IO Files: Lot 71 D 440
Memorandum of Conversation, by James W. Barco of the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly
US/A/AC.53/8
Subject: Palestine in the General Assembly
| Participants: | Mr. Moshe Sharett, Israeli Foreign Minister |
| Mr. Arthur Lourie, Israeli Delegation | |
| Mr. Gideon Rafael, Israeli Delegation | |
| Mr. Philip Jessup, USGADel | |
| Mr. Joseph Palmer, USGADel | |
| Mr. James Barco, USGADel |
Mr. Sharett opened the discussion by saying that he had called to see Mr. Jessup to compare notes on the coming debate on Palestine. [Page 964] He would be returning to Israel at the end of this week and would not be coming back. Before he left, he wished to see whether the Israel and American Delegations stood together on the question of Palestine. While there had been contacts between the Israel Embassy and the State Department, this was the first “business meeting” that the Israel Delegation had had with any delegation in Paris.
Mr. Sharett referred to his previous conversation with Mr. Jessup1 and reviewed what he had then said with respect to the Israel view of the problem, which he had divided into three parts: 1) Security in the area. In this connection Mr. Sharett felt that no change in the present armistice supervision arrangements were necessary. 2) The humanitarian problem. The problem of Arab refugees was one which was being handled satisfactorily by UNRWA. 3) Relations between Israel and the Arab States. International intervention was not necessary at this time.
Mr. Sharett said however that since this first talk with Mr. Jessup the Israel Delegation had been able to clarify their views. These clarifications had resulted partly from the Israel Delegation’s talks with Mr. Blandford. His Delegation now understood more fully Mr. Blandford’s approach to the question, and he wished to say that the Israel Delegation had no quarrel with it. They could understand that the UNRWA operation should be separated from political questions and that negotiations with Israel on the question of compensation should not be confused with the reintegration program at this stage. The question of determining the amount and the mode of payment could be left to negotiations between Israel and an organ of the United Nations. The question remained what organ should be designated for such negotiations. Mr. Sharett also recalled that he had stated that there was no need for United Nations machinery to deal with inter-state relations at the present time; that the parties themselves can advance from the armistice agreements under existing machinery; but whatever machinery there was, the essential thing was the will to come to agreement and as long as that was lacking, machinery was unimportant. However, the Israel Delegation had now concluded that the maintenance of some organ ready to help in widening the scope of the armistice agreements when and if the parties were ready was desirable, and the Israel Delegation had likewise concluded that whatever organ was set up should deal with both this question and the question of compensation. In this connection they were aware that a new organ might possibly be made up of states who were not familiar with the compensation question and had concluded that the Refugee Office of the PCC with its technical knowledge might be attached to any new organization to deal with this question. That left the question open as [Page 965] to what the new organ should be, where it should sit, of whom it should be composed, its name and terms of reference.
Mr. Sharett said that the Israel Government felt that there should be an entirely new arrangement which would make a clear break with the past. It should not be the PCC, the continuance of which would suggest a perpetuation of the PCC’s methods. While these were not on the whole bad, the PCC had made one mistake in bringing all the Arab States together en bloc. This should be avoided in the future and the nature of the new organ should be such as to convey to the parties concerned that an entirely new approach was being made. Above all there should not be a continuation of the practice of making a semblance of negotiations when everyone knew that there were no true negotiations being carried on.
The Israel Delegation felt that the new organ should be called a “Good Offices Committee.” This was not merely a question of title but reflected the substance of what the Israel Delegation believed desirable. It should be clearly indicated that the new organ was not to meet continuously or expected to report at the end of the year. It might do nothing at all for half a year or a year but should be ready to act when requested by the parties. The Israel Delegation saw the merit of maintaining the present membership of the PCC. It would have welcomed the addition of the United Kingdom, if membership could be increased to four; while if only three members were to be selected, it would prefer the United Kingdom to Turkey. Israel had had misgivings in 1948 about the Turks, although not all of these had been borne out. The fact was Turkey could not always take a detached view of the Middle East being, as she was, part and parcel of the area. Israel would, however, make no issue if there were good reasons for retaining Turkey as a member, and if to bring in the United Kingdom would complicate matters, Israel would make no issue on this. In any case, Israel had not spoken to the United Kingdom about it.
As to the seat of the organization, Mr. Sharett said that there seemed common agreement that New York was the best place. The terms of reference of the new body should be very simple. They should state 1) that the organ should be available to lend its good offices for any negotiations that might take place as a result of the application of any of the parties, and 2) that the Good Offices Committee should continue to deal with the question of compensation either directly or through an intermediary body such as the Andersen Refugee Office.
