Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

786.56/8–1451

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Jones)

top secret

Washington, August 14, 1951.

Participants:	State Department:
	BNA—Mr. William Hamilton
	MD—Mr. Robert Margrave
	NE—Mr. G. Lewis Jones
	S/ISA—Mr. George Emery
	—Mr. Jonathan Bingham
	WE—Mr. G. McMurtrie Godley
	Department of Defense:
	Captain G. S. Patrick, OSD
	Lt. Col. R. N. Lipscomb, AFOPD
	Lt. Col. P. J. Camp, Dept. of Army, G–3
	Major Ruth Briggs, Office of Military Assistance
	British Embassy, Washington:
	Mr. Denis Greenhill
	Wing-Commander Wiles

Mr. Lewis Jones (Chairman) opened the meeting with the explanation that on May 17, 1951 the British Ambassador had been handed an informal paper entitled “Notes re Arms Supply to the Arab States and Israel” (Enclosure A),¹ with the understanding that informal British comments on this paper would be forthcoming. When this happened, a “Working Group” would be established. The British Embassy advised the Department on August 10 that it was ready to comment and this meeting had been assembled to hear the British views.

Mr. Greenhill distributed “Informal British Comments on Notes on Arms Supply” (Enclosure B)² and after going through this briefly, Mr. Greenhill inquired whether those present could elucidate US paragraph B.11 regarding US preference for cash reimbursable assistance. He was told that this paragraph speaks for itself, since the US must restrict the amount of its grant assistance to the greatest extent possible as well as keep in step with the UK and France.

For the information of the British representatives, Major Briggs explained the procedures used in connection with current military assistance programs. She said that the first step in connection with aiding a country is the dispatch from Washington of an Army-Navy-Air Force-State-ECA Survey Group to draw up a list of the country’s forces and needs. The Survey Group then returns to Washington, where a tentative program is prepared and approved through established procedures. When a Bilateral Agreement has been signed with the recipient country, an “initial increment” of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) is sent to the country. Major Briggs said that MAAGs are tailored to the nature of the aid and the situation in the receiving country; that MAAGs have certain statutary functions involving the maintenance and proper use of arms supplied.

Mr. Greenhill inquired whether the US would be willing to operate in countries which, for security or other reasons, withheld information regarding their military establishments. He thought this situation might arise in Syria, for example. The sense of the meeting voiced by Mr. Bingham was that if a country wants US assistance, frankness with the US was a gauge of its sincerity.

Mr. Bingham stated that he did not think that the present pattern of MAAGs need necessarily be followed slavishly: the NE program is directed towards a new area in which the regional approach is desirable. Consequently, while we must preserve all of the statutary requirements involving MAAGs, he thought there could be a good deal of flexibility and that MAAGs could be small and inconspicuous if this were politically advisable. Mr. Bingham said that one MAAG conceivably could be assigned responsibilities involving the staffing of two or more countries. Colonel Lipscomb assured the group that MAAGs presented great manpower difficulties for the Services, and he was sure that Defense did not desire a proliferation of MAAGs.

Location Tripartite Agency

The next subject discussed was the location of the Tripartite correlation mechanism. The sense of the meeting was that it is premature at this time, before consultation with the French to attempt to settle on a location: if a command structure involving the US, UK, France and Turkey were established in the area, this headquarters might be the logical seat of the agency; on the other hand, a basis for deciding on a location might be the country supplying the most arms to the area.

French Participation

Mr. Greenhill, in expansion of paragraph C. of the British paper, stated that the British Government had considered the past difficulties experienced in dealing with the French on arms matters and certain objections on security grounds; nevertheless the UK felt that these risks should be accepted and the French must be in on the Tripartite agency on a completely equal basis.

It was agreed that as a next step the Department should hand a copy of its “Notes re Arms Supply” (brought up to date and clarified by some British drafting improvements [paragraph D.ii]³ of British paper dealing with procedure) to the French Embassy in the near future.⁴ The French would be asked to provide their comments promptly. The French would thus be brought level with the UK on this question. It was hoped that after the French had submitted their comments, the next move might be a US-UK-French Working Group.

It was agreed that the high level discussions of a “Middle East Command Structure” should not delay pressing forward on the question of the Tripartite Agency since the volume of arms sales to the Arab States and Israel is large enough to justify a Tripartite Agency starting to work immediately.

[Enclosure B]

Paper Prepared in the British Embassy

secret

Washington, August 14, 1951.

Informal British Comment on “Note on Arms Supply”, Handed Over by U.S. Representatives—at Meeting Held on May 17th

A. Nature of U.S. Arms Programme.

We welcome the political purpose of the U.S. programme and agree to the validity of the conception which has prompted it.

B. Conditions of Supply.

We are generally in agreement with the points listed in paragraph b. of the U.S. “Note on Arms Supply”. In particular it is necessary to see that the arms are not to be used in a manner inconsistent with the Tripartite Declaration. We should also wish to be reasonably satisfied on the attitude of the recipient country in the event of war and its capacity to put the arms to use in the common cause. We also greatly appreciate the intention of the U.S. to require payment for arms supply and to limit grant aid to special cases.

C. Co-relation of Arms Supply.

We agree on the necessity for a Tripartite coordination agency of which the French would be full and equal members. Such an agency should, in our view, form part of, or be associated with, any Allied Command organization that may be established in the Middle East. We feel that the coordinating agency would be best located with or close to the Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East who are in the best position to advise on the strategic aspects of supply. Alternative site for the agency would be London.

D. Functions of a Tripartite Agency.

(i) We agree in general with the sense of Section C of the American “Note on Arms Supply”. As we see it the Agency would make recommendations on the desirability, both on strategic and on technical grounds, of meeting request for arms submitted by the Middle East States. Its functions would be essentially advisory and its recommendations would not be binding on the three supplying governments.

(ii) Procedure

We do not envisage any direct contact between the Agency and the Middle East States; and we agree that so far as possible it should work under cover. We would suggest the adoption of a unified procedure whereby:

(a) States applying for arms would submit their requests to the Government of the supplying country concerned;

(b) The Government of the supplying country would despatch a copy to its own representative on the Tripartite Agency;

(c) The appropriate representative on the Agency would submit the recommendations of the Agency to his own Government.

(iii) Clandestine Purchases

We agree with paragraph 9 of U.S. Note on Arms Supply of 17th May. It should be borne in mind, however, that apart from clandestine purchases there are a considerable number of above-board purchases from sources other than the United Kingdom, United States and French Governments. These should presumably also be taken into account.

We agree that instances of dispute should be referred to Governments for settlement through diplomatic channels.

1. Same as Enclosure A to memorandum of conversation by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs, May 17, p. 139.
2. Printed below.
3. Brackets in the source text.
4. A typewritten note on the source text reads: “The U.S. ‘Notes re Arms Supply’ will be handed to the representatives of the French Embassy on August 17.” See memorandum of conversation, by Mr. Godley, August 17, infra.