484A.118/8–651
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)1
Subject: Visit of Ambassador Eban.
| Participants: | Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel |
| Moshe Keren, Counselor, Embassy of Israel | |
| Col. Chaim Herzog, Military, Naval, Air Attaché, Embassy of Israel | |
| Mr. McGhee—NEA | |
| Mr. Waldo—NE |
The Ambassador called, accompanied by the Counselor and the Military Attaché, to have his picture taken with me in my office by a photographer of the Saturday Evening Post for use in an article on Mr. Eban which will appear in a forthcoming issue of that magazine. After the photographs had been taken, the Ambassador discussed the following subjects:
1. Munitions Licenses for Israel:
The Ambassador launched into a discussion on a subject which he had mentioned to me on several previous occasions; namely, the delay in the Department’s approval of certain license applications for military equipment for Israel. The Ambassador decribed Israel’s military preparations as only a fraction of those of the neighboring countries. He said that Egypt had an armaments budget of $200,000,000 and that Syria’s was proportionately as great; that no other country in the Near East was threatened to the extent Israel was. It appeared to him that there was conflict between the Department’s policy of license restrictions and its policy of mutual aid as set forth in the US Government’s program.
I told the Ambassador that when I had discussed the situation with him on previous occasions I was not fully informed of all aspects of the problem. The licensing of military equipment for foreign countries was undertaken by an interdepartmental mechanism, on which the Munitions Division is the State Department representative. Our [Page 821] policy on arms shipments to the Near East is based on the Tripartite Declaration, which states that the countries of the Near East should receive arms for purposes of internal security and to play their part in the defense of the Near East. The Huleh disturbances, however, had appeared sufficiently alarming to warrant the temporary suspension of certain Israel license applications. There was therefore a definite connection between the Huleh situation and the temporary halt in the licensing of arms shipments to Israel. Subsequent to that time, a number of licenses had been approved. While I had not been able to study the problem fully, I believed that over a period of time the rate of license approvals would return to normal.
The Ambassador said he was certain that there were no aspects of the Huleh situation which could warrant a belief that hostilities would be resumed. He said he hoped that Syria had received similar treatment. I told him that Syria’s license applications were very few but that in so far as there were any, they had been suspended at the time of the incidents. I added that I did not understand what the Ambassador meant in his letter in referring to joint defense discussions with the United States.
The Ambassador replied that he had not intended this to be taken literally, but that Israel had been encouraged by General Marshall to put forward its ideas on its possible contribution to the defense of the Near East, although he knew there were no actual plans under consideration. I said that up until now we had no commitments in the area and no plans for forces there; that a mutual security program may be the basis for a new approach, but that there was no such approach at this moment. The British had primary responsibility there. The Ambassador said that with regard to Israel’s arms request from the US, one aspect of the situation which should be borne in mind was that, while the US is not the only country from which Israel is able to buy arms, and quite apart from the availability of arms in the UK or France, Israel would like to establish a certain reciprocal dependence between itself and the US. The Ambassador said that Israel’s proposals to the Department on Israel’s possible contribution to the defense of the area and the suggestion that the Israel Director of Military Training should come to this country were made with this factor in mind. I said we appreciated this fact and we regretted that we do not yet have some more positive basis for assistance.
The Ambassador continued that the feeling in the Middle East was that, while guarantees by Britain and France were valuable, there would be a greater feeling of security if the US were associated in some way with these guarantees. I said our position was that we have so many commitments it was difficult to meet all the demands. Authorization to grant arms shipments to the Arab states and Israel would be a good basis for a new approach.
[Page 822]2. Huleh Situation: The Ambassador said that Israel objected to the continued holding up of Israel engineering plans for the Demilitarized Zone out of deference to the property rights of certain Arab landowners. He said that the May 18 Resolution was a two-way resolution and that the Mixed Armistice Commission should undertake to consider the Israel complaints of Syrian aggression. The Armistice Commission, however, had not met for several weeks. Another point of fact was that El Hamme had been absorbed completely into Syria’s economy and the MAC should undertake to consider this question. The Ambassador pointed out that Riley had expressed a lack of satisfaction with Israel’s compliance regarding the return of Arabs to the Demilitarized Zone and the policing regulations in the Zone. Israel desired to solve all the practical problems relating to the Demilitarized Zone. There were certain differences of juridical theory with regard to sovereignty in the area, but Israel would undertake to discuss this matter with Riley. The Ambassador had therefore written Riley a letter2 on this subject on the instructions of the Israel Foreign Office. While Israel was perfectly willing to continue to deal with Riley here in the US, they would much prefer to negotiate with him in Israel. Without Riley’s presence there it was very difficult to carry on negotiations. The Israel government had sent the Syrians a letter dated July 10 which it was understood only reached Syria last week. The Israelis considered, therefore, that only Riley had the necessary prestige to take up the issues on the spot.
I told the Ambassador that we were concerned with the slowness of Israel’s compliance but were not in a position to judge the facts, and would therefore await General Riley’s report. I expressed the hope that Israel would accept the advice of Riley and other UN authorities in the Commission and not try to rely on its own unilateral interpretations of the Armistice Agreement. Such attitude might prejudice Israel’s chances on other issues on which Israel wants compliance, including the Suez question. The Ambassador said that Israel wished to comply, but did not wish to prejudice its legitimate interest in the Demilitarized Zone. I repeated that we would rely completely on General Riley in this matter, and told the Ambassador his problem was with the General, who, we hoped, would soon return to the field of operations.
3. Suez: The Ambassador then took up the question of the Suez and went over the points which he had reiterated on several previous occasions, concluding that it was clear to Israel that the SC should go forward immediately, since it was difficult to assume that Egypt would undertake any alleviation of Suez Canal restrictions without the [Page 823] adoption of an SC resolution. The Ambassador expressed reasonable certainty that Egypt would comply with a resolution. I mentioned the fact that compliance with the resolution was not always a positive matter, but sometimes negative as the Ambassador knew. The Ambassador merely replied that he hoped that if it were possible to straighten out this question with regard to the existence of a state of war, it might then be possible to negotiate with the Egyptians on other questions. The Ambassador was informed that the French, British and the US were finalizing a joint resolution on Suez today, and it was hoped it would be possible to show that resolution to Israel and other delegations today. We could not say, however, whether the resolution would be tabled on Thursday.