740.5/8–1051
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Dorsz)1
Subject: Middle East Command
| Participants: | Vice Admiral J. Wright, Department of Defense |
| Mr. Cabot, S/ISA | |
| Mr. Ferguson, S/P | |
| Mr. Martin, EUR/RA | |
| Mr. Dorsz, NEA/GTI |
At Admiral Wright’s invitation, several State Department officers visited him at the Pentagon to discuss the problems involved in establishing a Middle East command structure which might be acceptable to the parties concerned.
Admiral Wright reviewed our difficulties with the British arising from the designation of an American to serve as SACLANT.2 In seeking compensation for their acquiescence to SACLANT, the UK originally made strong demands for a UK commander for the Eastern Mediterranean and later pressed for the top spot in a Middle East command structure. As a bargaining tool to obtain our and eventually Turkey’s concurrence, the UK has linked their support for Greek-Turkish admission into NATO to that of resolution of the Middle East command structure. The command structure question has been discussed in the NATO Standing Group. The UK insists that it have the top command. We have been inclined to look with favor on a UK national serving as Supreme Allied Commander Middle East (SACME) but have not committed ourselves. The French have suggested that Greece and Turkey be under SHAPE and serve as the right flank of SACEUR. The Turks are primarily interested in obtaining a security commitment from the USA and a responsible position in the command structure. The question of their admission to NATO is secondary (State Department representatives observed that this was the case six months ago; now, however, the question of their admission to NATO is an emotional-psychological one and the Turks would be deeply embittered if their application is denied).
Admiral Wright exhibited a chart which he had prepared for possible consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on August 13. According to this chart, authority would flow from a Middle East Defense Board (MEDB)—a counterpart of the NAT Council—through a Middle East Standing Group (US/UK/France) aided by a Middle East Military Committee (Turkey, Commonwealth, and Middle East [Page 163] countries as appropriate) and SACME, headed by a UK national with US, French, Turkish and possibly Commonwealth deputies. SACME would have air and naval component commands and area commands designated as CINCLEVANT and CINCTURKEY. The Commander-in-Chief Turkey would be a Turkish national and he would be in command of all naval, air and land forces used in Turkey. CINCLEVANT (a UK or Commonwealth national) would command such troops as SACME would make available.
On the chart, MEDB was followed by a questionmark and Admiral Wright expressed uncertainty about the purpose of the Board. The State Department representatives indicated that their conception of the Board was that it would be an organization separate from SACME and with no authority over the Standing Group or SACME’s component arms. SACME, however, would be chairman. In this capacity he would accept and consider requests from the Middle East countries for assistance in the defense field and would make such recommendations and extend such assistance as might be appropriate and feasible. In the light of this explanation, to which thesis he agreed, Admiral Wright thought that as the Board would have to negotiate with governments, it should be a political organization. The NEA representative indicated that NEA’s view was that the Board should be a military one and that its contact should be with the defense establishments of the Middle East countries seeking aid and guidance. Otherwise, we might find ourselves participants in an ineffective political organization such as the Arab League. No final position was developed.
Admiral Wright said that after the JCS passes upon his paper,3 which will be revised to reflect the idea that the MEDB is functionally disassociated from SACME, Defense will discuss the matter with the Department with a view to working out a definitive United States Government position. When such a position is reached, we might then inform the British: (1) We favor that command structure but as we are not conditioning Turkish admission into NATO on its acceptance of any specific command formula we must insist that this understanding be regarded as tentative;4 and (2) we will exert our best efforts to get the Turks to accept this formula after they are admitted into NATO. On this basis we would hope that the British would recede from their current position and would join with us in exerting every possible effort to get Turkey into NATO at the September 15 Council meeting.
- Copies to Matthews, McGhee, Bonbright, Parsons, and Jones of NEA.↩
- For documentation on this subject, see vol. iii, pt. 1, pp. 460 ff.↩
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- At this point in the document a handwritten notation was appended in the margin, possibly by Bonbright, which reads as follows: “I don’t think we can count on firm UK support on NAT admission unless we reach a firm agreement with at least UK on command.”↩