As it has not yet been decided whether the December 15 meeting is in fact to
take place, the situation is definitely subject to change and hence this
paper must be regarded as tentative in many respects. It has been cleared
with the Defense Department’s Office of North Atlantic Treaty Affairs which
will also prepare a paper on NATO for the
talks with the new Administration.3 It is understood that that paper will
deal more specifically with force programs, and their relationship to the
U.S. budgetary program for fiscal ’54.
[Attachment]
Paper Prepared in the Office of European Regional
Affairs4
secret
[Washington,] November 14, 1952.
immediate problems facing u.s. in
nato
1. The Nature of the December 15
Meeting and the Problems it Raises.
The December 15 meeting of the North Atlantic Council is the first
Ministerial meeting scheduled since the NATO reorganization agreed upon at Lisbon in February
1952.5 If it is held, the
delegations of the NATO countries will
be headed by their Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers and Finance or
Economic Ministers. Up to the present the agreed objective of the
forthcoming meeting and its principal item of business has been the
completion of the Annual Review, that is to say the multilateral
reconciliation of military requirements with realistic politico-economic
capabilities.
Despite strenuous efforts on the part of the United States, commencing as
long ago as April last, the Annual Review has progressed slowly and
there is now a very serious question whether even the most limited
objectives of the Review can be accomplished at the December 15 meeting.
These limited objectives are (1) agreement on firm force goals for
calendar 1953, including maintenance thereof, and (2) some indication,
however sketchy, of provisional 1954 goals. Agreement on the former is
obviously necessary at the earliest possible moment because 1953 is
almost upon us and Government programs, including United States aid
programs, must be established in order to place contracts and determine
shipments of equipment. The latter is most desirable from the U.S.
viewpoint in order to provide a sound basis for the request to Congress
for fiscal
[Page 15]
’54 appropriations
for defense support, end-item assistance and offshore procurement for
the NATO effort.
A recent telegram from our NATO
Representatives in Paris reported a meeting of the Annual Review
Committee which broke up early in the morning of November 11 after hours
of wrangling over a proposal by the International Staff which proposed
that at the December 15 meeting there should be only an interim report
on 1953 force goals. Analyzing the situation, Ambassador Merchant
reported:
“It is my considered opinion that given extent of active and
passive resistance in other delegations and the lack of
leadership in the International Staff, we cannot now achieve for
consideration by the Ministers December 15th [meeting] an Annual
Review report containing anything resembling firm force goals
for 1953.”
Mr. Merchant’s analysis and its conclusions were concurred in by senior
staff officers from Washington who have been in Paris the last several
weeks for the critical stages of the Annual Review process. As a
consequence of these recent developments, we are probably faced with the
alternatives of a December 15 meeting at which little can be done on the
Annual Review, or no meeting at all until the earliest feasible date in
1953. The Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, namely Mr. Kraft,
Foreign Minister of Denmark, has called a meeting in New York for
November 14 of those NATO Foreign
Ministers who are currently there for the General Assembly. Out of this
meeting should come the answer as to whether there is to be a December
15 meeting or not.
2. What Could be Accomplished at Such
a Meeting?
The current position of the United States is that if the other NATO countries desire a December 15
meeting we will acquiesce. However, it is not at all clear as to which
Cabinet ministers from the United States would be in attendance and this
depends upon what kind of meeting the Ministers in New York agree to
hold. The United States successfully resisted efforts to hold a
Ministerial meeting in late September or October on the grounds that
during the election campaign there were obvious difficulties which would
have made it impracticable for the United States to participate. We
therefore strongly supported the December 15 date for a meeting
primarily focused on the relatively limited objectives related to 1953,
for most of which financial provision has already been made in the
fiscal 1953 budget. In taking this position, we recognized also that it
would be difficult for a new Administration to take responsibility for a
Ministerial meeting early in the new year.
Throughout the fall the United States has at all times been insistent on
the necessity for establishing firm goals for ’53 at the December
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15 meeting. This pressure has
been carried to the point where Ambassador Merchant has now been obliged
to report that it is being increasingly resented. More generally also,
our position must take account of general European attitudes which in
recent months have been less favorable to the United States for a
variety of reasons such as (1) the increasing unpopularity of an
expensive rearmament program at a time when the Soviet threat, in
European eyes at least, seems less acute, (2) the stationary or
declining standard of living of certain major classes in Europe as
contrasted with continued advances here, (3) European worries that the
United States is preparing more to win a war against the USSR than to
prevent a war, (4) resentment of legislative conditions attached to U.S.
aid, (5) growing dissatisfaction with continued dependence on the United
States, and (6) irritations at the multiplicity of U.S.
officials—civilian and military—in Europe.