In reply to Mr. Sharett, Mr. Jessup said that the study and thinking in the American Delegation had proceeded along lines closely parallel to that of the Israel Delegation. He went over the points briefly to see if any differences of view existed. With respect to security, he felt that there was no difference of opinion; that the Truce Supervision Organization and the Security Council were sufficient. With [Page 966] respect to refugees, our thinking, like that of the Israel Delegation, was that the arrangements were generally satisfactory. One point which Mr. Sharett had not mentioned was the question of blocked accounts. We understood that the Israel Delegation had indicated to the PCC that there was no problem in principle concerning the release of blocked accounts. It would be most helpful at this time in consideration of the Palestine question if Israel could make some step in the direction of unblocking the Arab accounts.
Mr. Sharett replied in this connection that the Israel Delegation had signified its willingness to discuss the question of blocked accounts but had reached no final decision. The Israel Government for the present must reserve its position but further clarification might be forthcoming in a few weeks. The problem for Israel was that the payment of blocked accounts involved an immediate payment of hard currency to the benefit of Israel’s neighbor states who still insisted that they were at war with Israel. The Israel Government’s difficulty would be to explain to parliament how they could justify such a payment in these circumstances. Mr. Sharett indicated parenthetically that the accounts of Jews blocked in Iraq about equalled the Arab accounts blocked in Israel, that is, each amounted to about 5,000,000 pounds sterling.
Mr. Jessup reiterated that in this field where it was much easier to move than in other matters, action by Israel at this time would be very helpful, and he felt sure that the Israel Government had this in mind. Mr. Jessup then said that the thinking in the American Delegation had run over all of the alternatives on the Palestine question. With respect to the establishment of some new body, we thought it undesirable to give the parties the idea that a new movement was beginning to undertake something that the PCC had not been able to do. If a new body with a new name were to be established, we would run the risk of creating the idea that some new initiative was about to take place. Our thinking started from the same premise as that of the Israel Delegation, that it was desirable to avoid creating the impression that something new was brewing. To keep the PCC on a standby basis might most successfully carry out this idea.
We agreed with the Israel Delegation, Mr. Jessup said, that changing the membership of the body might create new problems and new frictions. On the whole, it seemed that the simplest thing to do was to avoid novelty, to keep the same name and to create the idea of a standby basis. This might accomplish what we all had in mind. While the question of compensation and repatriation can’t be obliterated, Mr. Jessup observed, it seemed possible to move along with them; whereas to raise the question specifically of a new body’s terms of reference might result in over-emphasizing the repatriation question.
[Page 967]Mr. Sharett replied that in his opinion a retention of the PCC suggested continuing the old procedures, while their idea was that a new body would definitely suggest new procedures. As to repatriation, it was one thing not to proclaim that repatriation was definitely off; it was quite a different thing to reaffirm that repatriation must be implemented. It was in the interest of an early solution of the refugee problem and the wider problems of the area, if there were no reaffirmation of repatriation.
Mr. Rafael added that the Israel Delegation had been impressed by the PCC’s conclusions which, he said, corresponded to the realities of the situation. The Israel Delegation found that the PCC’s conclusion, that the attitudes of the parties and changed conditions in Palestine made it impossible for the PCC to carry out its mandate, was a bold, correct and realistic statement of which the United Nations should take advantage. Mr. Sharett added that by following the Israel Delegation’s suggestion, for a new body, the General Assembly would in fact be taking advantage of the PCC’s conclusions. Mr. Jessup added at that point that the PCC’s conclusions with respect to its mandate included the conclusion that it could not follow its present procedure. It was a most important point and the change to less active procedures that the United States had in mind could best be undertaken by the transfer of the PCC’s headquarters to New York and representation on the Commission by the permanent representatives to the United Nations. Mr. Lourie remarked that under the kind of resolution the Israelis had in mind there would be no occasion for keeping the Palestine question on the General Assembly agenda. Mr. Sharett added that whatever resolution was adopted, it should not obligate the body to submit an annual report. Annual reports always insured debate on the question. A report also acted as an incentive to activity which might be artificial.
Mr. Jessup observed that it would be desirable in this year’s debate not to approach the question on the basic issues but on the question of appropriate United Nations machinery. If the temper of the discussion could be lowered it would be most desirable and it would also be preferable to avoid discussion of the issues every year. Mr. Palmer added that he wondered if debate on the new body contemplated by the Israel Delegation might not provoke a detailed examination of the new body’s terms of reference and result in stronger language on repatriation. Mr. Sharett agreed that this was a point to be considered.
Mr. Palmer also referred to Mr. Sharett’s comment regarding the PCC procedure of dealing with all of the Arab countries en bloc and said that we did not feel that this would necessarily be the case if the PCC went on the standby basis we had in mind. Mr. Sharett replied that this was a most important point and had been one of the main reasons for their proposing a new body. If it could be assumed that the [Page 968] body in existence would be flexible as to procedure, this would be most desirable. At the conclusion of the discussion, Mr. Sharett asked when he might expect something from the US Delegation in a more crystallized form in reply to which Mr. Jessup said that we would keep in touch with his Delegation and hoped to have further discussions soon.
Mr. Sharett left with Mr. Jessup a draft resolution2 embodying the Israel Delegation views, a copy of which is attached.