus—
- a.
- To show the world national unity in foreign policy as far as politically possible.
- b.
- To maintain undiminished respect abroad for the power and influence of the United States as a nation.
- c.
- To sustain confidence of allies and friends in the continuity of essential elements of our foreign policy in so far as it is possible and proper to do so.
- d.
- To avoid special opportunities for the Kremlin to divide the United States and its allies and friends.
- e.
- To deter the Kremlin from precipitating crises on the basis of misestimates of the unity and strength of purpose of the United States.
The second purpose is to do what can be done by this Administration in the interim to facilitate the initial work of the succeeding Administration by—
- a.
- Giving opportunity to get the intimate perspective on the continuing and delicate aspects of our foreign relations.
- b.
- Informing the President-elect and his principal subordinates with the developments in pertinent fields between now and the time for taking over.
The President might next make clear the following:
General Eisenhower’s responsiveness in selecting Mr. Joseph M. Dodge and Senator Lodge to perform liaison functions with this Administration is welcome.
The Administration trusts that the liaison thus established on the most critical aspects of national policy can be continued and developed as progress is made in selecting the new Cabinet and other principal subordinates.
The Administration wants to do all it can to make this liaison helpful to the incoming Administration—to fill in the background on current problems, to make facilities available for informing the new Administration in advance on matters on which it may desire information in relation to the continuing problems—and at the same time to avoid bogging down the liaison with an excess of details.
This Administration will not so use the liaison function as to attempt to commit or even to sway the views of the incoming Administration. [Page 21] The attempt will be made to interpret the problems as we see them—but for information, not for persuasion.
The President might first take up the Korean situation, especially the armistice impasse, as the first of the topics on which status reports are appropriate at this time. The President might well emphasize that the Korean problem in particular, in regard to the prisoner repatriation issue, is one in which the prospect that the next Administration will uphold the stand taken by the present Administration has a direct bearing on the effectiveness of our position.
The Secretary of State might then review the Korean situation.
The President might then turn to the following topics in turn, calling on the Secretary of State or other appropriate subordinates for presentation of the details:
The problem of working out agreement between Iran and the United Kingdom so as to prevent an undermining of the Iranian position and thus to avoid a strategic defeat of the interests of the West.
The issues regarding the political status of Tunisia and Morocco and regarding tension in South Africa, especially the United Nations aspects.
Relations within NATO, especially the timing of the next meeting of the Council.
Status of proposed European Defense Community.
Progress on the assessment of future security requirements—NSC 135.
The President might then ask General Eisenhower for his views and suggestions regarding liaison between the present and the approaching Administrations.3
- A notation on the source text reads: “Copies given to [Special Presidential Assistant Charles S.] Murphy at W[hite] H[ouse]”. Attached to another copy of this paper were several background papers on the specific topics of Korea, Iran, South Africa, and the allocation of national resources (NSC 135). (Truman Library, PSF–General file) The background papers appear to be restatements of the undated paper prepared in the Department of State for the Secretary’s use in briefing President-elect Eisenhower, p. 6.↩
- For documentation on atomic energy matters, see volume ii.↩
- On Nov. 17, Under Secretary Bruce discussed with President Truman the issuance of some sort of statement following the meeting with Eisenhower. Truman indicated that while he had favored a White House press release “he would consider and probably adopt” Bruce’s suggestion of a joint communiqué. (Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 65 D 238, “Memcons with the President”) On Nov. 18, the day of the Truman-Eisenhower meeting, Secretary of Defense Lovett submitted a 15-page paper to the President “setting out … a series of notes on a variety of subjects in which the Office of the Secretary of Defense has or should have special concern.” (Truman Library, Truman papers, PSF–Subject file)↩