Under these circumstances, if, as seems probable, the other NATO partners desire to go through with
the December 15 meeting, we shall probably have to make the best of it.
Apart from routine business, of which there is a fair amount, such a
meeting might be made to serve a useful purpose in connection with
several other problems. Even if there can be no agreement on ’53 force
goals, the attention given to the 1953 buildup could be made to
demonstrate once more the necessity of obtaining German rearmament at
the earliest possible moment. As this can only be achieved following
ratification of the EDC Treaty, and as
France has been reluctant to face up to ratification, the meeting would
serve to bring indirect pressure upon the French. Furthermore, to the
degree that such pressure is effective, it would serve to promote the
policy of European integration which has such strong bipartisan support
in the United States.
Also, even though it may be decided that no decisions can be taken on the
Annual Review, it should still be possible for Ministers to give a
strong impetus in December to the AR
process. One of the main difficulties being faced, on the basis of the
country submissions thus far, is how to get the European countries to
reduce their proposed force plans, which
apart from those of the U.K. are generally unrealistic in terms of
standards by which readiness of forces is measured, support requirements
for troops and reserves of equipment.
Apart from the foregoing, there would be approved by the Ministers at
Paris a new NATO study of Soviet
foreign policy, which should help in laying the basis for the continued
NATO effort. There will also be
ready for approval a new “Strategic Guidance” prepared by the Standing
Group which would aid in bringing up to date common NATO planning.
[Page 17]
While it is being argued whether a meeting without substantial
accomplishment on the Annual Review would provoke a better or worse
public reaction than a cancellation of the NATO meeting, the preponderant view at the moment is that
the loss of momentum, sense of failure and public disillusionment would
be worse in the event of an outright cancellation of the meeting. This
is all the more true if it can be established in advance that, as
contemplated by the Lisbon meeting, NATO Ministers’ meetings do not necessarily have to lead to
spectacular achievement each time but should rather be accepted as
normal periodic meetings of the nations of the Atlantic Community to
discuss their common problems.
3. When Should There Be a Second
Meeting?
It is obvious from what has been written above that the date and nature
of the next meeting will be greatly influenced by the events of the next
several days. If, as seems almost certain, there can be no agreement on
firm force goals for ’53 at the December 15 meeting, it will be
necessary to hold a second meeting for this purpose at the earliest date
which is practicable for the new Administration. The first of March
would be in that event a most desirable target both from the standpoint
of U.S. budgetary submissions to Congress and from the standpoint of the
firming up of the 1953 effort of our other NATO partners.
Apart from the early 1953 meeting required to conclude the Annual Review,
there will be need for at least one other meeting which might take place
during the fall. This meeting would conclude the Annual Review for 1953.
In connection with this, it has for long been contemplated that 1953
would be a year of general reassessment of the progress of the
coalition, and of the composition and size of future NATO forces. At the present time studies
are in progress at SHAPE to determine
the effect of new weapons and new tactics for their use upon future
military requirements. This study, which is awaited eagerly by our
NATO partners in hopes that it may
ease their burdens, should be ready by next summer. At the moment, it
has been generally realized that the effects of new weapons development
are not likely to affect the NATO
buildup materially before 1956 at the earliest and would begin to show a
substantial effect only later. With NATO forces still inadequate, the limited degree of
additional buildup which can be achieved in 1953 and 1954 will be
required in any event.
The autumn-1953 meeting would also have to face up to another major
policy problem arising from the fact that we have now reached the point
in building up modern forces where maintenance and replacement becomes
an important and costly problem. Much of the modern equipment has been
provided or financed by the
[Page 18]
United States, and the incidence of replacement costs will become a
pressing question next year. This in turn is related to consideration of
whether the present forms of aid programs are to continue, or whether
the continuing dollar gap in Europe and inadequate productivity there is
to be combatted by other means, including the adoption of new United
States economic policies. This meeting too will be awaited by the
Europeans with particular concern as providing one of the first
indications of the considered attitude of the new Administration towards
the problems of Europe and the continued association of the United
States with Europe for mutual security purposes. In fact, it is quite
possible that because of this consideration the other NATO countries will press for an earlier
interim meeting in the late spring to review progress, deal with
political and economic questions and pave the way for the completion in
the autumn of the 1953 Annual Review.
