Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 109 Series

Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council¹

top secret
[NSC 109]

[Washington, undated.]

Turkey

1. Turkey is the strongest anti-Communist country on the periphery of the USSR and the only one in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East area capable of offering substantial resistance to Soviet aggression. It can and does contribute to the security interests of the United States, and therefore it continues to be in the interest of the United States that Turkey remain an ally of the free world in the struggle against international communism.

a. Turkey’s military strength-in-being, and firm determination to maintain its political independence and territorial integrity, continue to be effective deterrents to Soviet or satellite aggression directed against Turkey.

b. Turkey’s alignment with the free world furnishes a protective screen behind which the defensive strength of the countries in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East area can be developed.

c. Turkey controls the strategically important Turkish Straits, the denial of which the Soviet control is vital to the security interests of the United States.

d. Turkey is a bulwark on one flank of the area now embraced by the North Atlantic Treaty.

e. Military and other resources of Turkey, including base areas, would be of great value to the United States in the event of war with the USSR.

f. Soviet domination of Turkey would enhance the relative Soviet power position, seriously damage United States prestige which is heavily committed in Turkey, and weaken the will to resist in other countries threatened with Soviet domination.

g. Soviet domination of Turkey or even a neutral Turkey would protect the Soviet right flank in a Soviet attack against Iran and the Arab States.

h. Seizure of Turkey by force of arms could only be viewed as one phase of the Soviet plan of conquest, undertaken in full recognition of the risk of precipitating global war.

2. Accordingly, the United States should:

a. Continue to manifest publicly its active interest in the maintenance of the political independence and territorial integrity of Turkey and its continued support of the Truman doctrine.

b. Continue to provide appropriate international political support to Turkey.

c. Continue to exercise a constructive influence, without interference in Turkey’s internal affairs, on Turkey’s efforts to strengthen itself economically, militarily and politically.

d. Encourage Turkey to develop closer relations with the other countries of the Middle East, particularly Iran.

e. Continue to provide economic and technical assistance which, when combined with the maximum Turkish efforts of self-help, will permit the development of Turkey’s economy to the extent required to avoid social unrest, which will demonstrate United States interest in Turkey’s economic as well as military well-being, and which will assist the United States in securing from Turkey resources needed for the defense of the free world.

f. Lend appropriate support to the Turkish military establishment to give it the capability of:

(1) Maintaining internal security.

(2) Repelling a satellite attack on Turkey.

(3) Resisting to the maximum practicable extent an attack on Turkey involving direct or indirect Soviet participation.

(4) …

g Within the limits of priorities and availabilities, provide Turkey military materiél, supplies, and guidance necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives in f. above.

3. In order to assure Turkey’s full cooperation in international security measures and, in the event of war, its cobelligerency, the use of Turkish bases and other facilities, and the closure of the Straits to the USSR, the United States should:

a. Press now for the inclusion of Turkey as a full member of NATO, this being the most desirable form of reciprocal security arrangement.

b. If full membership of Turkey in NATO would be unacceptably delayed, conclude alternative security arrangements which would include Turkey and would not prejudice Turkish membership in NATO at the earliest practicable date.²

4. A Soviet or satellite attack against Turkey would so increase the danger of global war that the United States in common prudence, pending the conclusion of reciprocal security arrangements including the United States and Turkey, should assist in opposition to the attack in a manner and scope to be determined in the light of circumstances then existing, including the following general courses of action.

a. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the imminence of global war.

b. Seek, by political measures, to stop the aggression, localize the action, and restore the status quo.

c. Provide such military matériel and deploy such forces to the general area as can appropriately be made available in the light of recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.

d. Urge other nations to take similar action, including appropriate measures in the United Nations and NATO and the implementation of the United Kingdom–France–Turkey Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

5. After the conclusion of reciprocal security arrangements including the United States and Turkey, the United States should respond to a Soviet or satellite attack against Turkey in a manner and scope to be determined in the light of the recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the circumstances then existing, and within the framework of the obligations of the United States under those arrangements.

