974.531/8–2251
The Ambassador of Israel (Eban) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)
Dear Secretary McGhee: I write with reference to the conversation held this morning between Ambassador Ernest Gross and Mr. Gideon Rafael, a member of our delegation to the United Nations.1 In the course of that conversation, Ambassador Gross enquired whether we had heard rumours of an intention in some quarters to suggest that the Suez item now before the Security Council be referred to the Palestine Conciliation Commission.
I have no doubt that the United States would take the same view as Israel on this somewhat ludicrous suggestion, if it were to arise. In view of the extreme gravity of the contingency, however, I take this opportunity of putting in writing some of the considerations which Mr. Rafael was instructed to express to Ambassador Gross.
There is no doubt that the procedure described in this unsubstantiated rumour would confer fatal and simultaneous harm both upon the existing armistice system, and on the forthcoming conciliation conference. With respect to the former it must surely be admitted that the Security Council has outdone itself in unprecedented deference to Egypt, giving that country an unexampled opportunity to bring its actions into conformity with international opinion. The majority of the members have expressed themselves in favor of a [Page 839] specific resolution. If the Council were now to evade formal action, after the many postponements already accorded, we should have the unedifying spectacle of the highest organ of international security on its knees before Egypt, confessing its impotence to give formal expression to its own majority opinion. I suggest, in all moderation, that the Security Council would be unable to act with any authority or respect on any Palestine question ever again. Moreover, the inescapable conclusion that the Security Council would refuse in any circumstance to give a ruling in favor of an Israel complaint which all agree to be fully justified, would have a disastrous effect on the Security Council’s authority in respect of any problem in which Israel is involved. Moreover, the armistice machinery would remain paralysed if the Security Council were to prolong this refusal to give a ruling on the most important armistice question outstanding between the Parties.
Hardly less disastrous would be the effect of such a move on the Paris conference itself. There would be little prospect for that conference to succeed or even to exist at all, if the Security Council, after weeks of debate and consultation, were to acknowledge that Egypt has a veto over the formal expression of United Nations views. It is certainly inconceivable that Israel and Egypt could hold discussions on progress towards peace, at a time when the latter state maintained its theory of active belligerent rights, while the former was denied an authoritative Security Council judgment on that pernicious theory. Furthermore, the doubt which would justly arise in Israel whether the United Nations exists at all as a tribunal capable of expressing a verdict on an Israel complaint, would destroy the minimum confidence necessary for the conciliation procedure to function under United Nations auspices.
The maintenance of the armistice system is not something to be discussed in Paris. It is an unconditional obligation of the Parties and an indispensable prelude to any further effort to proceed beyond the armistice system.
In view of the deep interest that the United States has evinced both in the maintenance of the armistice system and in the attempt to make progress beyond the armistice during the Paris discussions, I feel sure that you will join in opposing any such tendency, should it be expressed, to debase the dignity of the Security Council and to doom the Paris talks to failure.2
With warm personal regards,
I remain, yours very sincerely,
- Memorandum of conversation not printed.↩
- A reply was sent on August 25 over the signature of Mr. Berry, who was Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. Mr. Berry assured Ambassador Eban that the Department did not look favorably on the suggestion that the Suez item be referred to the Palestine Conciliation Commission. (974.531/8–2251)↩