1. The source text and the NSC Staff Study (infra), along with a cover sheet and a covering note dated May 11 from James S. Lay, Jr., the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, were circulated to members of the NSC, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization for their consideration as NSC 109 of May 11, “The Position of the United States With Respect to Turkey.”

   Lay explained in the covering note that the enclosed draft statement of policy had been prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 366–c of October 12, 1950, in which the Council had agreed that the NSC Staff should prepare a new report on U.S. policy toward Turkey (NSC–S/S (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95: Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1950; for excerpts from NSC 42/1, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. v, pp. 410 and 1317.). Moreover, it was proposed in the covering note to revise the approved statement of policy in NSC 103/1, “The Position of the United States With Respect to Greece” (p. 463) to include a statement along the lines of paragraph 3 in the source text in order that, if approved, the recommendations advanced regarding security arrangements in both statements of policy would conform with one another.

   The draft statement of policy on Turkey had been completed by the NSC Staff Assistants on May 8 for consideration by the Senior Staff on May 10. Prior to this meeting, general agreement had been reached regarding its contents, except for the recommendations advanced in the subparagraphs of paragraph 3. The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff representatives disliked these subparagraphs and were advancing substitutions. At the Senior Staff session on May 10, the Department of State withdrew its objections to the Defense–JCS versions of the subparagraphs; the JCS representative then countered with a redraft of the JCS wording of subparagraph 3b.; and the Senior Staff proceeded to adopt them, after further revision, with the recommendation that the revised draft statement of policy be submitted to the Council for approval as NSC 109. The differences between the subparagraphs in the draft of May 8 and the final version of them circulated as NSC 109 on May 11 are indicated in a subsequent footnote.

   At its 92d meeting on May 23, the Council considered NSC 109. The members also noted a memorandum of concurrence from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense dated May 22 in which the JCS had approved the source text and the proposed revisions to the statement of policy in NSC 103/1 as they had been circulated on May 11. Executive Secretary Lay had, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, sent this additional paper, along with a covering memorandum, to the members of the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization on May 22. In it, the JCS expressed again their opinion:

   “that United States security interests demand that Turkey and Greece be admitted as full members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Joint Chiefs of Staff attach such great importance to insuring that Turkey and Greece are on the side of the Western Powers at the outset of a general war that they are willing to agree to an alternative mutual security arrangement for Turkey and Greece if their inclusion in NATO would be delayed to such an extent that orientation with the West in the event of a general war would be jeopardized. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the military point of view, would not regard either bilateral security arrangements between the United States and Turkey or Greece as an adequate solution.”

   The Council then adopted the statement of policy on Turkey and the proposed revisions to the statement of policy on Greece contained in NSC 103/1, which had been presented in the covering note of May 11, and, finally, the NSC formally submitted NSC 109 to the President for consideration. (NSC Action No. 480, May 23, 1951, NSC–S/S (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95: Record of Actions by the National Security Council, 1951)

   The following day, May 24, Executive Secretary Lay informed the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization that the President had that day approved the Statement of Policy on Turkey contained in NSC 109 and had directed its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State. For the revisions to NSC 103/1, see pp. 461 ff.

2. In the original May 8 draft of the statement of policy, the varying versions of the subparagraphs to paragraph 3 of the source text appeared as follows:

   State	Defense, JCS
   a. Enter, into reciprocal security arrangements with Turkey in such form as may be most feasible.	a. Press now for the inclusion of Turkey as a full member of NATO, this being the most desirable form of reciprocal security arrangement.
   b. Approve in principle, as the most feasible form of reciprocal security arrangements, the inclusion of Turkey as a full member in NATO.	b. If full inclusion of Turkey in NATO proves to be politically impossible, enter into some alternative form of reciprocal security commitment of a form most feasible in the circumstances.
   c. If full inclusion of Turkey in NATO proves to be politically impossible determine what alternative form of a security commitment would be more feasible in the circumstances.